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It was as true as taxes is.
And nothing’s truer than them.
Mr. Barkis in ‘David Copperfield’ (Charles Dickens)
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Corporate income tax rates have fallen tremendously over the last 25 years in
virtually all developed countries. Figure 1.1 makes this point, contrasting the
corporate income tax rates in 1982 with the tax rates in 2004.
Figure 1.1: Corporate Income Tax Rates, 1982 and 2004
01020304050
6070(in percent) 19822008
Notes: The figure shows top statutory corporate income tax rates in 1982 and 2008.
Sources: Devereux (2006) and IBFD (2008).
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Especially European countries have decreased their corporate tax rates over
the last decade. Interestingly, the EU accession countries have consistently
lower rates than the established EU members. Figure 1.2 shows the ranking
of tax rates within Europe in 2008 (where light grey bars identify accession
countries).
Figure 1.2: Ordering of Corporate Income Tax Rates, 2008
0510152025
303540(in percent)
Notes: The figure shows top statutory corporate income tax rates in 2008. Source:
IBFD (2008).
This may reflect a stronger need of less mature economies to attract foreign
capital. The common decrease in corporate income tax rate does not seem to
be purely coincidental. Devereux et al. (2008) have recently shown that coun-
tries do compete with one another for capital investment. As a response to
other countries’ moves, governments drive their corporate income tax rates
to lower levels. This process has often been coined a “race to the bottom”,
the possibility of which was first spelled out in the analytical contribution of
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). Whether such tax competition is desirable
or not ultimately depends on one’s view of the nature of government. If one
believes government to be a “Leviathan”, whose main goal is to collect as
much tax revenue from its citizens as possible, then tax competition is desir-
able as it constrains the beast. If one believes government to be benevolent
in nature, then tax competition depresses tax rates to inefficiently low levels,
leading to an insufficient supply of public goods.
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Whatever view on government one may take, the race to the bottom is a
more acute issue today than it was, say, 20 years ago. The best explanation
for this phenomenon is the increase in capital mobility which makes invest-
ment more sensitive to changes in taxes, in turn intensifying the potential to
compete for tax base (i.e., investment) via tax policy. The world has indeed
become a much smaller place for capital investment as the following figures
show. Trade volume is often used as an indicator of the speed at which the
global economy integrates. Between 1999 and 2006 the global international
trade volume increased by 63 percent (World Bank, 2007). Compared to the
increase in gross capital flows which have tripled in the same period of time
(IMF, 2008, Table 1), that is still timid growth.1 Foreign direct investment (FDI)
is of special interest because it can facilitate the transfer of technology, which
may boost economic growth. In 2006, FDI inflows worldwide amounted to
1.3 trillion US dollars; the global stock of FDI is about 12 trillion US dollars,
equivalent to 25 percent of world gross domestic product (UNCTAD, 2007,
Tables B.1 and B.2).
Not surprisingly, many researchers have found FDI to be quite sensitive to
corporate income tax rates. De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) find in their com-
prehensive meta-study a median tax rate elasticity of about -3.3. Hence, a
one percentage point reduction in the host country tax rate raises foreign di-
rect investment in that country by 3.3 percent. The large proportion of re-
search about the sensitivity of FDI to taxes led Gordon and Hines (2002) to
suggest that research has been “too greatly focused on an earlier question —
do tax policies influence FDI? — and not enough on more subtle variants”.
For instance, many observers associate the term FDI mainly with greenfield
investment, having firms in mind that build production facilities from scratch.
However, one of the main components of FDI in industrialized countries are
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As).2
1Growth figures by themselves could be misleading. Therefore, this footnote reports trade
and capital flows relative to GDP. In 2006, world exports were 27 percent of world GDP, of
which the latter summed up to 48.24 trillion US dollars at nominal exchange rates (World
Bank, 2007). The capital inflows in the Global Financial Stability Report (IMF, 2008, Table 1)
add up to about 14 percent of world GDP, although these figures exclude cross-border flows
taking place within the Euro area.
2Strictly speaking, cross-border M&As are not a subset of FDI. The value of M&As result-
ing in an acquisition abroad is counted as outward FDI of the acquiring country to the extent
that the acquiring firm finances the transaction in its home financial market. The United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (2000, p. 10) discusses the differences between
cross-border M&A and FDI data, and it concludes that the data suggest that M&As have con-
tributed an increasing share of FDI flows to developed and developing countries alike.
4 INTRODUCTION
By means of cross-border M&As, industries restructure themselves on an in-
ternational level; new multinationals are formed and expand to new markets
by acquiring local companies or other multinationals.3 Little evidence exists
on how corporate taxes affect this process of industrial reorganization and
hence the organizational structure of multinationals themselves.4 Desai and
Hines (2002) have examined the role of taxation in 26 cases of so-called inver-
sions of US multinationals in the 1982–2002 period. In these transactions, the
international corporate structure is inverted in the sense that the US parent
becomes a subsidiary and the earlier foreign subsidiary becomes the parent
firm. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation extend this line of research.
The basic insight is that the incentives described by Desai and Hines (2002)
apply more generally than just to corporate inversions. The consideration
where to best locate a multinational’s headquarter should play a role when-
ever firms from different countries merge. When a cross-border corporate
takeover materializes, the organizational structure of the resulting multina-
tional firm can be designed from scratch as the merging corporate entities
were previously unrelated. Therefore, cross-border M&As offer a unique op-
portunity to study the impact of international taxation on the parent-subsid-
iary structure of multinational firms. The following three chapters consider
cross-border M&As involving any two countries among a set of European
countries, Japan and the United States in the 1985 – 2004 period. Chapter 2
presents extensive information on all these countries’ tax systems and particu-
larly on their taxation of foreign-source dividend income received by resident
multinational firms. Chapters 3 and 4 empirically show that the international
tax system does indeed systematically affect the organizational structure fol-
lowing international M&As.
For each cross-border takeover, Chapter 3 constructs two rates of interna-
tional double taxation for the two possible outcomes regarding which of the
two affected firms becomes the parent firm (rather than a foreign subsidiary).
These double tax rates can be used to calculate international double tax lia-
bilities incurred by the newly created multinational firm in the two possible
scenarios as to parent-firm location. It is found that international double tax li-
abilities in the realized parent-subsidiary scenario are substantially lower than
in the counterfactual case where the structure is inverted. Specifically, the
3In 2006, there were 6974 reported cross-border M&As valued at 880 billion US dollar
(UNCTAD, 2007, Tables B.4 and B.5).
4The effect of taxes on the financial structure of multinationals is another issue. See, for
example, Huizinga et al. (2008).
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international double tax liability is calculated to be 0.62 percent of the com-
bined firm’s worldwide pre-tax income in the actual parent-subsidiary out-
come, whereas it would be 2.11 percent of worldwide income in the alterna-
tive case. Furthermore, the impact of double taxation on the parent-subsidiary
decision is estimated by means of a logit binary choice model. The results
show that international double taxation has a highly significant impact on the
parent-subsidiary structure.
Chapter 4 re-enforces the findings of Chapter 3. Instead of analyzing the
direction of individual cross-border M&As, Chapter 4 takes an aggregate per-
spective. Specifically, it considers how international double taxation affects
parent firm location at a bilateral, national level. To this end, a gravity model
is used to explain the aggregate number of M&As between two countries. This
approach captures that international double taxation may not only affect the
direction of M&As but that it may also affect the total number of M&As. The
chapter reports a semi-elasticity of the number of M&As generating a parent
firm in a country with respect to the double tax rate of -1.7. Based on 2004
M&A data, this suggests that a one percentage point increase in the double
tax rate facing US parent firms would decrease international acquisitions by
US firms by 1.9 billion US dollars.
Chapters 3 and 4 are in line with evidence from the literature, which shows
that countries find it increasingly difficult to tax the return on capital or eco-
nomic profits at the corporate level as corporations become more mobile and
multinational.5 Taxes can be avoided by relocating activities — really or vir-
tually — to low-tax environments.6 Barriers to capital flows have decreased
significantly over the last decades, especially within the European Union.
So which options does a country have left to finance the provision of public
goods and achieve redistributive goals? Countries could give up taxing cap-
ital altogether admitting that it is more mobile than labor. In most countries,
however, capital is mainly held by the richest 10 percent of the population,
whereas the poorest deciles are debtors. Hence, only taxing labor and not
capital would go against any redistributive policy. Just as importantly, any
economic profits, which are indistinguishable from capital income in standard
5The accounting profits in firms’ financial reports contain the return to (equity) capital as
well as economic profits, which are the profits that remain once all factors of production have
been remunerated.
6An example for virtual relocation is profit shifting through manipulation of transfer
prices. See Bartelsman and Beetsma (2003) and Huizinga and Laeven (2008).
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accounting and are hence taxed at the same rate, would go untaxed as well.7
This is undesirable because taxing economic profits is normally less distortive
than other taxes.8
Governments could switch from taxing income to taxing consumption. This
trend can be observed in several industrialized countries already. Germany,
for example, increased its value-added tax (VAT) rate from 16 to 19 percent
in 2007 while at the same time reducing wage-related social security con-
tributions. Furthermore, it reduced corporate income tax rates in 2008. Of
course, politicians never suggest any link between increasing VAT rates and
decreasing corporate income tax rates as it is very unpopular with the elec-
torate. However, it is difficult to design and implement progressive consump-
tion taxes.9 Thus, redistribution would have to be achieved via government
spending and not through taxation. This would increase the total tax revenue
that governments have to raise to accomplish the same relative redistributive
goal.10 Furthermore, some harmonization of consumption taxes may be nec-
essary to prevent cross-border shopping (see Nielsen, 2001, or Kanbur and
Keen, 1993).
Finally, capital income could be taxed on a residence basis at the individual
level instead of taxing it at the corporate level at source. Rather than taxing
the entities that employ capital, one could tax the ultimate individual owners
of capital. This approach has the appeal that the incidence of capital income
taxes is much more transparent than for corporate income taxes. As a matter
of fact, most countries have capital income taxes and/or capital gains taxes
at the individual level in place. However, the residence principle involves an
enforcement problem. A country on its own only has access to information
about its residents’ capital income at home. In order to tax capital income
derived abroad, the home tax authority must rely on its residents’ honesty
in reporting international capital income or on foreign tax authorities sharing
7Easily observable economic profits as, for example, in the oil industry are sometimes
taxed at a higher rate than general corporations. Windfall profit taxes may even be im-
posed with hindsight. Italy just recently introduced a windfall profit tax on oil companies,
the United Kingdom imposed windfall profit taxes on oil companies in 1997 (Betts, 2008).
8In theory, taxing fixed factors of production, such as land, does not give rise to distortions.
9Tait (1989, 1991) argues that consumption taxes are generally regressive and therefore not
suitable candidates for redistributive purposes.
10For example, if a government can only impose non-discriminatory lump-sum taxes in-
stead of progressive taxes, more tax-revenue would have to be raised to reduce some mea-
sure of inequality because the receivers of transfers first have to be compensated for paying
the lump-sum tax.
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information on capital income. Without information exchange between tax
authorities, the likelihood of fraudulent tax declaration is all too evident.
It does not seem to be in a country’s self-interest to share information be-
cause it deters tax-evading foreign investors that prefer secretive places to lo-
cate their capital. The literature has developed theories that explain why two
countries may nevertheless exchange information on capital income. In most
models, countries interact with each other repeatedly, which facilitates infor-
mation sharing.11 In the long run, cooperation yields a higher pay-off than
opting for the short-run gains of non-cooperation. The theories are optimistic
in the sense that under reasonable circumstances information exchange is fea-
sible.12 The OECD (1998, 2002) seems to share that point of view as it em-
braces information exchange as the means to fight international tax evasion
and create a ‘level playing field’ for jurisdictions competing with each other
for investment.13 However, the theories on the adaption and the intensity of
information exchange have never been tested.
Therefore, Chapter 5 provides an empirical analysis of information sharing
between tax authorities. Employing a unique panel data set on tax informa-
tion sharing for the Netherlands from 1992 to 2005, I use various econometric
models to investigate whether the factors put forward in the literature play a
role in determining the intensity of bilateral information sharing.
The econometric evidence on the determinants of information exchange gen-
erally supports the existing theory. Countries with high tax rates are more
interested in information exchange because their citizens’ incentive for tax
evasion is stronger. Next, a larger need for public funds fosters information
exchange because it shifts the governments’ interest from allowing citizens to
maximize their private income to protecting the tax base. Countries whose cit-
izens have invested a larger share of their capital abroad are also more prone
to share information. The high mobility of their citizens’ funds forces them to
cooperate with other countries. There is one determinant where empirical ev-
idence and theoretical predictions diverge; non-resident withholding tax rates
on capital income do not seem to be related to the degree of information ex-
11See, for example, Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) or Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000).
12More specifically, information exchange is feasible if the countries’ discount rates and
preferences for public goods are sufficiently high and the profitability of hosting deposits and
country size asymmetries are sufficiently small.
13Information exchange does not address the issue of tax avoidance because by definition
tax avoiding agents — by contrast to tax evading agents — abide (at least formally) by the ex-
isting laws and regulations. Hence, complete transparency across countries would not change
the degree of tax avoidance.
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change. According to theory, countries should exchange less information if
they have high non-resident withholding taxes. Intuitively, withholding taxes
raise revenues from foreign investors, which would be deterred by informa-
tion sharing. The disparity between the existing theory and the empirical
evidence can most probably be attributed to the two-country framework on
which models of information exchange have been based. With only two coun-
tries, a withholding tax can be used to raise revenue and act as a sort of user fee
for tax evasion services because citizens from the other country have only one
foreign country to deposit their funds in. The two countries are monopolist
suppliers of tax-free deposits for the other countries’ citizens. The presence
of many countries competing for tax evading foreign investors may explain
the missing link between withholding taxes and information exchange; low
withholding taxes become a necessity to attract any foreign funds.
Chapter 6 addresses the issue of cooperation on information sharing among
more than two countries. As mentioned before, predictions based on two-
country models may be overly optimistic about the circumstances under which
information exchange may develop. In fact, the European Union experienced
how difficult it is to enact information sharing among a large group of coun-
tries. It took the EU several decades from the first proposal of concerted in-
formation exchange to arrive at an effective treaty network on information
exchange that includes all European jurisdictions and their overseas depen-
dencies. And still, the existing agreement has only entered into force because
some jurisdictions were allowed to opt out of information exchange and resort
to a relatively high withholding tax rate that should have the same deterring
effect on tax evaders as information exchange. The game-theoretic model in
Chapter 6 may explain why the EU Savings Tax Directive has become feasible
now although it proved impossible a couple of years ago.
In essence, a country opting not to share any information while other coun-
tries do implies free-riding. The profitability of opting out actually increases
in the number of countries exchanging information. There are two — con-
ceptually opposite — sets of circumstances that inhibit such free-riding. First,
the payoffs of cooperation may be so large that sharing information is even
more attractive than being the only free-riding tax haven. Or, alternatively,
complete cooperation is enforced by a credible threat of all other countries to
the would-be tax haven that one country opting out of information sharing
causes all countries to stop exchanging information. In between these two
extremes, a range of circumstances exists under which free-riding tax havens
and information-sharing countries can coexist. On the one hand, it is more
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attractive for a few countries to free-ride than to join the group of cooperating
countries. On the other hand, the group of cooperating countries is also bet-
ter off by sharing information even in the presence of free-riders than if there
were no cooperation. Which of these three scenarios prevails depends on pa-
rameters such as the degree of capital mobility or the size of banking profits
from hosting capital, which is linked to the amount of capital invested. Ex-
tremely mobile or immobile capital would provide an environment suitable
to complete cooperation as explained in the former two scenarios. Moder-
ate capital mobility would foster a co-existence of tax havens and information
sharing countries. Hence, the EU Savings Tax Directive having become feasi-
ble can be explained by an increased degree of capital mobility due to the rise
of electronic banking, non-cash payment methods, a reduction of cross-border
transaction costs and freedom of movement across most European countries.
Explicitly stating the incentives at work helps pointing out the importance of
institutional features in the genesis of the EU Savings Tax Directive. The EU
initiative on information exchange actually has to rely on an entire network
of bilateral and multilateral treaties on information exchange. A “green light
provision” in these treaties ensured that all treaties became effective at the
same time — or none would have become effective. This provision ensured
that the threat of no cooperation whatsoever was credible until all designated
participating countries had taken the necessary legal steps. Otherwise, a coun-
try might have been tempted to opt out at the last moment as other countries
had already entered into information sharing treaties.
Another important feature of the EU initiative is the multilateral approach.
According to the model in Chapter 6, the degree of cooperation among coun-
tries is not predetermined in many circumstances. Several outcomes are pos-
sible. Multilateral negotiations about information exchange ensure a higher
degree of cooperation than if countries are left to negotiate bilateral treaties
on information exchange. The multilateral approach makes all countries bet-
ter off.
This Ph.D. dissertation investigates issues related to taxing mobile capital in
a multi-jurisdictional world. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 show that the headquarter
locations of multinationals and cross-border merger patterns respond to dif-
ferences between countries’ tax regimes in taxing cross-border income. Parent
firms tend to be located in the more tax-advantageous environment. The next
question is how large the benefits of hosting headquarters are and if coun-
tries actually compete with each other for headquarters. As taxing corporate
income at source becomes more competitive, resulting in sub-optimal rates,
10 INTRODUCTION
one alternative is to rely more on capital income taxation on a residence basis.
Chapters 5 and 6 explore the incentives to share information between coun-
tries which is necessary for residence based taxation.
The issues discussed here will become more acute with progressive eco-
nomic integration. Some countries have considered fiscal policy an area where
national sovereignty should prevail over international coordination efforts to
ensure an efficient provision of public goods. Lately, this stance may have lost
some support. The United Kingdom — having seen the headquarters of Shire
and United Business Media relocate to Ireland in April 2008 — is currently
experiencing the constraints that the presence of an attractive next door tax
location imposes on the design of its own tax system. At the same time, Sum-
mers (2008) encourages the United States “to take the lead in promoting global
co-operation in the international tax arena”. He observes that globalization
has contributed to widening the income gap between rich and poor people.
Public opinion therefore fancies protective measures that would try to reverse
economic integration. Instead of giving up the gains of free trade or capital
mobility, Summers suggests to increase international cooperation in tax and
regulatory issues. This would give countries sufficient sovereignty — in the
form of progressive income taxation, taxation of capital income, redistribu-
tion and setting of labor standards — to allow larger parts of the population
to enjoy the gains of globalization.14 In the end, normative views about the
nature of government seem to determine whether people prefer government
restraining tax competition or international fiscal cooperation. In the former
case, they tend to consider government to be a Leviathan which is only inter-
ested in maximizing the benefits for governing politicians and bureaucrats. In
the latter case, they tend to consider government to be benevolent.
14However, Kapur, Mehta and Subramanian (2008) have responded that they consider Sum-
mers’ call for more international cooperation and standard setting an example of nationalism.
They argue that capital mobility is applauded if it serves US interests but is not welcomed if
it is in favor of, for example, developing countries. In their own words: “Having swallowed
those bitter pills of intellectual property protection and capital mobility as a necessary price
for a better future, developing countries are now told that those medicines cause problems
that need more — in this case protectionist — medication.”
And it came to pass in those days, that there
went out a decree from Caesar Augustus,
that all the world should be taxed.
St. Luke ch. 2, v. 1
CHAPTER 2
THE INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INCOME TAX
SYSTEM1
This chapter describes how foreign profits of multinationals are taxed condi-
tional on the location of the multinational’s parent firm. Knowing how profit
repatriations may be subject to double taxation will facilitate reading Chap-
ters 3 and 4. These Chapters describe how the firms’ incentive to avoid double
taxation causes certain patterns in cross-border M&As; multinationals’ parent
firms tend to be located in a country with a favorable tax treatment of cross-
border income.2
2.1 Taxation of Foreign Subsidiaries’ Profits
If two firms from different countries merge into a single multinational firm,
they have to choose one of the two countries as the country where the parent
firm resides. Let this country be denoted by i, whereas the other country is
denoted by j. In addition, the multinational has to decide whether to operate
1This chapter is based on Huizinga and Voget (2006) and Huizinga and Voget (forthcom-
ing).
2The taxation of cross-border corporate income is illustrated by describing the situation in
2004, the last year of the sample. The empirical analysis employs data covering the complete
sampling period from 1985 until 2004.
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a foreign subsidiary or a branch in country j.3 Both of these aspects of the
multinational’s organizational structure potentially have tax consequences.
As a main principle, the parent country has the right to tax the multinational’s
overall income on a worldwide basis. In practice, however, some countries
only tax a multinational’s domestically generated income on a territorial basis.
The selection of the parent country thus affects whether the multinational’s in-
come generated outside the parent country is potentially subject to additional
taxation by the parent country. The choice between a foreign subsidiary or a
foreign branch structure matters as well, as some parent countries tax foreign-
source income in the form of dividends received from foreign subsidiaries dif-
ferently from foreign active business income generated by foreign branches.
In practice, most foreign establishments take the form of a subsidiary. There-
fore, this section focuses on the international taxation applied to foreign div-
idend income. In the following section, I discuss how international flows of
active business income may be taxed differently.
Income generated in subsidiary country j is first taxed in that country at a
corporate tax rate τj, leaving a share 1− τj of this income to be reinvested or
repatriated to the parent firm in the form of dividends. Table 2.1 provides
information on top corporate income tax rates for a sample of European coun-
tries, Japan and the United States in 2004. These tax rates include representa-
tive subnational state and city taxes.4 The subsidiary country j, in addition,
may apply a non-resident dividend withholding tax to dividends repatriated
to country i at a rate ωij. Information on bilateral dividend withholding taxes
for the 30 countries in the sample is provided in Table 2.2. These withholding
taxes are zero in case of long-standing EU member states on account of the
EU’s parent-subsidiary directive, which went into effect on January 1, 1992.5
Overall, the subsidiary country taxes the multinational’s local income to be
paid out as dividends at a rate τj + (1− τj)ωij.
Parent country i potentially taxes the foreign dividend income at a corporate
tax rate τi. Let τdoubleij be the resulting rate of double taxation defined as the tax
rate to be paid by the multinational firm on income from country j in excess
of the corporate income tax τj in subsidiary country j. This double tax rate
depends on whether the multinational firm can defer parent country taxation
3A subsidiary is an independent legal entity owned by a parent firm, whereas a branch
forms part of the parent firm’s entity itself.
4Special rates applied to listed firms in Greece until 2000 and to manufacturing firms in
Ireland until 2002.
5See Council of the European Communities (1990).
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until repatriation of profits and on whether, at the time of taxation, the par-
ent country provides any double tax relief from taxes paid in the subsidiary
country. In the absence of any deferral and double tax relief, the double tax
rate τdoubleij equals τi + (1− τj)ωij, reflecting both the parent country corporate
income tax and the subsidiary country withholding tax.
In practice, most countries provide some form of international double tax
relief. Some countries, for example the Netherlands, operate a territorial or
source-based tax system, and effectively exempt foreign-source income from
taxation. In this instance, the double tax rate τdoubleij is given by (1− τj)ωij in
the absence of deferral of parent country taxation. Alternatively, the parent
country operates a worldwide or residence-based tax system. In this instance,
the parent country taxes the worldwide income of its resident multinationals,
but it may provide double tax relief in the form of a foreign tax credit for
taxes already paid in subsidiary country j. The OECD model tax convention
on income and capital, which provides a model framework of recommended
practice, gives countries the option between an exemption and a foreign tax
credit as the only two ways to relieve double taxation.6
The foreign tax credit reduces domestic taxes on foreign source income one-
for-one with the taxes already paid abroad. A foreign tax credit can be indirect
in the sense that it applies to both the underlying corporate income tax and
the dividend withholding tax. Alternatively, the foreign tax is said to be direct
and it applies only to the withholding tax. In either case, foreign tax credits
in practice are limited to prevent the domestic tax liability on foreign source
income from becoming negative. With an indirect foreign tax credit provided,
the multinational pays no tax in the parent country on account of the foreign
tax credit limitation if τj + (1− τj)ωij ≥ τi. The double tax rate τdoubleij then
only reflects the withholding tax in the subsidiary country. Similarly with a
direct foreign tax credit provided, the multinational pays no tax in the parent
country due to the foreign tax credit limit if ωij ≥ τi. A few countries with
worldwide taxation do not provide foreign tax credits, but instead allow for-
eign taxes to be deducted from the multinational’s taxable income. For the
various double tax relief conventions, Table 2.3 summarizes analytical expres-
sions for the double tax rate τdoubleij that, in the case of a foreign tax credit,
depend on whether the foreign tax credit limitation is binding.
Countries tend to vary their method of double tax relief, that is, through
an exemption, credit or deduction, based on whether they have concluded
6See OECD (2005) for the most recent version of the model tax convention. The convention
serves as a model for bilateral double tax treaties.
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a tax treaty with the other country.7 Columns (2) and (3) of Table 2.1 show
which double tax relief method countries apply to treaty signatory and non-
signatory countries. The exemption method is seen to be the most common
method of double tax relief on dividend income from foreign countries with
and without a tax treaty, followed by foreign tax credits. Several countries,
including Finland and Spain, exempt dividend income from a treaty country,
while they apply a foreign tax credit to dividend income from a non-treaty
country. In these instances, the existence of a tax treaty makes the method
of double tax relief more generous. Among the European countries, most
countries have concluded bilateral tax treaties, even if some Eastern European
countries are still in the process of completing their treaty networks as seen in
Table 2.4, which indicates whether there is a tax treaty in force between any
two countries. Based on this information, I can represent the pattern of double
tax relief granted bilaterally in Table 2.5.
The sample consists of 30 countries. Thus, for each country I can calculate
29 double tax rates for dividends received (for outward FDI) and dividends
paid (for inward FDI) using the statutory information on corporate tax rates,
dividend withholding taxes and international double tax relief conventions.
These double tax rates per country provide information on whether a coun-
try can serve as a tax-advantaged location for parent firms (with low double
taxation of dividends received) and a tax-advantaged location for subsidiary
firms (with low double taxation of dividends paid out). Table 2.6 ranks the
30 countries on the basis of the average double taxation of dividends received
τdoublei , while it also provides information on the average double taxation of
dividends paid out τdoublej . These average double tax rates are equal-weighted
across the 29 partner countries.
At the top of Table 2.6, one can see that the Netherlands has an average dou-
ble tax rate of dividends received of only 1.3 percent. The Netherlands has a
territorial tax system so that this 1.3 percent is wholly due to non-resident div-
idend withholding taxes levied by subsidiary countries. Other countries at the
top of the table, in particular Denmark, Finland and Sweden, similarly have a
7Note that the method of double tax relief for dividends is not determined by the tax treaty
itself, but in the domestic code of the dividend receiving country (although the domestic
provisions are frequently conditional on the existence of a double tax treaty). Double tax
treaties generally only regulate cross-border cases of juridical double taxation (i.e., taxing
the same juridical entity for the same income twice). However, taxing parent companies for
dividend income is not a case of juridical double taxation — only a case of economic double
taxation (i.e., taxing the same economic activity twice). See Helminen (1999), Couzin (2002),
Rohatgi (2002) and Helminen (2005) for more on this subject.
CHAPTER 2 15
territorial tax system. An interesting case is Ireland that also has a rather low
average double tax on incoming dividends despite its system of worldwide
taxation with foreign tax credits. Ireland had a low corporate income tax rate
of 12.5 percent in 2004, which implies this country de facto exempted most
foreign-source income.8 Japan and the United States also apply worldwide
taxation with foreign tax credits, but these countries have relatively high cor-
porate tax rates. This explains these countries’ positions at or near the bottom
of the table. On tax grounds, Japan and the United States thus are not good
residences for the parent companies of multinational firms. From the table,
one can see that the average rates of double taxation of incoming and outgo-
ing dividends bear little relationship to each other. To illustrate, Greece and
the United States are well placed to host foreign subsidiaries, even if their tax
systems do not favor parent location.
Multinationals generally are able to defer parent country taxes in case their
foreign-source income is not immediately repatriated.9 Some countries, how-
ever, deny the deferral of parent country taxation under certain conditions,
even in the case where foreign-source income is not repatriated. For these
countries, the conditions under which deferral is not available are summa-
rized in Table 2.7. As seen in the table, for each country one or more sets of
several conditions are listed. Non-deferral applies if all of the conditions in a
particular set of conditions are satisfied. In the case of Japan, for instance, a
Japanese parent firm with more than a 5 percent ownership of a foreign sub-
sidiary cannot obtain deferral if the foreign tax rate is less than 25 percent and
the foreign-source income is mainly passive.
2.2 Taxation of Foreign Branch Profits
Double tax relief conventions applied to foreign branch income are agreed in
bilateral tax treaties.10 Many countries apply the same method of double tax
relief in all their tax treaties. The first column in Table 2.8 reports the pre-
8See Table 2.1 for corporate income tax rates.
9As described by Gordon and Hines (2002), there exist additional methods of tax avoidance
such as debt shifting, transfer price manipulation and the relocation of intangible assets. In
any case, even relocated profits have to be repatriated to the parent country before being
paid out to shareholders, and parent country taxation, if worldwide, will apply eventually.
Furthermore, these methods of tax avoidance generally incur some costs, which implies that
the burden of international double taxation cannot be fully avoided.
10A minority of tax treaties is not bilateral but multilateral such as the consequent Nordic
tax treaties between Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden and also the older tax
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ferred method of double tax relief if this method has consistently been chosen
in all new tax treaties since the year 2000. In case of inconsistencies across
tax treaties, there is no preferred convention provided. The method of double
tax relief that is unilaterally applied in the absence of a tax treaty is listed in
the second column of Table 2.8. Compared to Table 2.1 regarding the double
taxation of dividend income, there are two main differences. First, more coun-
tries change their method of double tax relief for foreign branch income if a
tax treaty is in place. Second, foreign tax credits rather than exemptions are
the favorite method of double tax relief in the case of foreign branch income
in the absence of a tax treaty. Only several ’core’ European countries (i.e.,
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, Netherlands and
Switzerland) apply the exemption regime. Other European countries, Japan
and the United States prefer tax credits. The method of double tax relief for
international branch income on a bilateral basis is provided in Table 2.9.
Analogous to Table 2.6, Table 2.10 ranks countries with respect to average
double tax rates on foreign branch income in 2004. Countries exempting ac-
tive income from foreign source tend to appear at the top of the table, while
countries with high corporate income tax rates applying a foreign tax credit
system are ranked at the bottom. Some countries, such as Italy and Spain, are
ranked much lower in the case of branch income than in the case of dividend
income. Both countries regularly exempt foreign-source dividends, whereas
they only give foreign tax credits for branch income. Other countries, such as
Belgium, France and Germany, advance in the ranking because they fully ex-
empt foreign branch income — in contrast to foreign-source dividends, which
are not fully exempted.
The last column in Table 2.10 reports the average double tax rate applied to
outgoing branch income in 2004. When comparing the two average double
tax rates for incoming and outgoing branch income, one can see again that
there is no strong covariation between the two. The case of Japan illustrates
this. The country imposes the highest average double taxation on incoming
branch income of all countries in the table at 15.8 percent, while the average
double taxation of outgoing branch income is among the lowest rates at 0.0
percent in the table.
treaty COMECO between several members of the Warsaw pact from 1977.
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2.3 Conclusion
The previous two sections describe that — in the absence of any non-tax fac-
tors — multinationals have an incentive to locate their parent firms in coun-
tries that impose no or low double taxes on international profits. The pattern
of cross-border M&As should reflect such a tax incentive because M&As are
one of the means for international industrial reorganization and the formation
of multinationals. In the presence of non-tax factors, it is an empirical matter
if the tax incentives are still clear and present or if the more critical view of
Markusen (1995) applies, that any effect of taxes on FDI will be dominated by
other factors. The following two chapters empirically investigate whether or
not tax incentives affect the direction and volume of cross-border M&As.
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Table 2.1: Tax rates and tax regimes across countries in 2004
Country of Tax Dividend taxation
residence rate With tax Without
treaty tax treaty
(1) (2) (3)
Austria 34.0 Exemption Exemption
Belgium 34.0 Exemptiona Exemptiona
Bulgaria 19.5 Credit Creditb
Croatia 20.0 Exemption Exemption
Czech Republic 28.0 Credit Deduction
Denmark 30.0 Exemption Exemption
Estonia 0.0 Credit Credit
Finland 29.0 Exemption Creditb
France 35.4 Exemptiona Exemptiona
Germany 38.3 Exemptiona Exemptiona
Greece 35.0 Credit Credit
Hungary 17.7 Exemption Exemption
Iceland 18.0 Exemption Exemption
Ireland 12.5 Credit Credit
Italy 37.3 Exemptiona Exemptiona
Japan 42.0 Credit Credit
Latvia 15.0 Exemption Exemption
Lithuania 15.0 Exemption Exemption
Luxembourg 30.4 Exemption Exemption
Netherlands 34.5 Exemption Exemption
Norway 28.0 Exemption Exemption
Poland 19.0 Credit Credit
Portugal 27.5 Exemptionc Exemptionc
Romania 25.0 Credit Credit
Slovak Republic 19.0 Exemption Exemption
Spain 35.0 Exemption Credit
Sweden 28.0 Exemption Exemption
Switzerland 24.0 Exemption Exemption
United Kingdom 30.0 Credit Credit
United States 40.0 Credit Credit
Average 26.7
Notes: The first column lists top corporate income tax rates including representative state and municipal taxes where
applicable with respect to retained earnings. The second column lists the countries’ method of tax relief that applies
to dividend income in the presence of a tax treaty. The last column provides the same information in the absence of
a tax treaty. The parent firm is assumed to hold a majority in the dividend-paying subsidiary so that participation
exemptions take effect.
Footnotes: a: Only 95 percent of the dividend is exempted. b: Only withholding taxes are credited but not the
underlying corporate income tax. c: Only dividend income from EU sources is exempted. Other dividend income is







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































20 THE INTERNATIONAL TAX SYSTEM
Table 2.3: Analytical expressions for the double tax rate τdoubleij
Form of double tax relief Condition Double tax rate τdoubleij
None τi + (1− τj)ωij
Indirect foreign tax credit τj + (1− τj)ωij ≥ τi (1− τj)ωij
τj + (1− τj)ωij < τi τi − τj
Direct foreign tax credit ωij ≥ τi (1− τj)ωij






Notes: τi is the corporate income tax rate in parent country i; τj is the corporate income tax
rate in subsidiary country j; and ωij is the withholding tax rate for dividends repatriated from
a subsidiary in country j to a parent firm in country i. In case of a direct foreign tax credit,
foreign corporate income taxes are taken to be deductible expenses against taxable corporate










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.6: Country ranking of double tax rates on dividends in 2004
Country Dividends received Dividends paid
τ̄doublei Corei Whti τ̄
double
j Corej Whtj
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Netherlands 1.3 0.0 1.3 1.3 0.6 0.9
Sweden 1.7 0.0 1.7 1.4 1.4 0.0
Finland 1.8 0.0 1.8 4.4 1.2 3.5
Denmark 2.1 0.0 2.1 2.9 1.1 1.8
Ireland 2.3 0.4 2.3 5.6 5.0 0.6
Luxembourg 2.8 0.0 2.8 1.0 1.0 0.0
Austria 2.9 0.0 2.9 4.1 0.6 3.8
France 3.0 1.3 1.7 2.0 0.5 1.7
Switzerland 3.0 0.0 3.0 5.8 2.8 4.1
Norway 3.3 0.0 3.3 4.1 2.0 2.6
Belgium 3.8 1.3 2.5 3.1 0.6 2.7
Italy 3.8 0.6 3.4 4.2 0.4 4.1
Germany 3.9 1.4 2.5 2.1 0.3 2.0
Spain 4.0 2.4 3.2 3.2 0.5 3.0
Croatia 4.5 0.0 4.5 8.1 4.2 6.1
Poland 4.5 1.2 4.1 6.9 3.2 5.1
Estonia 4.6 0.0 4.6 18.6 10.1 14.7
Lithuania 4.9 0.0 4.9 8.2 4.7 5.3
Hungary 5.2 0.0 5.2 9.1 3.5 6.8
Iceland 5.5 0.0 5.5 8.5 4.7 6.1
Slovak Republic 5.6 0.0 5.6 3.2 3.2 0.0
Latvia 5.9 0.0 5.9 9.0 5.4 5.7
United Kingdom 6.0 5.7 2.4 1.1 1.1 0.0
Romania 6.4 3.3 5.4 7.9 2.6 6.7
Bulgaria 6.9 3.1 5.5 9.1 3.8 7.4
Czech Republic 7.2 4.5 4.6 5.6 1.4 5.0
Portugal 7.8 5.5 4.2 5.7 1.4 4.9
Greece 9.8 9.2 4.4 0.5 0.5 0.0
United States 14.1 13.8 3.8 1.2 1.2 0.0
Japan 16.2 15.8 6.1 6.9 0.7 6.6
Average 5.2 2.3 3.7 5.2 2.3 3.7
Notes: The table is ordered in an ascending manner with respect to the average double tax rate τ̄doublei in the first
column that applies to foreign source dividend income repatriated to the country of residence listed on the left
on January 1, 2004. Averages are taken across all potential source countries in the sample. Rates are reported in
percentage points. Participation exemptions are taken into account in calculating the tax rates. The second and
third columns report two components of the double tax. Corei is the average double tax rate if withholding taxes are
neglected. Whti is the average double tax rate if withholding taxes were the only source of double taxation (equivalent
to all countries exempting foreign source income from taxation). Note that double tax relief for withholding taxes is
generally provided so that τ̄doublei is generally less than the sum of Corei and Whti . The fourth column reports τ̄
double
j ,
which is the average double tax rate from the point of view of source countries. The countries listed on the left now
represent the source country and tax rates apply to dividends leaving the country. The last two columns again report
the two components of the double tax.





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.8: Tax relief regimes applied to foreign branch income in
2004
Country of Branch taxation
residence With recently Unilateral
concluded (without






























United Kingdom Credit Credit
United States Credit Credit
Notes: The first column presents the method for tax relief that applies to foreign branch income in the presence of
a tax treaty. The method of tax relief in the presence of a tax treaty can vary between different bilateral treaties, in
which case no unique applicable tax regime can be indicated. The first column indicates the method of tax relief
for foreign branch income only if a country has consistently applied the same method in all tax treaties becoming
effective in the year 2000 or later. The second column gives the method for tax relief that applies to foreign branch
income in the absence of a tax treaty.
Footnotes: a: Belgium only charges 25 percent of the standard tax rate if the deduction regime applies in order to
reduce double taxation. b: In case of excess foreign tax credits, Luxembourg allows a deduction of the excess foreign
taxes as expenses.
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































United States 13.8 0.1
Japan 15.8 0.0
Average 3.5 3.5
Notes: The first column reports the average double tax rate in percent that applies to income remitted by foreign
branches to their parent firm’s country of residence listed on the left. Averages are taken across all potential source
countries. The table is ordered in an ascending manner with respect to this average double tax rate τbranchi . The
second column reports the average double tax rate from the point of view of source countries. The countries listed
on the left now represent the source country and the tax rates apply to branch income flows leaving the country. The
average is then taken across all potential residence countries.

Never marry for money,
but marry where money is.
Proverb from the 19th century
CHAPTER 3
THE DIRECTION OF CROSS-BORDER M&AS AND
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION1
A multinational typically has a parent firm in one country and subsidiaries
in one or more foreign countries. In this setting, the location of the parent
firm generally affects the taxes due in the parent country and all the other
countries. As explained in the previous chapter, some parent countries tax
the worldwide income of their resident multinationals, whereas other coun-
tries exempt the foreign-source income of their multinationals from domestic
taxation. A multinational firm with a tax residence in a country that imposes
worldwide taxation risks being subject to international double taxation on in-
come generated outside the parent country. Multinationals thus stand to ben-
efit from judiciously choosing the location of the parent firm so as to mitigate
any international double taxation.
At the time of a cross-border takeover, the organizational structure of the
resulting multinational firm is designed from scratch. Cross-border M&As
therefore offer a unique opportunity to study the impact of international tax-
ation on the parent-subsidiary structure of multinational firms. This chapter
provides empirical evidence that international tax considerations have mate-
rially affected organizational outcomes of cross-border M&As.
The merger of Daimler in Germany with Chrysler in the United States in
1This chapter is based on Huizinga and Voget (2006) and Huizinga and Voget (forthcom-
ing).
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1998 offers an example where the international tax system appears to have
been a key consideration. This merger resulted in a multinational firm with a
parent firm (Daimler) located in Germany and a subsidiary (Chrysler) located
in the United States. According to testimony given by Daimler-Chrysler’s
chief tax counsel before the US Ways and Means Committee on June 30, 1999,
the exemption from taxation by Germany of dividend income from abroad in
contrast to the US system of worldwide taxation was one of the main reasons
for locating the parent firm of Daimler-Chrysler in Germany (Bogenschütz
and Wright, 2000). Another interesting case is the formal merger of British
Shell with Dutch Koninklijke Olie in 2005. Shell and Koninklijke Olie already
joined forces in 1903, but had retained separate stock listings and separate
tax residences in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. After the formal
merger in 2005 following criticism of its previous corporate structure, the new
company became a tax resident of the Netherlands, even though the firm took
the legal form of a British public limited company. Based on that decision,
the Dutch exemption system applies to the firm’s overall income rather than
British worldwide taxation.
The empirical work in this chapter is the first to show that the international
tax system systematically affects the organizational structure following inter-
national M&As. I consider cross-border M&As involving any two countries
among a set of European countries, Japan and the United States in the 1985 –
2004 period. For each cross-border takeover, I construct two rates of interna-
tional double taxation for the two possible outcomes regarding which of the
two affected firms becomes the parent firm (rather than a foreign subsidiary).
These double tax rates can be used to calculate international double tax lia-
bilities incurred by the newly created multinational firm in the two possible
scenarios as to parent firm location.
I find that international double tax liabilities in the realized parent-subsidiary
scenario are substantially lower than in the counterfactual case where the
structure is inverted. Specifically, the international double tax liability is cal-
culated to be 0.62 percent of the combined firm’s worldwide pre-tax income in
the actual parent-subsidiary outcome, while it would be 2.11 percent of world-
wide income in the alternative case. I proceed to estimate the impact of double
taxation on the parent-subsidiary decision using a logit binary choice model.
This estimation allows for the inclusion of a range of control variables, such
as the relative size of the two merging firms, that affect the selection of the
parent firm. International double taxation is found to have a highly signifi-
cant impact on the parent-subsidiary structure. This result is robust to various
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changes in model specification and estimation technique.
The logit estimation results can be used to simulate the impact of a change in
the international tax system on the pattern of international parent firm selec-
tion. As an interesting possibility, I examine that the United States unilaterally
abolishes its system of worldwide corporate income taxation, thereby ceasing
to subject the foreign-source income of its multinationals to international dou-
ble taxation. Such a regime switch, as proposed by the President’s Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005), is estimated to increase the proportion
of cross-border takeovers resulting in a parent firm in the United States from
53.1 percent to 57.6 percent. For 2004 data, this corresponds to a 8.6 billion US
dollar increase in the difference between outward and inward takeovers for
the United States.2
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 reviews related studies on
international taxation and M&As. Section 3.2 discusses the M&A data. Sec-
tion 3.3 and Section 3.4 introduce the estimation model and present the esti-
mation results, while Section 3.5 simulates the impact of the adoption of the
exemption system of international taxation by the US on parent firm selection.
Section 3.6 offers a conclusion.
3.1 Related Studies
Two recent studies examine the impact of taxation on a multinational’s struc-
ture using firm-level data. First, Desai and Hines (2002) examine the role of
taxation in 26 cases of so-called inversions of US multinationals in the 1982–
2002 period. In these transactions, the international corporate structure is in-
verted in the sense that the US parent becomes a subsidiary and the earlier for-
eign subsidiary becomes the parent firm. These inversions serve to eliminate
US worldwide income taxation of all previous foreign subsidiaries. In fact,
international double taxation is avoided (except for US dividend withhold-
ing taxes) if the new parent resides in a country with an exemption system.
Desai and Hines (2002) show that inverting firms typically face low foreign
tax rates to confirm that inversions yield tax benefits. Despite these tax bene-
fits, corporate inversions, however, are relatively rare due to a certain inertia.
2In 2004, US inward and outward M&As were valued at 81.9 and 110.0 US dollars. The
value of all M&As involving the US was 191.9 billion US dollars. The change in the US net
outflow of M&As is estimated to be 4.5 percent of this or 8.6 billion US dollars. See Table B.4
of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2005).
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International double taxation potentially has an economically more signifi-
cant impact on the organizational structures of multinationals created through
cross-border M&As as considered in this chapter, as in these instances orga-
nizational structures are made from scratch. Second, Devereux and Griffith
(1998) examine the impact of taxation on the decisions of US firms whether
and how to serve European markets. The US firm can choose to establish pro-
duction facilities in a European country or it can export to Europe. Taxation
is found to affect the choice among European production locations, but not
the choice whether to produce in Europe at all. Devereux and Griffith (1998)
use data on multinationals headquartered in the US, hence taking a US tax
residence as given.
Several studies focus on non-tax determinants of cross-border M&As. Rossi
and Volpin (2004), for example, report a governance motive for cross-border
takeovers. Firms in countries with strong shareholder protection, in particu-
lar, tend to acquire firms in countries with poor shareholder protection. This
enables firms in countries with poor shareholder protection to “import” better
protection, possibly resulting in a lower cost of capital and higher firm valu-
ation. In line with this, Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that an industry’s market
value increases when firms in that industry are acquired by foreign firms re-
siding in countries with better shareholder protection and better accounting
standards.
3.2 The M&A Data and International Double Tax-
ation
From the Thomson Financial Securities Data Company database, I select all
M&As involving any two countries in a sample of European countries, Japan,
and the United States during the 1985-2004 period. The cross-border acquiring
firm becomes the parent firm of the newly created multinational firm, while
the target firm becomes a foreign subsidiary or branch.3 For tax purposes, the
newly created multinational is resident in the acquiring or parent country. The
database does not provide information on whether a subsidiary or a branch
3I do not have any information on any pre-existing subsidiaries of the two merging firms.
This implies that I cannot check whether the parent firm of the newly created multinational
firm will be able to engage in worldwide tax averaging. This would potentially reduce the
overall tax costs of repatriations. At the same time, I can not analyze how pre-existing sub-
sidiaries are rearranged in the new ownership structure.
CHAPTER 3 33
is created. As subsidiary structures are more common, I take these to be the
benchmark case. In the empirical work, however, I consider the international
taxation of branches as a robustness check. The acquiring firm, as reported by
Thomson, becomes the immediate owner of the target firm. The database also
provides information on the ultimate owner of the newly acquired firm. In
some cases, the nationalities of the immediate and ultimate owners differ and
the ultimate owner uses a holding company in another country to acquire the
target. Corporate structures of this kind may aim to delay or avoid taxation by
the ultimate parent country. In a robustness check, I exclude countries where
multinationals commonly use organizational structures involving immediate
owners in other countries.
Multinational firms are more likely to be concerned about the amounts of
international double tax to be paid than about double tax rates per se. Hence,
the selection of the parent firm in an international takeover can be expected
to reflect the additional tax liability that is incurred one way versus the other.
To reflect this, for each takeover I construct a double tax liability rate, denoted
θdoubleij , defined as the incurred double tax liability as a share of the combined
firm’s worldwide pre-tax income if firm a (from country i) takes over firm b





0 if PIb ≤ 0
τdoubleij × PIbPIa+PIb if PIb > 0, PIa > 0
τdoubleij if PIb > 0, PIa ≤ 0
(3.1)
PIa and PIb are the pre-tax incomes of the two firms before merging to proxy
for expected future incomes, and τdoubleij is the statutory double tax rate dis-
cussed in the previous chapter.4 Expression (3.1) reflects that there is no dou-
ble taxation of the target’s income if this income is zero and negative. Further-
more, the expression avoids inflating the tax burden variable θdoubleab beyond
the statutory double tax rate τdoubleij if the acquiring firm’s income is negative.
5
Straightforwardly, θdoubleba is the corresponding double tax liability rate, if in-
stead firm b takes over firm a.
To calculate θdoubleab , I need information on the pre-tax incomes of both the
acquiring and target firms. For 626 M&As, this information is provided by the
4An additional subscript t indicating the year in which an M&A takes place is suppressed.
The variation in τdoubleij and τ
double
ji over time due to changes in tax rates and tax regimes
between 1985 and 2004 has been taken into account, of course.
5If PIa < 0, I assume the parent firm can carry any losses forward or backward so that τij
is the applicable double tax burden.
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Thompson database. To expand the sample, I obtained additional informa-
tion on pre-tax incomes for some firms from the Compustat Global and Com-
pustat North America databases using CUSIP company identification codes.6
In this manner, I increased the sample of international M&As for which one
can calculate two-way double tax liabilities to 917. For these M&As, I calcu-
late that the average double tax liability according to (1) is 0.62 percent of the
merged firm’s worldwide pre-tax income. This corresponds to an average an-
nual absolute double tax liability of 4.4 million US dollars per M&A. Interest-
ingly, if the parent-subsidiary structure were inverted, the double tax liability
rate would increase to 2.11 percent of worldwide pre-tax income, which cor-
responds to an absolute annual double tax liability of 15.5 million US dollars.
These data suggest that the organizational structure of multinational firms
following cross-border M&As is chosen with international double taxation in
mind. Additional information on the distribution of actual double tax liability
rates and the rates for inverted mergers is provided in Figure 3.1.






























Legend: The solid line describes the distribution of double tax liability rates θdouble
for actual mergers ordered from the lowest to the highest double tax liability rate.
The dashed line describes the distribution of double tax liability rates θdouble if all
mergers were inverted.
The solid and dashed lines in the figure indicate the actual and counterfac-
tual double tax liability rates by percentile, respectively. The figure confirms
6CUSIP is the acronym for the Committee on Uniform Security Identification Procedures.
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that the mean actual double tax liability rate is lower than the counterfactual,
where the parent-subsidiary structure is inverted. At the same time, the ac-
tual share of M&As subject to no double taxation is larger than in the inverted
case.
In the following sections, I provide empirical evidence on how double taxa-
tion affects the direction of cross-border M&As given that the transaction takes
place. For this purpose, I estimate a logit binary choice model of selecting the
acquiring and target firms.
3.3 Estimating Equation
Following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996), the binary choice model assumes
that mergers reflect the synergies from combining two firms and that investors
value the individual firms and the merger correctly.7 Let Vab = x′abβ + εab be
the value of the merged company if firm a acquires firm b. In this expres-
sion, xab is a vector of independent variables, including the double tax lia-
bility θdoubleab for the case where firm a acquires firm b, while β is a vector of
coefficients and εab is an error term with a Weibull distribution. Similarly, let
Vba = x′baβ + εba be the value of the newly created firm if firm b acquires firm
a. The difference in the two firm values, Vab −Vba, is given by
Vab −Vba = (xab − xba)′β + εab − εba (3.2)
where the error term εab − εba follows a logistic distribution as seen in Mc-
Fadden (1973). If Vab − Vba > 0, then firm a will be the acquirer. Hence, the
probability of firm a taking over firm b is given by8
Prob (Vab −Vba > 0 | xab, xba) =
exp x′abβ











7Alternatively, the model could also reflect stock market driven acquisitions (Shleifer and
Vishny, 2003), where rational managers initiate mergers without real economic long-run gains
as a reaction to investors’ over- and undervaluation of firms.
8The probability is conditional on there being a profitable opportunity for the two firms
to merge such that (Vab ≥ Va + Vb) ∨ (Vba ≥ Va + Vb), that is, the sum of the parts is
worth more than the parts of the sum. I expect this condition to be independent of
Prob (Vab −Vba > 0).
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1 if Vab −Vba > 0
0 if Vab −Vba ≤ 0
,
∆xn ≡ (xab − xba)n, and n counts the mergers. The n cross-border takeovers
are taken to involve a total of m countries.
For exposition, let a be the observed acquirer and b the target. In the vector
∆xn of regressors, I include m− 1 country dummy variables that capture the
propensity of a particular country to be the acquirer country rather than the
target country. This country dummy variable for, say, Austria can take on one
of three values: (i) it is set to 1 if firm a is Austrian; (ii) it is set to -1 if firm b
is Austrian; and (iii) it is set to zero otherwise. In addition to these country
fixed effect variables, the vector ∆xn includes the relative double tax burden
variable, ∆θdoubleab ≡ θdoubleab − θdoubleba , and several firm-level and country-level
controls.
With a and b denoting the acquiring and target firms, it follows that the de-
pendent variable vector yn just contains 1’s and hence displays no variation.
A model with a constant dependent variable would, of course, obtain a per-
fect but trivial fit, if it included a constant among the regressors. The country
fixed effect variables, however, are not constants and generally no linear com-
bination of these variables exists that adds up to a constant vector. Thus, the
model can be estimated in a non-trival way. Estimation is by maximization of










1 + exp ∆x′kβ)





With a and b denoting the acquiring and target firms, yk equals 1 in (5) for all k
and the second term within the square brackets vanishes.9 The convention of
letting firm a always be the acquiring firm, however, is arbitrary and this does
not affect the estimation results. To see this, let us invert the labeling for ex-
actly one transaction so that for this transaction firm b becomes the acquiring
firm and firm a is the target firm. Note that now the dependent variable vec-
tor yn no longer is a unit vector, as it now contains exactly one zero element.
It is easily seen that inverting the labeling convention for one deal does not
affect the expression for the log-likelihood in (5). Specifically, for this particu-
9Note that all regressors in ∆xn have to take on both negative and positive values for
different observations k to ensure that the maximum likelihood estimation is well defined.
Otherwise, the likelihood would not converge but go to infinity. This implies that each coun-
try should have at least one acquiring firm and one target firm in the sample. This condition
is satisfied.
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lar transaction k now yk equals zero (so that the second term between square
brackets in (5) no longer drops out), while ∆x′k becomes the negative value of
what it was before (as xba − xab = −(xab − xba)). Hence, the log-likelihood ex-
pression remains the same, and the estimation yields the same coefficients β.
Generally, one can, of course, take firm a to be the target firm in any number
of observed M&As without affecting the estimation. I expect the estimation to
yield a negative coefficient for the ∆θdoubleab variable, as double taxation by a
country a makes parent firm location in that country less likely.
The relative double tax burden ∆θdoubleab = θ
double
ab − θdoubleba is due immedi-
ately, if subsidiary profits are repatriated to the parent country. As mentioned
in the previous chapter, parent country taxation can generally be deferred if
profits are not repatriated, but there are some exceptions.10 As reported by Ta-
ble 2.7 of Chapter 2, deferral is not available under some conditions in Japan,
Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom and the United States. On the basis of
this information, I construct bilateral dummy variables Dab and Dba indicating
whether parent country a allows deferral of taxation on income from country
b, and vice versa.
Frequently, I do not have all information necessary to see whether non-
deferral applies in a certain case. For instance, I do not know the mix of
active and passive income of the target firm. Thus, I have to make certain
assumptions to be able to construct the deferral variables. Specifically, any
necessary conditions regarding the type of income, the rate of profit distri-
bution, and the ownership share of the parent that potentially trigger non-
deferral are assumed to be met. With these assumptions, Japan, Portugal,
Spain, United Kingdom and the United States deny deferral, if the subsidiary-
country tax rate is rather low. Next, I construct the variable ∆θdouble,dab =
Dabθdoubleab − Dbaθdoubleba as the part of the double tax liability ∆θdoubleab that can
be deferred. Deferral makes parent country taxes less burdensome and thus I
expect the ∆θdouble,dab variable to obtain a positive coefficient.
Among the firm-level controls in the set ∆xn, ∆Size is a measure of the rel-
ative size of the two firms involved in the takeover. It is defined as the dif-
ference in the two firms’ assets divided by the sum of their assets (see Table
3.1 for variable definitions and data sources). I expect this variable to obtain
a positive sign, as the larger firm is more likely to take over the smaller one.
10Desai and Hines (Figure 2, 2004) show that rates of profit repatriation of US multination-
als have declined substantially since 1982, increasing the scope for deferral. For established
multinationals, Hines (1994) demonstrates that deferral importantly affects investment and
profit shifting incentives.
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Next, ∆Liquidity is the difference in the ratios of liquid assets to total assets.
The more liquid firm may find it relatively easy to take over the other firm,
as it has relatively little need for costly external funds to finance the acquisi-
tion.11 Next, ∆Leverage measures the difference in the leverage ratios of the
two merging firms. This variable could reflect relative borrowing capacity, for
instance on account of different costs of borrowing. Desai and Hines (2002)
argue that a low leverage may reflect a high borrowing cost and thus a low
borrowing capacity. A positive sign for the ∆Leverage would suggest that the
more highly leveraged firm is more likely to be the acquirer. As an alternative
measure of borrowing capacity, I also use ∆Fixedassets, which is the differ-
ence in the two firms’ ratios of fixed assets to total assets. Fixed assets may
easily serve as collateral and hence may signal borrowing capacity (cf. Rajan
and Zingales, 1995). An acquiring firm may either wish to borrow against its
own fixed assets or against the target’s fixed assets, and therefore the expected
sign for the ∆Fixedassets variable is not clear. The variable ∆ROA is the dif-
ference in the rates of return on assets. More profitable firms are expected to
take over less profitable ones.12 Parent firm location in a country will involve
certain headquarter activities that are subject to the parent country corporate
tax rate. For this reason, parent firm location in the high-tax country may be
less likely. Conversely, parent firm location in the high-tax country may be
more likely, if a high taxation regime implies high public spending on, for in-
stance, infrastructure that benefits parent firms. Thus, the difference in the two
countries tax rates, represented by the ∆Taxrate variable, could obtain either
sign. Next, I construct the ∆Stockmarket variable as the difference in the two
countries’ stock market capitalizations divided by their summed capitaliza-
tion. The acquiring firm may more easily raise equity capital in its domestic
capital market and hence the ∆Stockmarket variable is expected to obtain a
positive sign. As in Di Giovanni (2005), the variable is lagged one period to
account for possible endogeneity. Along similar lines, ∆Credit is the differ-
ence in the two countries’ domestic credit to the private sector divided by the
11The ‘pecking order’ for financing firms (i.e., preferring internal funds over external funds)
is a result of asymmetric information between managers and investors as first comprehen-
sively illustrated by Myers and Majluf (1984). A significant liquidity variable in the context of
M&As could imply that the acquiring firm’s managers are better informed about target firms
than outside investors.
12ROA may also serve as a proxy for the book-to-market ratio, which is not available for
most firms in the sample. The model for stock market driven acquisitions by Shleifer and
Vishny (2003) predicts that acquirers should be more overvalued than their targets. Rau and
Vermaelen (1998) have found suggestive evidence that supports this hypothesis.
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summed credit provision, all lagged one year. The acquiring firm may more
easily borrow in its own country or in the target country, depending on how
important bank information about the acquiring firm and the acquired assets
are. Thus, the ∆Credit variable could take on either sign. Further, ∆Exch.rate is
symmetrically calculated as the difference in the annual percentage changes in
the bilateral exchange rate lagged by one year. A positive value of ∆Exch.rate
implies past exchange rate appreciation, which is expected to make foreign
acquisitions more likely (Blonigen, 1997, and Di Giovanni, 2005). In a robust-
ness check, I further include the ∆Pretaxinc variable, which is the difference
of the pre-tax incomes divided by their sum. This variable thus measures rel-
ative size by pre-tax income rather than assets. Again, I expect the larger firm
to take over the smaller one. Finally, ∆Investment is the difference of the two
firms’ ratios of investment to assets. Firms with high investment rates may
have profitable investment opportunities that to some extent are transferrable
to target firms, which could explain a positive estimated coefficient. Table
3.2 contains the variables’ summary statistics. Note that the included country
dummy variables serve to capture country-specific determinants of M&A ac-
tivity such as the legal and regulatory framework and capital gains taxation.
See Rossi and Volpin (2004), Dyck and Zingales (2004), La Porta et al. (2002),
Comment and Schwert (1995) and Ayers et al. (2003) for empirical evidence
on these determinants of M&As.13
3.4 Estimation Results
Table 3.3 presents the results of regressions explaining the direction of M&As.
In regression (1), the relative double tax burden variable ∆θdouble enters with
a coefficient of -0.358 that is statistically significant. This suggests that an in-
crease in the double tax burden in one country by one percentage point re-
duces that country’s probability of being the acquiring country by 9.0 percent-
age points in case of a merger of equals.14 For comparison, the relative double
13Differences in capital gains taxation may also have an influence on the direction and the
form of an international M&A. An empirical study by Ayers et al. (2003) suggests that such
an effect may exist, as these authors find that domestic shareholder-level capital gains taxes
are associated with higher acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. I do not explicitly
take capital gains taxes into account. There is, however, no bilateral variation in capital gains
taxes. Hence, country-specific effects should be sufficient to control for their effect.
14The marginal effect of a change in the regressors on the probability that firm a is the
acquiring firm is given by the expression
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tax burden from the acquirer’s perspective is -1.5 percent on average as seen
in Table 3.2. International double taxation thus affects M&A outcomes in an
economically significant way. Among the controls, the relative size variable
enters with a positive and significant coefficient to suggest that the larger firm
is more likely to be the acquirer. More liquid assets and a larger leverage ap-
pear to make it also more likely that a firm becomes the acquirer firm. The
rate of return on assets variable obtains a negative coefficient, but it is statisti-
cally insignificant.15 The relative tax rate obtains a positive coefficient that is
statistically insignificant. The relative stock market capitalization and credit
provision variables enter with positive and negative coefficients, respectively,
that are both insignificant. The exchange rate variable, finally, obtains an un-
expected negative, but insignificant, coefficient.
Next, in regression (2) I add the ∆θdouble,d variable that reflects the part of
∆θdouble that is potentially deferred. This variable enters with a negative coef-
ficient, but it is statistically insignificant. This could reflect that the value of the
deferral option is uncertain to merging firms or that deferral has little value
because it may lead to suboptimal reinvestment in the subsidiary country, for
instance. Also, the deferral variable may measure the expected availability of
deferral imperfectly.
The negative estimated coefficient for the ∆θdouble variable in regression (1)
could merely reflect that firms with relatively high pre-tax incomes are likely
to be acquiring firms for reasons other than international double taxation. To
exclude this possibility, in regression (3) I include the relative pre-tax income
variable as a separate control variable. This relative pre-tax income variable
obtains a positive coefficient, but it is insignificant. The relative double tax
burden variable now obtains a coefficient of -0.263 that remains statistically
significant.
Regression (4) includes the relative investment variable as a control variable.
This reduces the sample size from 582 to 346 observations due to missing in-
vestment cash flow data. The relative investment variable is estimated with
a positive and significant coefficient. This could reflect that firms with high
investment levels have profitable investment opportunities that can be trans-
∂E[yn |∆xn ]
∂∆xn
= Λ(∆x′nβ) [1−Λ(∆x′nβ)] β,
where Λ(·) indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function. With a merger of equals,
∆xn = 0 and the marginal effect of xn on the probability reduces to 0.25β.
15The insignificance of an indicator for managerial competence is in line with Franks and
Mayer (1996), who also failed to find evidence for M&As being triggered by managerial fail-
ure.
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ferred to target firms. The relative double tax burden variable obtains a some-
what more negative coefficient of -0.501 that remains statistically significant.
In regression (5), I replace the relative leverage variable by the relative fixed
assets variable as an index of borrowing capacity. The negative estimated co-
efficient for the latter variable suggests that firms with relatively large fixed
assets make good takeover targets, but the estimate is statistically insignifi-
cant.
As a test of robustness, regression (6) applies the probit model rather than
the logit model to specification (1). This yields an estimated coefficient for
the relative double tax burden variable of -0.186 that is statistically significant.
This estimate implies that an increase in the double tax burden of one per-
centage point in a country reduces the probability of that country being the
acquirer by 7.4 percent for the case of a merger of equals.16 Thus, the calcu-
lated marginal affect of a change in double taxation is slightly less than for the
logit model.
So far, I have assumed that a merger results in a multinational firm with a
foreign subsidiary. Alternatively, the multinational firm could opt for a branch
structure. As discussed in Chapter 2, the international taxation of the income
of foreign subsidiaries and foreign branches generally differ. As a robustness
check, I next construct the relative double tax burden variable ∆θdouble on the
assumption that foreign establishments take the form of branches. The esti-
mated coefficient for the relative double tax variable for the branch case in
regression (7) is very similar at -0.355, and it remains statistically significant.
Two firms engaging in a cross-border merger can opt for a simple parent-
subsidiary structure or, instead, for a more complex structure involving a
holding company in a third country. The data source provides information
on the nationalities of the immediate and ultimate acquirers and thus one can
check whether international holding companies are prevalent in the sample.
For the 582 transactions in the benchmark regression, there are 12 where these
two nationalities differ. These 12 transactions involve 5 countries of ultimate
ownership: France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom. In the case of France, 2 out of 36 ultimate owners in France use immedi-
ate owners in other countries. For Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the




where φ(·) indicates the standard normal density function. With a merger of equals, ∆xn = 0
and the marginal effect of xn on the probability reduces to about 0.4β.
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United Kingdom, the corresponding figures are 5 out of 28, 1 out of 3, 3 out
of 39 and 1 out of 89, respectively. Regression (8) excludes transactions with
ultimate owners or targets in France, Italy, Luxembourg or the Netherlands, as
ultimate owners in these countries use holding companies in other countries
in this sample relatively intensively. The estimated coefficient on the relative
double tax burden is similar to previous results at -0.340 and it is statistically
significant.
Next, regression (9) applies a conditional logit model to specification (1).
Specifically, the estimation is conditioned on information about the proportion
of firms that establish a parent firm in one of two countries for any pair of
countries.17 The estimated parameter for the relative double tax parameter is
very similar to previous results at -0.322 and is statistically significant.
Finally, I consider the possibility that corporate taxation is endogenous to
the direction of M&As. To see how endogeneity may arise, one can inter-
pret international double taxation as a user fee for using a country as the par-
ent country. Such a fee may be justified by, say, a country’s superior legal
and accounting environment or alternatively the smooth operation of its la-
bor market. An increase in the demand for a country’s services as the parent
country may endogenously give rise to an increase in the user fee, that is, a
higher rate of double taxation applied to resident parent firms. Such a posi-
tive response of international double taxation to the location of parent firms
in a country could give rise to a positively biased estimated coefficient for
the ∆θdouble variable. To adjust for potential endogeneity, I apply a two-step
instrumental variable probit, where ∆θdouble and ∆Taxrate are instrumented
by their one- and two-year lagged values.18 The relative tax burden variable
now obtains a coefficient of -0.190 as reported in regression (10), which is very
similar to the estimate of -0.186 in the probit regression (6). A Wald test of
the hypothesis that ∆θdouble and ∆Taxrate are exogenous cannot be rejected. A
test of the overidentifying restrictions indicates that the hypothesis that the in-
struments are valid cannot be rejected either. Overall the results in this section
show that the direction of international M&As is affected by the prospect of
17For mergers between countries i and j (with i < j), I define all observations with head-
quarters locating in country i as “successes” (yn = 1) and all observations with headquarters
locating in country j as “failures” (yn = 0). Conditioning the likelihood on the country-pair
specific number of successes and failures results in Chamberlain’s (1980) fixed-effects logit
estimator, which allows for the presence of fixed effects on the level of bilateral country rela-
tionships. See also Greene (2008, pp. 800–805) for a good description of the fixed-effects logit
estimator.
18The chapter’s appendix contains further details on the instrumental variable estimation.
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international double taxation and that the estimated effect is economically sig-
nificant. This finding is robust to a variety of changes in the empirical model
specification and estimation technique.
3.5 Simulation of International Tax System Change
by the United States
The empirical results suggest that countries can attract additional parent com-
panies by lowering international double taxation, either through lower tax
rates or more generous double tax relief. For the US case, the President’s Ad-
visory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) has recently advocated abolishing
the US system of worldwide taxation in favor of an exemption system. The
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 already temporarily allowed US multi-
nationals to repatriate profits subject to a flat tax rate of 5.25 percent from
October 2004 until the end of 2005. In response, the foreign subsidiaries of US
multinationals increased their repatriations six fold from 34 billion US dollars
in 2004 to 217 billion US dollars in 2005.19 This shows that the current system
of worldwide taxation in the United States has a material impact on the be-
havior of US multinationals. In this section, I present simulations of how an
abolition of worldwide taxation by the United States would affect the propen-
sity of newly created multinational companies in this sample to establish a
parent firm in the United States. The international tax systems of other coun-
tries are assumed to remain unchanged. In the simulations, I use the estimated
coefficients of regression (1) in Table 3.3.
Column (1) of Table 3.4 gives the proportion of multinational firms result-
ing from M&As involving the US that establishes a parent firm in country i.
This proportion equals the average predicted probability Pi of parent firm lo-
cation in country i. Note that 53.1 percent of the deals actually resulted in a
parent firm in the United States. Column (2) gives the change in this propor-
tion, or dPi, that is simulated to occur after the US switches to an exemption
system, while column (3) provides the corresponding relative change in the
19See Federal Reserve Board of Governors (2006, p. 18). Annual repatriations by US multi-
nationals have never exceeded 50 billion US dollars before 2005. The counterpart to the repa-
triations from foreign subsidiaries are foreign earnings retained abroad. For the US, quarterly
foreign earnings retained abroad have always been positive and since 1996 they have grown
from 50 to about 150 billion US dollars before plunging to -62 billion and -81 billion US dollars
in the last two quarters of 2005 (see Federal Reserve Board of Governors, 2006, p. 13).
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propensity to choose a US parent, or dPi/Pi. In columns (2) and (3), estimated
changes in the probability of establishing a US parent are zero for Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Japan, and Spain, as these countries’ tax rates are so high in
the sample that the US imposes no double tax on foreign-source income from
these countries. All other ‘partner’ countries see their chances of becoming
the parent country decrease. For Ireland, the probability of obtaining the par-
ent firm falls rather strongly from 38.2 percent to 3.6 percent. This reflects that
US multinationals operating in Ireland are subject to considerable US tax due
to the low Irish tax rate of 12.5 percent. The United States itself experiences an
increase in the probability of becoming the parent country from 53.1 percent
to 57.6 percent.
Columns (4)-(6) provide information about how the US abolition of world-
wide taxation affects country i’s chances of hosting the parent firm follow-
ing cross-border deals involving any country (and not just the United States).
These columns reflect how deals involving the United States are affected, as
before, and also a country’s proportion of deals with the United States. The
probability of a parent firm in Ireland is now reduced by about 13 percent-
age points, which reflects that about a third of the deals involving Irish firms
are with a US partner. All the same, the redistribution of parent firm activity
towards the United States from Ireland and several other countries remains
substantial.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that the international tax system affects the organizational
structure of cross-border takeovers. Countries that impose high levels of in-
ternational double taxation are less likely to attract the parent companies of
newly created multinational firms. For a merger of equals, an increase in the
effective double tax rate by one percentage point lowers the probability of the
burdened firm to be the acquirer by 9.0 percent. This effect is lower when
firms differ in size, but the negative effect of double taxation persists even
when accounting for size differences.20 This result implies that, over time,
multinationals will assume a corporate structure that minimizes double taxa-
tion. Industries are reorganized on an international level through cross-border
mergers to achieve production efficiency with respect to increasing market
20The smaller marginal effect in case of asymmetric firms is a property of the logit regression
(as it is non-linear).
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sizes. In every merger, the parent firm tends to reside in the country offering
the lower double tax burden.
The organizational structure of multinational firms, of course, has important
non-tax as well as tax implications. Specifically, the international organization
of the firm implies cross-border relationships of ownership and control that
are bound to affect the internal operation of the firm and the dealings of the
firm with the affected national economies in the form of employment, for in-
stance. The sensitivity of organizational outcomes of cross-border takeovers
to international double taxation suggests that this taxation may carry signifi-
cant economic costs in distorting international relationships of ownership and
control.
One implication is that countries taxing worldwide income tend to lose multi-
nationals’ headquarters over time and every relocated headquarter contributes
to the erosion of the corporate income tax base. The countries can slow this
process by lowering their corporate income tax rate as this reduces the dou-
ble tax burden with respect to its trading partners. Some countries may even
actively cater to multinationals as a location for headquarters by exempting
foreign income from taxation and offering a complete set of tax treaties with
other countries that offer advantageous dividend withholding tax rates.
Some facts support such a tentative hypothesis: The Netherlands are a well-
known location for multinational headquarters and it is striking to find this
country ranked with the lowest double tax burden in the ranking of Table 2.6.
In contrast, the US and Japan are found at the very bottom of this ranking
with relatively high double tax burdens, suggesting that the US and Japan
indeed act as Stackelberg leaders in the spirit of the model developed by Gor-
don (1992): The US and Japan, being large (and traditionally FDI-exporting)
countries, apply a foreign tax credit regime and keep corporate taxes relatively
high. The other countries act as Stackelberg followers by either keeping the
corporate tax level lower than the US or Japan or by exempting foreign source
income from taxation, which may eventually attract some multinational head-
quarters.
The countries applying worldwide taxation may change their policy if the
distortions caused by double taxation become too strong. The United King-
dom is about to abandon its traditional foreign tax credit system and exempt
dividend income from abroad from taxation.21 Also, quite recently, the Presi-
21Ironically, the looming changes in tax policy prompted two firms, Shire and United Busi-
ness Media, to relocate their headquarters to Ireland by means of an acquisition in April 2008.
These two cases are good examples of how double taxation has an effect on the organizational
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dent’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) has advocated the elimi-
nation of worldwide taxation by the US. Simulations presented in this chapter
suggest that the impact of such a policy reform on the international patterns
of parent country selection could be economically significant. I estimate that
the proportion of US-related cross-border takeovers resulting in an American
parent company would increase from 53 to 58 percent.
This chapter has mainly focused on the impact of double taxation on the
organizational structure of multinationals and the location of headquarters.
However, the previous paragraph touches upon another aspect of cross-border
mergers and acquisitions: They are also the most substantial contributor to
foreign direct investment, especially between developed countries. The next
chapter discusses cross-border mergers and acquisitions from that point of
view.
structure of multinationals. It seems that the two multinationals did not like the prospect of
the United Kingdom taxing their worldwide passive income such as licensing fees on a cur-
rent basis. The United Kingdom meant to introduce this measure as a supplement to the
exemption system in order to reduce the scope for profit shifting.
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Table 3.1: Definitions of explanatory variables and data sources
Variable Description and data source
∆θdouble Difference between firms’ double tax burden rates in per-
cent after acquiring the other firm. The double tax bur-
den is the additional double tax liability divided by the
two firms’ combined pre-tax income. The variable is mea-
sured in percentage points. Sources for corporate income
tax rates: Chennells and Griffith (1997), Eurostat (2004),
KPMG International Tax and Legal Center (2003). Sources
for tax regimes, tax treaties and withholding taxes: Coopers
& Lybrand (1998), IBFD (2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d). Pre-
vious issues of these publications were consulted as well.
Sources for financial information: Thomson Financial, SDC
Database; Compustat Global and Compustat North Amer-
ica.
∆θdouble,d The part of ∆θdouble that can be deferred in case of non-
repatriation of subsidiary profits. Sources as for the variable
∆θdouble above.
∆Size Difference in firms’ assets divided by the sum of the merg-
ing firms’ total assets in millions of U.S. dollars. Sources:
Thomson Financial, SDC Database; Compustat Global and
Compustat North America.
∆Liquidity Difference in firms’ liquidity ratios (liquid assets/ total as-
sets). Sources: Thomson Financial, SDC Database; Compu-
stat Global and Compustat North America.
∆Leverage Difference in firms’ leverage ratios (total liabilities/ total as-
sets). Sources: Thomson Financial, SDC Database; Compu-
stat Global and Compustat North America.
∆Fixedassets Difference in the firms’ ratios of fixed assets over total as-
sets. Sources: Thomson Financial, SDC Database; Compus-
tat Global and Compustat North America.
∆ROA Difference in firms’ profitability (net income / total assets).
Sources: Thomson Financial, SDC Database; Compustat
Global and Compustat North America.
(continued on the next page)
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Table 3.1 (continued)
Variable Description and data source
∆Taxrate Difference in corporate income tax rates of the two coun-
tries. Sources: Chennells and Griffith (1997), Eurostat
(2004), KPMG International Tax and Legal Center (2003).
∆Stockmarket Difference in stock market capitalizations of the two coun-
tries relative to the sum of the countries’ stock market capi-
talizations lagged by one year. Source: World Development
Indicators 2004, World Bank (2004).
∆Credit Difference in domestic credit to the private sector of the two
countries divided by the summed volume of credit provi-
sion lagged by one year. Source: World Development Indi-
cators 2004, World Bank (2004).
∆Exch.rate Difference in the two countries’ changes (between 1 January
and 31 December) of the real bilateral exchange rate in per-
centage points lagged by one year. An increase in this vari-
able represents an appreciation of firm a’s home currency.
Source: International Financial Statistics 2007, International
Monetary Fund.
∆Pretaxinc Difference in firms’ pretax incomes divided by the sum of
pretax income in millions of US dollars, where non-positive
values of pretax income are replaced by 0.001 to avoid low
values in the denominator. Sources: Thomson Financial,
SDC Database; Compustat Global and Compustat North
America.
∆Investment Difference in firms’ investment activities as measured by
the (negative) ratio of net cashflow from investment activ-
ities to total assets. A negative cashflow indicates a posi-
tive investment activity. Sources: Thomson Financial, SDC
Database; Compustat Global and Compustat North Amer-
ica.
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max
y 917 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
∆θdouble 917 -1.50 4.65 -30.00 27.50
∆θdouble,d 582 -0.51 1.65 -16.30 5.80
∆Size 917 0.70 0.36 -0.99 0.99
∆Liquidity 582 0.00 0.20 -0.82 1.55
∆Leverage 582 -0.02 0.51 -5.36 3.18
∆Fixedassets 394 -0.16 0.19 -0.88 0.66
∆ROA 582 0.08 0.35 -1.18 3.01
∆Taxrate 582 0.42 10.09 -30.00 30.00
∆Stockmarket 582 -0.01 0.73 -0.99 0.99
∆Credit 582 -0.01 0.72 -0.99 0.99
∆Exch.rate 582 -0.02 0.18 -0.45 0.50
∆Pretaxinc 582 0.58 0.56 -1.00 1.00
∆Investment 346 0.05 0.22 -0.80 1.09
Notes: The summary statistics describe the relative values of a variable for firms a and b for
the case where the acquiring firm is classified as firm a and the target firm is classified as firm
b. This labeling matters for the value of these statistics. For example, the dependent variable
y changes from a unit vector to a zero vector and the explanatory variable means switch signs
if the labels a and b are switched for all firm pairs. y is a binary variable indicating whether
firm a acquires firm b or vice versa. For more variable definitions and data sources, see Table
3.1.
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Table 3.3: Estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Bench- Deferral Pretax Invest- Fixed
mark income ment assets
∆θdouble -0.358∗∗ -0.357∗∗ -0.263∗ -0.501∗∗ -0.498∗∗
(0.086) (0.090) (0.119) (0.165) (0.180)
∆θdouble,d – -0.011 – – –
(0.254)
∆Size 5.698∗∗ 5.696∗∗ 5.453∗∗ 7.412∗∗ 10.397∗∗
(0.587) (0.589) (0.611) (1.231) (1.902)
∆Liquidity 3.160∗ 3.154∗ 2.950∗ 6.726∗∗ 3.252
(1.253) (1.259) (1.276) (2.414) (1.752)
∆Leverage 0.852∗ 0.850∗ 0.825 2.168 –
(0.431) (0.432) (0.428) (1.135)
∆Fixedassets – – – – -1.335
(2.524)
∆ROA -0.360 -0.359 -0.583 -0.449 -0.286
(0.778) (0.778) (0.746) (1.374) (1.766)
∆Taxrate 0.091 0.090 0.069 0.192 0.328∗∗
(0.056) (0.056) (0.060) (0.108) (0.118)
∆Stockmarket 1.420 1.403 0.943 -1.685 4.089
(2.737) (2.769) (2.769) (5.573) (5.034)
∆Credit -5.243 -5.217 -4.942 -3.041 -12.645∗
(3.143) (3.205) (3.169) (6.191) (5.807)
∆Exch.rate -1.659 -1.650 -1.827 -1.694 -4.694
(1.328) (1.346) (1.337) (2.162) (2.534)
∆Pretaxinc – – 0.617 – –
(0.555)
∆Investment – – – 6.646∗∗ –
(2.286)
Observations 582 582 582 346 394
Log-likelihood -77.4 -77.4 -76.7 -32.6 -28.0
(continued on next page)
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Table 3.3 (continued)
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Probit Branch Holding Con- IV
company ditional
∆θdouble -0.186∗∗ -0.355∗∗ -0.340∗∗ -0.322∗∗ -0.190∗∗
(0.044) (0.088) (0.088) (0.099) (0.047)
∆Size 2.978∗∗ 5.730∗∗ 5.399∗∗ 5.380∗∗ 2.893∗∗
(0.265) (0.592) (0.667) (0.706) (0.273)
∆Liquidity 1.545∗ 3.189∗ 2.899∗ 3.616∗∗ 1.510∗
(0.625) (1.245) (1.379) (1.342) (0.637)
∆Leverage 0.372 0.877∗ 0.902∗ 0.782 0.376
(0.235) (0.426) (0.427) (0.479) (0.219)
∆ROA -0.259 -0.321 -0.268 -0.598 -0.294
(0.400) (0.780) (0.851) (0.778) (0.380)
∆Taxrate 0.046 0.100 0.089 0.220∗∗ 0.048
(0.029) (0.056) (0.069) (0.083) (0.036)
∆Stockmarket 0.762 1.167 3.025 -3.448 0.729
(1.423) (2.730) (3.427) (4.757) (1.446)
∆Credit -2.939 -5.069 -6.221 -29.024∗∗ -2.731
(1.676) (3.134) (3.975) (8.708) (1.666)
∆Exch.rate -1.138 -1.793 -1.879 -0.324 -0.991
(0.678) (1.324) (1.558) (1.594) (0.713)
Wald test: – – – – 0.79/0.67
Overid test: – – – – 3.11/0.21
Observations 582 582 417 518 574
Log-likelihood -78.6 -77.7 -58.0 -46.1 n.a.
Notes: The dependent variable y equals one if firm a acquires firm b and it is zero if firm b ac-
quires firm a. For other variable definitions and data sources, see Table 3.1. All regressions are
logit regressions except the probit regression (6) and the two-step instrumental variable pro-
bit regression (10). Regression (7) assumes that target firms are integrated as foreign branches
instead of as subsidiaries. Regression (8) excludes deals with ultimate acquirers in four coun-
tries that use holding companies relatively intensively. Regression (9) is a conditional logit
regression. The likelihood is maximized conditional on the number of acquiring and target
firms per bilateral relationship. Regression (10) is a two-step instrumental variable probit re-
gression, where the variables ∆θdouble and ∆Taxrate are instrumented by their one and two
year lagged values. Country fixed effects are not reported. The Wald test of exogeneity has
as null hypothesis that the variables ∆θdouble and ∆Taxrate are in fact exogenous. With a
χ2 statistic of 0.79 and a p-value of 0.67, this hypothesis cannot be rejected. The test of the
overidentifying restrictions has an Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum χ2 statistic of 3.11 and a
p-value of 0.21. The hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate the significance level: ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%.
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Table 3.4: Simulation of exemption system in the U.S.
U.S. related
M&As only All M&As







Austria – – – 44.4 0.00 0.00
Belgium 94.5 0.00 0.00 66.7 0.00 0.00
Denmark 54.0 -10.16 -0.19 57.9 -5.88 -0.10
Finland 72.5 -14.77 -0.20 71.4 -5.63 -0.08
France 48.8 -0.21 0.00 48.7 -0.10 0.00
Germany 46.6 0.00 0.00 51.9 0.00 0.00
Greece – – – 33.3 0.00 0.00
Ireland 38.2 -34.61 -0.91 66.7 -13.19 -0.20
Italy 69.7 0.00 0.00 66.7 0.00 0.00
Japan 51.7 0.00 0.00 50.0 0.00 0.00
Luxembourg 36.4 -1.10 -0.03 60.0 -0.66 -0.01
Netherlands 72.1 -0.48 -0.01 65.5 -0.24 0.00
Norway 32.3 -0.81 -0.03 20.0 -0.27 -0.01
Portugal – – – 50.0 0.00 0.00
Spain 59.0 0.00 0.00 42.9 0.00 0.00
Sweden 58.4 -5.35 -0.09 54.5 -2.43 -0.04
Switzerland 71.9 -5.58 -0.08 71.0 -2.34 -0.03
United Kingdom 35.8 -6.02 -0.17 33.8 -4.35 -0.13
United States 53.1 4.50 0.08 53.1 4.50 0.08
Total 50.0 0.00 0.00 50.0 0.00 -0.01
Notes: This table reports the change in the proportion of acquiring firms per country if the
United States switch from applying worldwide taxation to exempting foreign income taxa-
tion. Pi is the original proportion of acquiring firms reported in percent and dPi is the corre-
sponding change in the proportion reported in percent. dPiPi is the implied relative change in
the proportion. Marginal effects are calculated using regression (1) in Table 3.3 and taking the
observations’ explanatory variable values into account. The first three columns relate exclu-
sively to mergers involving the United States, Austria, Greece and Portugal have no values
reported because these countries do not have any U.S.-related merger in the sample. The last
three columns relate to all mergers in the sample.
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3.A Appendix
This appendix discusses the instrumental variable (IV) estimation reported
in Table 3.3. Fiscal policy variables change slowly in comparison to firms’
decision making in international M&As. Corporate income tax rates are not
changed very frequently and the method of relief for double taxation is changed
even less frequently. Therefore, we have assumed so far that the double tax
variable ∆θdoublet is predetermined. Here, we assume to the contrary that this
variable is endogenous. An instrumental variable approach is warranted then.
It appears untoward to instrument the complete set of explanatory variables.
Instead, we instrument only the tax variable of interest and all explanatory
variables that must be endogenous once I assume the tax variable of interest
is endogenous. For example, if I assume the double tax variable ∆θdoublet to be
endogenous, then ∆Taxratet is endogenous as well, because countries tend to
affect double tax rates by changing their corporate income tax rates. Lagged
values of the endogenous variable provide natural instruments (Greene, 2008,
p. 319). One- and two-year lags are chosen to overidentify the model in order
to be able to test the exclusion restrictions and orthogonality conditions.
The IV estimator is basically a system of equations regression. For instance,
there are three equations implicit in regression (10) of Table 3.3 corresponding
to the dependent variable y and the two endogenous explanatory variables
∆θdoublet and ∆Taxratet. I use Newey’s (1987) minimum χ
2 estimator, which
is asymptotically efficient relative to many conventional two-stage probit es-
timators.
The second stage results have already been presented in regression (10) of
Table 3.3. The first stage results are now presented in Table 3.5. The instru-
ments seem to be good predictors of the endogenous explanatory variables.
Furthermore, the instruments should be orthogonal to the error term in the
probit equation and the instruments’ exclusion from the probit specification
should be valid. The IV estimator is overidentified as there are four orthog-
onality conditions instead of two, which would just identify the model. This
enables testing the validity of the instruments. Under the joint null hypothe-
sis of correct model specification and valid orthogonality conditions, Newey’s
minimum distance function follows a χ2 distribution with two degrees of free-
dom. With a test statistic of 3.11 and a p-value of 0.21, the null hypothesis
cannot be rejected.
As a byproduct of Newey’s minimum χ2 estimator, the two-step IV esti-
mator by Rivers and Vuong (1988) is calculated, which allows testing if the
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explanatory variables ∆θdoublet and ∆Taxratet are indeed endogenous. The fit-
ted errors from the first stage regressions must be included as explanatory
variables in the second stage probit regression. Under the null hypothesis of
∆θdoublet and ∆Taxratet being exogenous, the coefficients of the fitted errors are
zero, which can be evaluated by a Wald test. With a test statistic of 0.79 and a
p-value of 0.67, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. ∆θdoublet and ∆Taxratet
may very well be exogenous, which is in line with the reasoning at the begin-
ning of this section. Then the standard regression results are more efficient
than the IV regression results.
CHAPTER 3 55






























Notes: The table reports first stage OLS regressions which are part of the IV estimation re-
ported in column (10) of Table 3.3. The dependent variable is ∆θdouble in regression (1) and
∆Taxrate in regression (2). The variables relate to mergers between a firm a and a firm b.
∆θdouble is the double tax burden if firm a acquires firm b minus the double tax burden if firm
b acquires firm a. ∆θdoublet−1 and ∆θ
double
t−2 are the double tax burdens lagged by one and two
years. ∆Taxrate is the difference between corporate income tax rates of firm a’s country of
origin and firm b’s country of origin. ∆Taxratet−1 and ∆Taxratet−2 are the difference in tax
rates lagged by one and two years. For other variable definitions and data sources, see Ta-
ble 3.1. Country fixed effects are not reported. Stars indicate the significance level: ∗: 5%,
∗∗: 1%.

What a neighbour gets is not lost.
Proverb from the 16th century
CHAPTER 4
THE VOLUME OF CROSS-BORDER M&AS AND
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE INCOME TAXATION1
The previous chapter has focused on the microeconomic effects of double tax-
ation at the firm level. It shows that double taxation has an effect on the di-
rection of mergers and acquisitions (M&As). This chapter, on the other hand,
takes a macroeconomic point of view and analyzes the effect of double taxa-
tion on the aggregate number of M&As. The previous chapter focused on the
tax effect on the direction of mergers. The different approach of this chapter —
replacing individual mergers by aggregate figures as the unit of observation
— allows an analysis of the effect of double taxation on the bilateral volume
of M&As. Double taxation may affect the number of cross-border M&As in
two distinct ways. First, the number of M&As may be relatively low in pres-
ence of double taxation, because the additional burden nullifies the gains of a
potential acquisition. Second, the number of M&As for a particular bilateral
relationship may also be small, because unburdened competitors from coun-
tries with low double taxation value potential target firms in the host country
more. These latter ‘substitution’ effects are also captured when examining ag-
gregate figures of M&As.
Analyzing the volume of cross-border mergers and acquisitions also allows
drawing conclusions about the distorting effects of double taxation on foreign
1This chapter is based on Huizinga and Voget (2006) and Huizinga and Voget (forthcom-
ing).
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direct investment (FDI) in general. In fact, cross-border M&As contribute sub-
stantially to total FDI figures. In 2006, the ratio of the value of cross-border
M&As to worldwide FDI was 72.3 percent (UNCTAD, 2007, Tables B.1 and
B.4).2
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.1 reviews related studies on
international taxation, FDI and M&As. Section 4.2 discusses the data. Sections
4.3 and 4.4 introduce the estimation model and present the estimation results,
while Section 4.5 simulates the impact of the adoption of the exemption sys-
tem of international taxation by the United States on cross-border M&As. Fi-
nally, Section 4.6 concludes.
4.1 Related Studies
The large overlap between aggregate FDI and cross-border M&As places this
chapter in the tradition of a strand of literature that empirically analyzes the
effect of taxation on FDI.
Studies on taxation and FDI typically use aggregate national or bilateral FDI
data and hence do not distinguish between the part of FDI due to M&As and
other components of FDI such as greenfield investment, reinvested earnings,
or intra-company loans. Among these studies, Grubert and Mutti (1991),
Hines and Rice (1994), and Altshuler et al. (2001) find that a one percent-
age point increase in the local tax rate reduces the FDI stock between 0.1 and
2.8 percent. Other studies, such as Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987),
Newlon (1987), and Young (1988), use time series data of single countries,
yielding estimated tax elasticities of FDI of around -0.6. All these studies fo-
cus only on local taxation and ignore international double taxation.
Slemrod (1990) and Hines (1996) recognize the importance of international
double taxation for inward U.S. FDI by distinguishing between investments
from countries with and without worldwide taxation of corporate income. In
the absence of worldwide taxation, the U.S. tax constitutes the overall tax on
U.S.-source income. Slemrod (1990) indeed finds some time-series evidence
that U.S. taxation more strongly affects investments from countries without
2The value of M&As resulting in an acquisition abroad is counted as outward FDI of the
acquiring country to the extent that the acquiring firm finances the transaction in its home
financial market. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2000, p. 10)
discusses the differences between cross-border M&A and FDI data, and it concludes that the
data suggest that M&As have contributed an increasing share of FDI flows to developed and
developing countries alike.
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worldwide taxation. Hines (1996) further investigates how investments by
the two groups of countries across U.S. states vary with the state-level corpo-
rate income tax rate. Countries with worldwide taxation are shown to invest
relatively more in U.S. states with high corporate income tax rates. This re-
flects that multinationals located in countries with worldwide taxation would
be able to obtain off-setting foreign tax credits for U.S. state taxes.
If bilateral investment flows are considered, there are, of course, many non-
tax factors that determine observed outcomes. Several previous studies have
used the gravity model to explain international investment outcomes. Portes
and Rey (2005), for instance, estimate a gravity equation for trade in financial
assets, while Wei (2000), Evenett (2003) and Buch et al. (2004) use the gravity
model to explain FDI flows. In a recent study, Di Giovanni (2005) applies the
gravity model to the volume of cross-border M&As.3 As already mentioned
in Chapter 3, several studies focus on non-tax determinants of cross-border
M&As. Rossi and Volpin (2004), for example, report a governance motive for
cross-border takeovers. Firms in countries with strong shareholder protec-
tion, in particular, tend to acquire firms in countries with poor shareholder
protection. This enables firms in countries with poor shareholder protection
to ‘import’ better protection, possibly resulting in a lower cost of capital and
higher firm valuation. In line with this, Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that an
industry’s market value increases when firms in that industry are acquired
by foreign firms residing in countries with better shareholder protection and
better accounting standards.
4.2 The Data
The sample is similar to the previous chapter. From the Thomson Financial
SDC database, I select all M&As involving any two countries in a sample of
European countries, Japan and the United States during the 1985-2004 period.
The cross-border acquiring firm becomes the parent firm of the newly cre-
ated multinational firm, while the target firm becomes a foreign subsidiary or
branch. For tax purposes, the newly created multinational is resident in the
acquiring or parent country. The database does not provide information on
whether a subsidiary or a branch is created. As subsidiary structures are more
3In the trade literature, the gravity model has been applied for much longer. See Tinbergen
(1962) for an early empirical application, and Anderson (1979) for a theoretical justification of
the gravity approach in trade.
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common, I take these to be the benchmark case. In the empirical work, how-
ever, I consider the international taxation of branches as a robustness check.
The acquiring firm, as reported by Thomson, becomes the immediate owner of
the target firm. The database also provides information on the ultimate owner
of the newly acquired firm. In some cases, the nationalities of the immediate
and ultimate owners differ and the ultimate owner uses a holding company
in another country to acquire the target. Corporate structures of this kind may
aim to delay or avoid taxation by the ultimate parent country. In a robustness
check, I exclude countries where multinationals commonly use organizational
structures involving immediate owners in other countries. Table 4.1 shows the
number of acquiring firms and target firms in the sample per country.4 The
table also reports the value of acquired firms and target firms per country (if
available). From the table, one can see that Eastern European countries tend to
be home to relatively many target firms. Japan and the United States instead
are shown to attract relatively many acquiring firms despite these countries’
high taxation of incoming dividends as seen in Table 2.6.5
4.3 Estimating Equation
I apply the gravity model to estimate the impact of international double taxa-
tion on bilateral aggregate numbers of inward and outward M&As. Aggregate
numbers of this kind reflect the directions of M&As between any two coun-
tries, as considered in the previous chapter, and in addition the total number
of M&As between the two countries. In practice, there are no M&As for some
country pairs. To reflect this, I will estimate a tobit, censored regression model








0 if MA∗ijt < 0
(4.1)
where MAijt is the number of M&As at time t with i and j denoting the acquir-
ing and target countries, and MA∗ijt is an index function given by
MA∗ijt = β0 + β
′xijt + εijt. (4.2)
In (4.2), xijt is a set of explanatory variables and β0 and β are parameters to
be estimated, and εijt is a normally distributed error term. The main variable
4The data provider claims to register cross-border M&As exhaustively.
5The large differences in the ratio of acquiring firms to target firms suggests the presence
of country-specific effects.
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of interest as part of xijt is the double tax rate τdoubleijt discussed in Chapter 2.
Higher double taxation imposed by country i on the foreign source income
of local parent firms is expected to lead to fewer M&As where this country
is the acquiring country.6 Next, Dijτdoubleijt is the interaction of a dummy vari-
able Dij signalling deferral of country i’s taxation of income from country j
and the double tax rate τdoubleijt . International double taxation is expected to
affect aggregate M&As less negatively, if it can be deferred. I also include the
acquiring and target country corporate income tax rates τit and τjt. Taxation
in both countries may discourage the formation of multinationals operating
in the two countries. Among the non-tax controls, I include standard gravity
model variables such as the bilateral distance, Distij, and the two countries’
real gross domestic products, GDPit and GDPjt. These variables — as other
controls, apart from categorical variables — are in logarithms. Additional ex-
planatory variables are the parent and subsidiary countries’ per capita real
gross domestic product, denoted GDPpercapit and GDPpercapjt. Multina-
tional firms often have parent firms in rich countries, which suggests a posi-
tive effect for GDPpercapit. At the same time, multinational firms may wish
to acquire targets in low-wage countries to have access to cheap labor or in
high-wage countries to have access to skilled labor and interesting product
markets. Hence, the impact of target country per capita GDP, GDPpercapjt,
can possibly have either sign.
Next, parent country financial development variables such as stock market
valuation over GDP, (Stocks/GDP)it−1, and credit provision to the private
sector over GDP, (Credit/GDP)it−1, are expected to have a positive impact on
acquisitions. Following Di Giovanni (2005), I lag these variables for financial
depth by one period to avoid endogeneity. The rate of appreciation of coun-
try i ’s bilateral real exchange rate with respect to country j, ∆Exch.rateijt−1,
is expected to promote acquisitions in country j as this country’s assets have
become cheaper. The mean statutory tariff rate in the target country, Tarif fsjt,
could equally have a positive impact on acquisitions in that country if multi-
nationals wish to ‘jump’ a country’s tariffs. An index counting the types of
capital controls in the target country, Controlsjt, may negatively impact on
acquisitions, as they may prevent foreign investors from acquiring local com-
panies. The variables Borderij and Languageij denote a common border and
6As mentioned in Chapter 2, international double taxation also comes in the form of non-
resident dividend withholding taxes. Higher non-resident dividend withholding taxes im-
posed by country j on flows to country i are expected to result in fewer M&As where country
i is the acquiring country and country j is the target country.
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language and they are both expected to have a positive impact on bilateral
acquisitions. The EUijt variable in turn reflects joint membership of the Eu-
ropean Union, and this variable is also expected to foster acquisitions. Next,
Legalqualityjt measures the quality of the legal structure and the security of
property rights in the target country. I expect this variable to have a positive
impact on acquisitions in the target country, as it signals some protection from
expropriation and other unreasonable treatment. Table 4.2 provides all vari-
able definitions and data sources and Table 4.3 provides the variables’ sum-
mary statistics. Finally, the regressions contain dummy variables for acquiring
and target countries and for time.7
4.4 Estimation Results
Table 4.4 reports regressions explaining the logarithm of the bilateral number
of M&As, MAijt, resulting in parent and subsidiary firms in countries i and
j, respectively. Regression (1) shows a coefficient of -0.017 for the double tax
rate variable τdoubleijt that is statistically significant. This estimate suggests that
an increase in the double tax rate by 1 percentage point reduces the number
of foreign acquisitions by 1.7 percent.8 The acquiring and target country tax
rates, τit and τjt, both obtain negative coefficients, but only the latter coeffi-
cient is statistically significant. The various control variables enter the regres-
sion largely as expected. Distance has a negative impact on the number of
cross-border acquisitions. The GDPs of the acquiring and target countries en-
7Differences in capital gains taxation may also have an influence on the direction and the
form of an international M&A. An empirical study by Ayers et al. (2003) suggests that such
an effect may exist, as these authors find that domestic shareholder-level capital gains taxes
are associated with higher acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. I do not explicitly
take capital gains taxes into account. There is, however, no bilateral variation in capital gains
taxes. Hence, country-specific effects should be sufficient to control for their effect.
8This is less than the 9.0 percent change reported in the previous chapter in Section 3.4,
but it should be kept in mind that the 9.0 percent applies for the specific case of a merger of
equals. Note that the estimate of 1.7 percent is an upper bound given the tobit specification.




= β× Prob [MA∗ijt ≥ 0] .
The coefficient vector β gives an upper bound of marginal effects because 0 < Prob [MA∗ijt ≥
0] < 1. The marginal effects for country-pairs involving two big countries will approximate
this upper bound because the probability of a positive number of acquisitions is close to one.
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ter with positive coefficients that are not statistically significant in this regres-
sion that includes country dummy variables.9 Stock market capitalization in
the acquiring country has a positive and statistically significant impact on the
number of acquisitions, as does the target country’s tariff rate. A shared bor-
der and a common language equally are positively and significantly related to
the number of acquisitions.
Next, in regression (2), I include the double tax rate interacted with a defer-
ral dummy. This variable obtains a positive coefficient, but it is statistically
insignificant. This may reflect that the deferral option is not very valuable
to merging firms, or alternatively, that the deferral variable measures the ex-
pected availability of deferral imprecisely.
In regression (3), I include the legal quality variable.10 The regression shows
that the target country’s legal quality is positively and significantly related
to the number of acquisitions with no change in the estimated coefficient for
the double tax variable. Regression (4) uses a τdoubleijt variable constructed on
the assumption that the newly created multinationals have an international
branch rather than subsidiary structure. The estimated coefficient for the dou-
ble tax variable is little changed. Regression (5) replaces the number of M&A
deals by the value of these deals.11 The estimated coefficients for the dou-
9If the ‘import’ and ‘export’ country dummy variables are left out, the GDP variables be-
come highly significant. Therefore, GDP is able to explain a great deal of cross-country vari-
ation in the number of M&As, but the covariation over time between GDP and the number
of M&As is weaker than the link between GDP and trade, for example. This is probably due
to trade exhibiting a relatively stable growth rate as compared to M&As that occur in waves
with large declines in between these waves.
10The legal quality variable is not part of the benchmark regression because this variable is
computed differently before 1995. Furthermore, values between 1985 and 1990, and between
1990 and 1995 have been interpolated.
11 There is a caveat using the value of M&A values as the dependent variable. Replacing
the number of M&As by the value of M&As introduces a sample bias with respect to country
coverage. The data provider, Thompson, claims to have an exhaustive list of international
M&As. Using the number of M&As thus does not introduce a sample bias. However, the deal
values of an M&A are only recorded in about 40 percent of all cases, as the information is often
not publicly available. In addition, there is a strong geographical pattern in the missing data.
For example, the share of acquiring companies from the United Kingdom would increase from
19.3 percent to 31.6 percent of all acquisitions in the sample. The share of acquiring German
firms would decrease from 10.0 percent to 6.2 percent. The same holds for the pattern of target
firms: Using the deal values would increase the share of US target firms from 17.2 percent to
25.1 percent of all targets in the sample. The German share would decrease from 12.9 percent
to 8.8 percent. Such a structural mismeasurement of the dependent variable by about 50
percent would result in extremely biased estimation results.
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ble tax variable is now estimated to be -0.052, which is more negative than
in regression (1) to suggest that deals with a larger value are relatively more
affected by international double taxation.
Next, I present several regressions that indicate how robust the results are to
changes in the estimation approach. First, regression (6) is estimated by ordi-
nary least squares using only uncensored observations with a positive number
of M&As. Disregarding censored observations should result in an attenuation
of coefficients and indeed the estimated coefficient for the double tax rate vari-
able now is less negative at -0.009, but it remains significant. Second, regres-
sion (7) assumes that the dependent variable yn ≡ MAijt is Poisson distrib-
uted such that Prob(Yn = yn) =
exp−λn λynn
yn! for yn = 0, 1, 2... with ln λn = β
′xn.
Again, the estimated coefficient for the double tax variable is negative at -0.018
and statistically significant. Regression (8) generalizes the previous one by as-
suming that the dependent variable is distributed according to the negative
binomial distribution with similar results.12
As discussed in Section 3.4 of the previous chapter, there is a possibility that
tax policy is endogenous to the international pattern of M&As. In fact, changes
in this pattern may well prompt countries to change their tax policies to affect
the number of M&As they are involved in as acquiring or target countries.
Hence, τdoubleijt , τit and τjt are potentially endogenous to the number of ob-
served M&As. To adjust for this, I instrument these variables by their one- and
two-year lagged values in a two-step instrumental variable tobit regression.13
Standard errors are adjusted for variation from the first-step regression. The
double tax variable remains statistically significant and obtains a coefficient of
-0.018 in regression (9). A Wald test of the hypothesis that τdoubleijt , τit, and τjt
are exogenous cannot be rejected. Similarly, a test of the hypothesis that the in-
struments are valid cannot be rejected. Overall, this section’s results show that
international double taxation has a significant impact on parent firm location
at the aggregate, national level. These results are robust to various changes in
model specification and estimation technique.
12One restrictive consequence of a Poisson distribution is the equality of the distribution’s
mean to its variance. The negative binomial distribution relaxes this restriction such that
Prob(Yn = yn) =
exp−λn λynn
yn ! for yn = 0, 1, 2... with ln λn = β
′xn + ln un. The last term ln un
represents additional sources of variance such as unobservable or omitted variables and is
distributed according to un ∼ Gamma(1/α, α) where α is estimated jointly with the coeffi-
cients β.
13For further details on the instrumental variable estimation, see the Appendix 4.A.
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4.5 Simulation of a US Policy Switch to Exempting
Foreign Income
Similar to the previous chapter, I simulate how an abolition of worldwide tax-
ation by the United States would affect the the pattern of cross-border M&As.
The international tax systems of other countries are assumed to remain un-
changed. In the simulations, I use the estimated coefficients of regression (1)
in Table 4.4. On average, US firms acquired 549.7 foreign targets per year be-
tween 2000 and 2002. The switch in US international taxation would increase
this number by 57.6, which is a 10.5 percent increase. Table 4.5 reports the US
acquisitions and the simulated increase in US acquisitions per target country.
Percentage changes are also reported. For a particular host country, the in-
crease in target firms depends on the size of double taxation that is eliminated
by the change in US tax policy. The lower the host country’s corporate income
tax rate, the more double taxation is eliminated. Specifically, the number of
target firms in the United Kingdom (acquired by US firms) would increase by
19.0 percent. For some smaller countries (with very low corporate income tax
rates and hence a high double tax burden to be eliminated), the increase in
target firms is even larger: The number of Irish target firms would increase by
39.0 percent and the number of Estonian target firms would nearly double.
The effect of the U.S. abolishing worldwide taxation on the direction of cross-
border M&As has already been simulated in the previous chapter. In the fol-
lowing, the two simulations are reconciled. This chapter and the previous
chapter have approached the same subject — double taxation of international
profit flows and its effect on cross-border merger and acquisitions — from a
different point of view. The present chapter has taken a macroeconomic view
by analyzing aggregate patterns of cross-border mergers and acquisition. The
previous chapter has taken a microeconomic point of view by analyzing the
impact of double taxation on the firm level.
The macroeconomic estimates allow statements about the changes in the
number of acquirers Aj and the number of targets Tj in country j. The micro-
economic approach takes the occurrence of a merger as given, so it can make
no statement on the total number of firms involved in cross-border mergers
Fj ≡ Aj + Tj, but it estimates the probability Pj that a firm from country j in-
volved in a merger is the acquiring party. The two different approaches are
linked by the following identities:
Aj = Pj · Fj (4.3)
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Tj = (1− Pj) · Fj (4.4)




























The last expression allows a reconciliation of the macroeconomic and micro-
economic simulation by substituting per country the results from Table 4.5 on
the left-hand side of (4.7) and the results from Table 3.4 on the right-hand side
of (4.7).14 The correlation between the left-hand side values derived in this
chapter and the right-hand side values derived in the previous chapter is 0.90.
The scatterplot in Figure 4.1 illustrates this correlation. The two simulations
arrive at similar results.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter shows that the international tax system affects the pattern of
cross-border M&As. Specifically, firms from countries that impose high lev-
els of international double taxation engage less in acquisitions abroad. An
increase in double taxation by one percentage point decreases the frequency
of cross-border mergers and acquisitions by 1.7 percent. International double
taxation comes in the form of non-resident dividend withholding taxes and
parent-country corporate income taxation of repatriated dividends. With re-
spect to dividend withholding taxes, the results imply that a host country can
encourage acquisitions from another country by lowering withholding taxes
vis-à-vis that country. This will be reflected in increased FDI inflows as cross-
border M&As are a main contributor to FDI. This chapter’s results allow to
quantify the FDI-promoting aspects of double tax treaties. A typical double
tax treaty reduces withholding taxes by 15 percentage points from the rate
14If the US exempts dividend repatriations from taxation, the term dTj/Tj is non-negative
for all countries as reported in Table 4.5. The term dAj/Aj is positive for the US and zero for
all other countries as reported in the notes to Table 4.5.
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that would apply in the absence of a treaty. Assuming both signatory coun-
tries to have a corporate income tax rate of 33.3 percent and to exempt foreign
source dividends from taxation or provide indirect tax credits, it follows that
such a decrease in withholding taxes on dividends increases the number of
cross-border mergers and acquisitions between these two countries by 17 per-
cent.15
With respect to double taxation in the form of parent-country corporate in-
come taxation of repatriated dividends, the results imply that multinationals
subject to double taxation are relatively less represented especially in those
host countries where they are at a comparative disadvantage compared to
multinationals whose home countries do not impose double taxes. This is
especially an issue in host countries with low corporate income tax rates due
to the nature of foreign tax credits.16 Hence, this chapter generalizes Hines’
1996 findings in an international context.17 Furthermore, it quantifies how the
difference in host and home country tax levels affect investment via double
taxation.
To summarize, the sensitivity of organizational outcomes of cross-border
takeovers to international double taxation suggests that this taxation may carry
significant economic costs in distorting international relationships of owner-
ship and control. For that reason, the causes of double taxation should be elim-
inated. Non-resident dividend withholding taxes, in fact, are already quite
low for most countries in my sample due to the EU Parent-Subsidiary Direc-
tive. This directive, adopted in 1990, eliminates the taxation of intra-EU, intra-
company dividend flows. Parent-country corporate taxation of foreign-source
income, however, is still substantial in the EU and elsewhere. As already men-
15Table 2.3 implies that τdoubleijt increases by 10 when corporate tax rates of 33.3 percent are
assumed and when the two countries either exempt dividend repatriations from taxation or
provide indirect tax credits. The 17 percent increase is, as mentioned before, an upper limit
because it is based on coefficient estimates from tobit regressions.
16As an example: if the United Kingdom decreases its tax rate from 30 percent to 29 percent,
this generally has a positive effect on the number of foreign firms that acquire British firms.
For firms from the United States, however, this positive effect is nullified by the accompanying
increase in double taxation because the decrease in the United Kingdom tax results in lower
foreign tax credits. Consequently, US acquirers are relatively less represented than acquirers
from other countries.
17Hines (1996) wrote that “the ability to apply foreign tax credits against home-country tax
liabilities reduces an investor’s incentive to avoid high-tax foreign locations”. In light of this
chapter, one is tempted to transform this line as follows: “The inability to fully exploit low
host country tax rates due to double taxation restricts investors subject to worldwide taxation
to high-tax foreign locations.”
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tioned in Chapter 3, this may change as well in the near future. The United
Kingdom is about to abandon its traditional foreign tax credit system and ex-
empt dividend income from abroad from taxation. And in the United States,
the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform (2005) has advocated
the elimination of worldwide taxation by the US.
The findings in the last three chapters raise quite a few further questions.
The residence of multinationals is sensitive to double taxation, but what is the
exact value of having a multinational’s headquarter in the country? Of course,
for countries with worldwide taxation their presence increases the tax base,
but are there any positive spill-over effects? After all, a headquarter employs
high-skilled labor. Research and development often takes place close to the
headquarter’s location. Maybe there even exists a home bias in multination-
als’ investment decisions. The choice of taxation regime for foreign income is
decisive for the eventual size of double tax burdens. Do countries make their
choice in a strategic manner or is it a result of tradition and history? How
does the choice of taxation regime interact with the level of the tax rate? Large
foreign-tax-credit countries in general have lower corporate income tax rates
than large countries that exempt foreign income from taxation. Is that pure co-
incidence or is this difference caused by the countries’ desire to keep double
taxation at a minimum? The limitation of double taxes would reduce incen-
tives to relocate headquarters and also support the activities of a country’s
multinationals abroad where they have to compete with other multinationals
whose foreign income is exempt from taxation. Does it amplify the degree
of tax competition if foreign-tax-credit countries have such an additional in-
centive to reduce corporate income taxes? These questions are left for future
research.
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Table 4.1: Outgoing versus incoming acquisitions
Country Number of Number of Value of Value of
acquiring firms target firms acquisitions target firms
(millions of (millions of
US dollars) US dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Austria 624 552 10,947 19,399
Belgium 940 995 63,923 62,269
Bulgaria 0 67 0 2,857
Croatia 6 39 120 1,538
Czech Republic 18 438 86 11,046
Denmark 852 761 25,097 27,646
Estonia 23 117 89 454
Finland 787 717 51,614 33,970
France 2,720 3,563 378,284 200,067
Germany 3361 4,372 381502 453,361
Greece 114 48 7,451 3,377
Hungary 46 428 888 7,069
Iceland 36 11 1,861 369
Ireland 792 409 28,207 22,084
Italy 882 1,610 70,579 83,971
Japan 1,073 398 82,879 41,202
Latvia 7 52 6 395
Lithuania 10 88 1 1,246
Luxembourg 205 127 20,105 19,759
Netherlands 2,173 1,728 203,345 172,100
Norway 554 639 19,455 34,786
Poland 27 570 403 13,831
Portugal 95 298 1,998 9,535
Romania 6 101 6 1,946
Slovak Republic 7 88 25 2,851
Spain 430 1,531 34,698 63,276
Sweden 1,682 1,299 96,144 128,616
Switzerland 1,310 1,105 173,394 57,662
United Kingdom 6,479 5,429 978,858 583,042
United States 8,142 5,821 535,888 1108,131
Total 33,401 33,401 3167,853 3167,853
Notes: This table lists the number of acquiring firms (column 1) and the number of target firms
(column 2) per country. Column 3 lists the deal value of foreign acquisitions and column 4
lists the deal value of acquisitions by foreign firms in millions of US dollars. The sample
includes all M&As between listed countries recorded in the Thomson database from 1985
through 2004.
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Table 4.2: Variable definitions and data sources
Variable Description and data source
MAijt Frequency of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the year t,
in which the acquiring firm is located in country i and the target
firm is located in country j. A transaction is included if the bid-
ding firm acquires a controlling stake in the target firm. Source:
Thomson Financial, SDC Database.
τdoubleijt Double tax rate for dividend income repatriated from country j to
country i in year t. This rate includes the burden of withholding
taxes. Sources as for the variable ∆θdouble above.
Dij Dummy variable indicating potential deferral granted by acquir-
ing country i of taxes on subsidiary’s profits in country j. Data
are for 2004. Sources as for the variable ∆θdouble above.
τit Corporate income tax rate (in percent) in the acquiring country i.
Sources as for the variable ∆θdouble above.
τjt Corporate income tax rate (in percent) in the target country j.
Sources as for the variable ∆θdouble above.
Distanceij Distance in miles between the capital of acquiring firms’ country
i and the capital of target firms’ country j (logarithm). Source:
Rose (2000).
GDPit Gross domestic product of the acquiring country in constant 1995
U.S. dollars (logarithm). Source: World Development Indicators
2004, World Bank (2004).
GDPjt Gross domestic product of the target country in constant 1995
U.S. dollars (logarithm). Source: World Development Indicators
2004, World Bank (2004).
GDPpercapit Real income per capita of the acquiring country (logarithm).
Source: World Development Indicators 2004, World Bank (2004).
GDPpercapjt Real income per capita of the target country (logarithm). Source:
World Development Indicators 2004, World Bank (2004).
(continued on the next page)
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Table 4.2 (continued)
Variable Description and data source
(Stocks/GDP)it−1 Ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP of the acquiring country
(logarithm). Source: World Development Indicators 2004, World Bank
(2004).
(Credit/GDP)it−1 Ratio of domestic credit to the private sector to GDP of the acquir-
ing country (logarithm). Source: World Development Indicators 2004,
World Bank (2004).
∆Exch.rateijt−1 Change in the logarithm of the real bilateral exchange rate between
countries i and j between the end of year t− 1 and t− 2. An increase in
this variable represents an appreciation of country i’s currency. Source:
International Financial Statistics 2007, IMF (2007).
Tarif f sjt Mean statutory tariff rate of target country (logarithm). Source: Gwart-
ney and Lawson (2005).
Controlsjt Index of the number of capital controls in the target country based on
13 types of capital controls reported by the IMF. The original index is
inverted such that a higher index corresponds to more capital controls.
Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005).
Borderij Dummy variable indicating whether acquiring country i and target
country j have a common land border. Source: Rose (2000).
Languageij Dummy variable indicating whether acquiring country i and target
country j share a common language. Source: Rose (2000).
EUijt Dummy variable indicating whether acquiring country i and target
country j were both members of the European Union in year t. Source:
Rose (2000).
Legalqualityjt Indicator for the quality of legal structure and the security of property
rights in the target country. The definition of the variable was broad-
ened in 1995. Values between 1985 and 1990, and between 1990 and
1995 have been interpolated. Source: Gwartney and Lawson (2005).
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Table 4.3: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max
MAijt 8042 3.51 13.14 0.00 364.00
τdoubleijt 8042 5.35 6.29 0.00 42.00
Dij τdoubleijt 8042 4.98 6.12 0.00 40.40
τit 8042 35.38 9.36 0.00 61.80
τjt 8042 35.70 8.87 0.00 65.00
Distanceij 8042 6.93 0.91 4.37 8.82
GDPit 8042 12.25 1.88 8.45 16.03
GDPjt 8042 12.18 1.92 8.31 16.03
GDPpercapit 8042 9.73 0.94 7.29 10.99
GDPpercapjt 8042 9.73 0.97 7.24 10.99
(Stocks/GDP)it−1 8042 -1.08 1.19 -6.43 1.70
(Credit/GDP)it−1 8042 -0.40 0.73 -2.64 0.71
∆Exch.rateijt−1 8042 0.00 0.16 -1.45 1.45
Tarif f sjt 8042 1.58 0.79 -4.09 3.10
Controlsjt 8042 3.08 2.49 0.00 10.00
Borderij 8042 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
Languageij 8042 0.05 0.22 0.00 1.00
EUijt 8042 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
Legalqualityjt 8042 7.86 1.19 4.50 9.60
Notes: For variable definitions and data sources, see Table 4.2.
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Table 4.4: Estimation results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bench- Deferral Legal Branches
mark quality
τdoubleijt -0.017
∗∗ -0.024∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Dijτdoubleijt – 0.008 – –
(0.006)
τit -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
τjt -0.019∗∗ -0.019∗∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.019∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Distanceij -0.967∗∗ -0.964∗∗ -0.970∗∗ -0.955∗∗
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036)
GDPit 0.553 0.732 0.564 0.553
(0.957) (0.966) (0.957) (0.920)
GDPjt 1.394 1.370 1.142 0.801
(0.874) (0.873) (0.880) (0.857)
GDPpercapit 1.236 1.043 1.205 1.236
(1.084) (1.092) (1.083) (1.037)
GDPpercapjt -1.209 -1.170 -0.916 -0.595
(0.935) (0.935) (0.943) (0.915)
(Stocks/GDP)it−1 0.239∗∗ 0.236∗∗ 0.240∗∗ 0.236∗∗
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039)
(Credit/GDP)it−1 0.151∗ 0.153∗ 0.151∗ 0.163∗∗
(0.061) (0.061) (0.061) (0.061)
∆Exch.rateijt−1 0.131 0.136 0.134 0.152
(0.094) (0.094) (0.094) (0.090)
Tarif f sjt 0.197∗∗ 0.193∗∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.179∗∗
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.058)
Controlsjt -0.010 -0.010 -0.010 -0.004
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Borderij 0.154∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.151∗∗ 0.176∗∗
(0.055) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054)
Languageij 0.230∗∗ 0.231∗∗ 0.230∗∗ 0.246∗∗
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.052)
EUijt -0.049 -0.038 -0.056 0.007
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.045)
Legalqualityjt – – 0.102∗ –
(0.045)
Observations 8042 8042 8042 8845
Log-likelihood -5110.6 -5109.6 -5108.0 -5411.7
(continued on next page)
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Table 4.4 (continued)
(5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Deal OLS Poisson Negative IV
values binomial
τdoubleijt -0.052
∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.018∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.018∗∗
(0.016) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
τit 0.002 -0.001 -0.009∗ -0.005 -0.006
(0.014) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
τjt -0.074∗∗ -0.011∗∗ -0.017∗∗ -0.025∗∗ -0.023∗∗
(0.013) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Distanceij -2.647∗∗ -0.718∗∗ -0.881∗∗ -1.181∗∗ -0.942∗∗
(0.153) (0.038) (0.052) (0.048) (0.038)
GDPit 1.932 1.440 2.143∗ 1.365 1.034
(3.950) (1.069) (0.937) (1.066) (1.014)
GDPjt 8.365∗ 2.299∗ 0.379 1.821 2.714∗∗
(3.659) (1.011) (1.145) (1.032) (0.952)
GDPpercapit 2.502 -0.530 0.067 0.798 0.649
(4.546) (1.204) (1.075) (1.226) (1.165)
GDPpercapjt -8.493∗ -2.618∗ 0.557 -1.341 -2.981∗∗
(3.983) (1.070) (1.267) (1.125) (1.042)
(Stocks/GDP)it−1 0.639∗∗ 0.243∗∗ 0.664∗∗ 0.454∗∗ 0.282∗∗
(0.174) (0.046) (0.074) (0.055) (0.043)
(Credit/GDP)it−1 0.338 0.102 0.230∗ 0.208∗∗ 0.162∗
(0.269) (0.062) (0.091) (0.081) (0.063)
∆Exch.rateijt−1 0.375 0.104 0.114 0.160 0.082
(0.385) (0.109) (0.139) (0.118) (0.155)
Tarif f sjt 0.639∗ 0.129∗ 0.173 0.223∗∗ 0.141∗
(0.259) (0.062) (0.088) (0.080) (0.063)
Controlsjt -0.089 0.010 0.001 -0.014 -0.008
(0.050) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
Borderij 0.157 0.104 0.147∗ 0.139∗ 0.180∗∗
(0.236) (0.055) (0.058) (0.061) (0.057)
Languageij 0.289 0.255∗∗ 0.612∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.213∗∗
(0.218) (0.057) (0.048) (0.054) (0.053)
EUijt -0.175 -0.096∗ -0.106 -0.122∗ -0.059
(0.198) (0.049) (0.060) (0.053) (0.048)
Wald test: 0.53/0.91
Overid. test: 6.08/0.11
Observations 6873 3339 8042 8042 7100
Log-likelihood/R2 -6253.9 0.656 -11691.8 -9969.3 n.a.
Notes: Unless indicated otherwise, these are tobit regressions and the dependent variable is
the logarithm of the frequency of M&As in year t, in which the acquiring firm is located in
country i and the target firm in country j. Zero observation are taken into account as censored
observations. Regression (4) assumes that target firms are integrated as foreign branches.
Regression (5) uses the logarithm of the deal values of M&As as dependent
(continued on next page)
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(notes continued)
variable. Regression (6) is an ordinary least squares regression using the uncensored obser-
vations (i.e., those with a positive number of M&As). Regression (7) is a Poisson regression
using the number of M&As as dependent variable. Regression (8) is a negative binomial
regression using the number of M&As as dependent variable. Regression (9) is a two-step
instrumental variable tobit regression, where τdoubleijt , τit and τjt are instrumented by their one-
and two-year lagged values. Country and time fixed effects are not reported. The Wald test
of exogeneity has as null hypothesis that the variables τdoubleijt , τit and τjt are exogenous. With
a χ2 statistic of 0.53 and a p-value of 0.91, this hypothesis cannot be rejected. The test of the
overidentifying restrictions has an Amemiya-Lee-Newey minimum χ2 statistic of 6.08 and a
p-value of 0.11. The hypothesis that the instruments are valid cannot be rejected. Standard
errors are provided in parentheses. Stars indicate the significance level: ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%. For
detailed variable definitions and data sources, see Table 4.2.
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Austria 5.0 0.2 0.05
Belgium 16.7 0.0 0.00
Bulgaria 1.0 0.0 0.00
Croatia 0.3 0.0 0.00
Czech Republic 8.3 0.8 0.10
Denmark 11.0 1.5 0.13
Estonia 1.0 1.0 0.99
Finland 5.7 0.8 0.14
France 56.3 0.6 0.01
Germany 74.7 0.0 0.00
Greece 0.3 0.0 0.00
Hungary 3.7 1.2 0.33
Iceland 0.7 0.2 0.24
Ireland 13.0 5.1 0.39
Italy 24.3 0.0 0.00
Japan 27.0 0.0 0.00
Latvia 0.0 0.0 naa
Lithuania 1.7 0.5 0.27
Luxembourg 1.0 0.0 0.04
Netherlands 24.7 0.8 0.03
Norway 9.0 0.2 0.02
Poland 10.0 1.4 0.14
Portugal 2.0 0.1 0.05
Romania 2.7 0.1 0.03
Slovak Republic 1.0 0.1 0.14
Spain 16.0 0.0 0.00
Sweden 21.0 3.3 0.16
Switzerland 15.0 2.9 0.19
United Kingdom 196.7 36.9 0.19
United States nab nab nab
Notes: The table reports the change in target firms per country if the United States switch from applying worldwide
taxation to exempting foreign income taxation. Tj is the average number of target firms acquired by US firms between
2000 and 2002 and dTj is the predicted average increase in target firms acquired by US firms. dTj/Tj is the implied
relative change in target firms. Predictions are calculated using regression (1) in Table 4.4 and taking the observations’
explanatory variable values into account.
a: US firms did not acquire any Latvian firm from 2000 to 2002, so the growth rate is not defined.
b: The number of US target firms is not affected. However, the average number of acquiring US firms is AUS = 549.7,
the average predicted increase in acquiring US firms is dAUS = 57.6 and the relative change in acquiring US firms is
dAUS/AUS = 0.105.
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Figure 4.1: Comparing simulations of the United States exempting
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This scatter plot illustrates the similarity between the simulations in Sections 3.5
and 4.5. Every scatter represents one country. The horizontal axis measures the
left-hand term of expression (4.7) for a given country, which is derived in Section
4.5 and reported in Table 4.5. The vertical axis measures the right-hand term of
expression (4.7) for a given country, which is derived in Section 3.5 and reported
in Table 3.4. The correlation coefficient of the left- and right-hand side is 0.90.
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4.A Appendix
This appendix discusses the instrumental (IV) estimation reported in Table 4.4
in detail. Tax policy is a slow process in comparison to firms’ decision mak-
ing in international mergers and acquisitions. Corporate income tax levels
are not changed very frequently and the method of relief for double taxation
is changed even less frequently. Therefore, we have assumed so far that the
double tax variable τdoubleijt , is predetermined. Here, I assume to the contrary
that this variable is endogenous, which requires an instrumental variable ap-
proach.
It appears untoward to instrument the complete set of explanatory variables.
Instead, I instrument only the tax variable of interest and all explanatory vari-
ables that must be endogenous once I assume the tax variable of interest is en-
dogenous. More specifically, if I assume the double tax variable τdoubleijt , to be
endogenous, then τit and τjt are most probably endogenous as well, because
countries tend to affect double tax rates by changing their corporate income
tax rates. As before, one- and two-year lagged values are chosen as instru-
ments for the endogenous variables to be able to test the exclusion restrictions
and orthogonality conditions.
The IV estimator is basically a system of equations regression. For instance,
there are four equations implicit in regression (9) of Table 4.4 corresponding to
the dependent variable MAijt and the three endogenous explanatory variables
τdoubleijt , τit and τjt. The system of equations is estimated using Newey’s (1987)
minimum χ2 estimator which is asymptotically efficient relative to many con-
ventional two-stage tobit estimators.
The second stage results have already been reported in regression (9) of Ta-
ble 4.4. The first stage results are reported in Table 4.6. The chosen instru-
ments predict the endogenous explanatory variables well. The IV estimator
is overidentified as there are six orthogonality conditions instead of the min-
imum three, which are necessary to identify the model. Under the joint null
hypothesis of correct model specification and valid orthogonality conditions,
Newey’s minimum distance function follows a χ2 distribution with three de-
grees of freedom. With a test statistic of 6.08 and a p-value of 0.11, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. Under the null hypothesis of τdoubleijt , τit and τjt
being exogenous, the first stage regression fitted errors have no effect in the
second stage tobit regression. With a Wald test statistic of 0.53 and a p-value
of 0.91, τdoubleijt , τit and τjt are probably exogenous and the standard regression
results should be preferred.
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τit−1 -0.033∗∗ 0.690∗∗ 0.003
(0.009) (0.011) (0.012)
τit−2 -0.024∗∗ -0.034∗∗ -0.001
(0.008) (0.011) (0.011)
τjt−1 0.048∗∗ 0.017 0.717∗∗
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013)
τjt−2 -0.001 -0.020 -0.022
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Distanceij 0.094 0.036 0.015
(0.078) (0.104) (0.106)
GDPit 14.542∗∗ 11.962∗∗ 2.177
(1.927) (2.552) (2.616)
GDPjt 1.133 2.044 2.179
(1.839) (2.436) (2.497)
GDPpercapit -16.922∗∗ -15.673∗∗ -2.603
(2.132) (2.823) (2.894)
GDPpercapjt -0.675 -2.044 -6.954∗
(2.036) (2.697) (2.764)
(Stocks/GDP)it−1 -0.001 -0.821∗∗ 0.055
(0.069) (0.091) (0.093)
(Credit/GDP)it−1 0.383∗∗ 0.836∗∗ -0.182
(0.132) (0.174) (0.179)
∆Exch.rateijt−1 0.994∗∗ 3.041∗∗ -2.426∗∗
(0.300) (0.397) (0.407)
Tarif f sjt -0.377∗∗ -0.028 -0.047
(0.113) (0.150) (0.154)
Controlsjt -0.038 0.004 0.241∗∗
(0.026) (0.034) (0.035)
Borderij 0.054 -0.033 -0.080
(0.129) (0.170) (0.175)
Languageij 0.266∗ 0.049 0.045
(0.132) (0.174) (0.179)
EUijt -0.738∗∗ 0.221 0.220
(0.097) (0.128) (0.131)
Observations 7100 7100 7100
R2 88.03 91.18 89.47
(Notes on next page)
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Notes on Table 4.6: The table reports first stage OLS regressions which are part of the IV
estimation reported in column (9) of Table 4.4. The dependent variable is τdoubleijt in regression
(1), τit in regression (2) and τjt in regression (3). τdoubleijt is the double tax rate that applies to
dividend income repatriated from the target firms’ country j to acquiror firms’ country i in
the year t. τit and τjt are the corporate income tax rates in country i and country j in year
t. τdoubleijt−1 and τ
double
ijt−2 are the double tax rates lagged by one and two years. τit−1, τit−2, τjt−1
and τjt−2 are corporate income tax rates in country i and country j lagged by one and two
years. Distanceij is the logarithm of the distance between country i’s capital and country j’s
capital in miles. GDPit and GDPjt are the logarithms of country i’s and country j’s GDP in
year t. GDPpercapit and GDPpercapjt are the logarithms of the per capita income of countries
i and j in year t. (Stocks/GDP)it−1 is the logarithm of country i’s stock market capitalization
relative to its GDP in year t − 1. (Credit/GDP)it−1 is the logarithm of country i’s domestic
credit provided to the private sector relative to its GDP in year t − 1. ∆Exch.rateijt−1 is the
change in the logarithm of the real bilateral exchange rate between countries i and j between
year t− 1 and year t− 2. Tarif f sjt is the logarithm of the average tariff on goods imported to
country j in year t. Controlsjt is an index of the number of capital controls in country j in year t.
Borderij indicates whether countries i and j share a common land border. Languageij indicates
whether countries i and j share a common language. EUijt indicates whether countries i and
j were both members of the European Union in year t. Country and time fixed effects are not
reported. Stars indicate the significance level: ∗: 5%, ∗∗: 1%. For detailed definitions and data
sources, see Table 4.2.
I only ask for information.
Miss Rosa Dartle in ‘David Copperfield’ (Charles Dickens)
CHAPTER 5
THE DETERMINANTS OF CROSS-BORDER TAX
INFORMATION SHARING1
The increased mobility of capital flows, facilitated by technological develop-
ments and the lifting of capital controls in the 1980s, has affected countries’
ability to effectively tax cross-border capital flows. Because of the ready ac-
cess to foreign financial markets — often located in offshore financial centers
levying no or low tax rates — taxpayers can easily conceal their capital income
and asset ownership. Tax authorities of the country of residence of investors
are faced with an increasing number of taxpayers disappearing from their ‘tax
radar screen’. Although it is difficult to quantify the overall size of the rev-
enue loss, it is generally considered to be sizable. These developments have
raised calls for stepped-up international cooperation between national tax au-
thorities in the form of tax information sharing.
The need for taxpayer-specific information arises from the pervasive use of
the residence principle in the taxation of cross-border (capital) income.2 Un-
der the residence principle, income tax is ultimately payable to the country
in which a taxpayer (natural person or company) resides, possibly with some
1This chapter is based on Ligthart and Voget (2008).
2The residence principle—which provides the welfare case for information sharing—is un-
derpinned by the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971b) theorem on the desirability of production
efficiency. Keen and Wildasin (2004), however, show that the conditions for the Diamond-
Mirrlees theorem are far from trivial in an international setting. Besides the requirement that
pure profits are fully taxed, countries need to have access to lump-sum taxes.
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credit or deduction for taxes paid in the country of source (i.e., in which the
income is generated). To enforce the residence principle, tax authorities of
countries must have information on their residents’ income (and potentially
assets) abroad. Many countries require taxpayers to disclose (through a sys-
tem of self-assessment) details of such income to the tax authorities of their
country of residence, but the likelihood of fraudulent (or no) declaration is all
too evident. To address international tax evasion, residence countries need to
have access to information in the country of source.
Tax information sharing between national tax authorities lies at the heart of
important recent policy initiatives. In 1998, the OECD launched the ‘Harmful
Tax Practices’ project (cf. OECD, 1998), which considers the lack of effective
information sharing as one of the key criteria identifying harmful tax prac-
tices.3 In addition, as of July 1, 2005, 22 EU member states automatically
exchange information on individuals’ interest income between each other.4
Little is known about countries’ actual experiences in terms of the size and
nature of information flows and even less is known about the effectiveness
of information sharing. This is no doubt a reflection of the considerable de-
gree of confidentiality with which the data are treated by tax authorities. In-
deed, by not revealing these data, tax authorities create a healthy uncertainty
amongst taxpayers. To my knowledge, there are no formal empirical studies
on the determinants of information sharing.5 This study tries to fill that void.
I empirically investigate whether the determinants put forward in the theoret-
ical literature play a role in determining the intensity of bilateral information
sharing ‘on request’ related to a particular taxpayer.6 To this end, I employ
a unique panel data set (covering 81 countries during 1992–2005) on tax in-
formation requested by the Dutch tax authorities. To deal with zero-valued
bilateral information flows, I use various econometric models (i.e., , negative
binomial, and Heckman selection).
3Countries featuring harmful tax practices were put on a blacklist. The original (June 2000)
list featured 37 countries. As of August 2007, only three countries remain on the OECD black-
list: Andorra, Liechtenstein, and Monaco.
4As of January 1, 2007, this also includes Bulgaria and Romania. Three member states
(i.e., Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg) operate a non-resident withholding tax on interest
income.
5Huizinga and Nicodème (2004) study employs a dummy variable indicating whether
countries have entered into an automatic information sharing agreement. No significant effect
of information sharing on depositing patterns is found, however.
6Information on request is defined as information that is provided in response to a well-
founded request by the requesting tax authorities. This implies that ‘fishing trips’ are pre-
vented.
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Not much is known about countries’ incentives to exchange tax information,
except for a few theoretical contributions focusing on information sharing for
income tax purposes.7 The key theoretical challenge is to understand why
countries would be willing to engage in information sharing. By providing
tax information, source countries become less attractive places to tax-evading
foreign investors. Furthermore, the tax authorities of source countries also
bear the direct administrative costs of information provision. Bacchetta and
Espinosa (2000) and Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) argue that bilateral coop-
eration in information sharing may be sustained if the choice of tax rates is
viewed as an infinitely repeated game rather than a one-off matter. Each coun-
try must then weigh the temporary gain from not providing information (by
attracting tax evading investors), one the one hand, against the cost of non-
cooperative behavior by the other country (generally, more aggressive tax
competition or absence of information provision or both) forever after. Bac-
chetta and Espinosa (2000) and Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) formally derive
the attractions of defecting, which provides a list of potential determinants of
tax information sharing.
This chapter provides empirical tests of the predictions regarding the de-
terminants of information exchange from this literature. The determinants
suggested by the theoretical literature are mostly confirmed with one excep-
tion. A country’s willingness to engage in information sharing increases in the
marginal cost of public funds, in the share of a country’s interest-bearing de-
posits held abroad and in the domestic income tax rate. However, there is no
support that the size of withholding tax on non-residents’ saving income has
any effect on the propensity to exchange information. The potential revenue
from hosting foreign investors’ funds does not seem to inhibit information ex-
change.8 A corollary result is that information sharing is characterized by a
considerable degree of reciprocity. Last, the chapter investigates which insti-
tutional arrangements countries choose to facilitate or to inhibit information
exchange. The EU Mutual Assistance Treaty seems to result in more informa-
7Central contributions are those by Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000), Eggert and Kol-
mar (2002, 2004), Huizinga and Nielsen (2003), and Keen and Ligthart (2006a, 2007) . See
Keen and Ligthart (2006b) for a survey of the theoretical literature and an overview of the
institutional arrangements underpinning information sharing.
8Furthermore, there is weak support for the hypothesized negative effect on information
sharing of a country’s ability to monitor its taxpayers’ investment activities. The bank re-
porting dummy is significant at the 5 percent level, whereas the bank secrecy dummy and
auditing variable are insignificant.
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tion exchange than bilateral tax treaties with information exchange clauses.9
Relationships characterized by tax treaties without an information exchange
clause exhibit very low levels of information sharing — even much less than
relationships without a tax treaty at all.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.1 discusses a simple model
from which various hypotheses are derived. Section 5.2 analyzes the tax infor-
mation sharing data and discusses the sample used in the regression analysis.
Section 5.3 sets out the empirical methodology. Section 5.4 presents the em-
pirical results. Finally, Section 5.5 offers a conclusion.
5.1 Tax Information Sharing
The section first deals with the economics of tax information sharing before
it turns to institutional and legal issues. This yields a number of hypotheses,
which are tested empirically in Sections 5.3–5.4.
5.1.1 Why Information Sharing?
Under what circumstances does self-interest drive source countries to volun-
tarily supply tax information to the countries of residence of savers? Common
sense suggests that source countries that provide tax information become less
attractive places to tax-evading foreign investors (because the source country
helps the residence country to enforce its income taxes). In addition, source
countries bear the administrative costs of information gathering, which is
more of a burden the less developed is the country’s tax administration and
banking system. Information sharing is a kind of barter trade. The infor-
mation receiving (or residence) country obtains a gift (i.e., additional public
revenue) from the information providing (or source) country. The amount of
additional tax revenue collected is typically private information to the resi-
dence country.10 It is presumed that in a decentralized Nash equilibrium of a
static tax setting game tax information is under-supplied or even not supplied
at all.
9The impact of the EU Mutual Assistance Treaty cannot easily be distinguished from the
effect of other institutional features that apply to EU membership.
10Sometimes tax authorities inform each other on the additional tax revenue collected as a
result of tax information with a view to further strengthen the bilateral relationship between
them.
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Some countries may be willing to provide information, even if it is appar-
ently against their own interests, because they believe this is an aspect of good
behavior toward countries they have economic or political ties with. Not sur-
prisingly, this is more the exception than the rule. More persuasive arguments
are rooted in self-interested behavior of national governments. In this con-
text, the literature has put forward various reasons why countries may be
interested in exchanging information.11 The first reason is related to benefi-
cial strategic effects as set out in Bacchetta and Espinosa’s (1995) two-stage
game. Prior to their choice of tax rates, countries commit to tax information
sharing, reflecting the long-term nature of information exchange treaties.12 If
countries cannot discriminate between residents and non-residents in tax set-
ting, then a country may benefit unilaterally by providing some information
in the first stage because it induces the foreign partner country to set a higher
tax rate in the second stage. Indeed, tax evasion by residents of the partner
country becomes less attractive, so that it can afford to set a higher tax rate.
Of course, there is also a negative effect because information provision makes
the information supplying country less attractive to foreign investors. But the
strategic effect can dominate this adverse effect, which explains why countries
may choose to provide partial information in equilibrium. A crucial assump-
tion of the analysis is that there are only two large countries. Otherwise, the
strategic effect breaks down, due to countries’ free-riding on others providing
information.
Another explanation for information sharing is related to governments in-
teracting with each other over time. Even if governments have to decide
simultaneously on the amount of information to provide to the other coun-
try, some form of bilateral cooperation may be sustained if the game is infi-
nitely repeated (as is analyzed in Section 5 of Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000)
and Huizinga and Nielsen (2003)).13 Countries then perform a dynamic cost-
benefit analysis in deciding whether or not to add an information sharing
11I will not discuss the papers by Keen and Ligthart (2006a, 2007), who stress the incentive
effects of revenue transfers. If the residence country transfers a share of the revenue it collects
as a result of the information passed to it by the source country, the latter may be more willing
to cooperate on information sharing. Because this proposal has not been implemented in
practice yet, I will not further discuss it.
12Tax information exchange agreements usually take the form of an additional clause in a
bilateral income tax treaty (e.g., Article 26 of the OECD (2005) Model Convention on Income
and Capital). Consequently, these agreements change less frequently than tax rates.
13In such a world, the Folk theorem applies, which says that many outcomes (including
that of the one-shot game) can be sustained (cf. Abreu, 1988).
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clause to a bilateral tax treaty. Each country weighs the one-off benefits from
failing to provide information (i.e., attracting tax evading investors) against
the discounted cost of having to deal with non-cooperative behavior by the
partner country (i.e., more aggressive tax competition and/or no provision of
information) forever after. If the short-run benefits dominate the long-term
costs, then the sustainable level of information provision is zero or very low
and vice versa.
Repeated interaction is not necessary for information exchange if the coun-
tries can commit themselves to information sharing. In Bacchetta and Es-
pinosa, (2000, Section 4), countries can credibly agree on a level of information
sharing because they effectively lack the possibility to take advantage of the
other country by deviating from the agreed upon policy. The lacking benefit
of defection is due to the assumption that deviating behavior is detected —
and hence can be retaliated — by the other country before private investors
take notice of the change in information exchange policy. The authors show
that a Pareto improvement is always possible by exchanging at least some
information, although the amount of information that a country provides in
equilibrium may differ from the amount of information it receives. Any infor-
mation clause that improves the non-cooperative situation will be added to a
double tax treaty. At which ‘price’ a country is willing to provide information
depends more or less on the same set of factors found in the repeated game
mentioned above. The relevant factors are discussed below.
5.1.2 A Simple Analytical Framework
This section derives a number of testable hypotheses based on the work of
Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000) and Huizinga and Nielsen (2003).14 Consider a
world consisting of two (potentially asymmetric) countries. Each country fea-
tures a continuum of households that live for one period. Upon death house-
holds are being replaced by a new generation, implying a constant population
size. Each individual is endowed with one unit of savings, a proportion of
which can be invested abroad (denoted by F). Investment abroad involves
14I draw on a simplified version of Bacchetta and Espinosa’s (2000) model, in which I as-
sume that households receive a 100 percent tax credit for taxes paid abroad. Note that the
framework of Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) is very similar. It differs with respect to the mod-
eling of the banking sector, which is not included in Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000), and in the
form of the transaction cost function. Transaction costs are linear in distance in Huizinga and
Nielsen (2003), whereas they are a convex function of cross-border investment in Bacchetta
and Espinosa (2000).
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convex transaction costs σ(F), whereas investment at home does not involve
any transaction costs.15 In both countries there is a constant-returns-to-scale
technology yielding a constant rate of interest (r). The domestic tax authority
can perfectly monitor all domestic investments, but can only monitor a (fixed)
fraction of the foreign (portfolio) investments made by its own residents. The
degree of non-monitored investments is denoted by 0 ≤ k ≤ 1 for the home
country, where I assume that k is constant. Similarly, for the foreign country
I define 0 ≤ k∗ ≤ 1, where asterisks denote foreign variables. Individuals
investing abroad are assumed not to report their foreign income to the tax
authorities of their country of residence. Without assistance from the source
country, the residence country has a hard time identifying those of its own
residents who have saved abroad. However, the tax authorities of the source
country can transmit a proportion (ξ and ξ∗ for the home and foreign country,
respectively) of information on tax evaders’ income to their country of resi-
dence. For an individual investor, the probability (1− k) of being monitored
by the home country and the probability ξ∗ of being reported by the foreign
country are independent. It is assumed that information transmission is cost-
less.
Domestic investment is subject to the domestic income tax (τ for the home
country and τ∗ for the foreign country). Non-monitored foreign investment
income pays the non-resident withholding tax only. Non-resident withhold-
ing taxes in the home (foreign) country are denoted by tN (t∗N). In accordance
with the residence principle, monitored foreign investment income is taxed in
the residence country at the domestic income tax rate minus a hundred per-
cent tax credit for non-resident withholding tax paid abroad. No penalty on
tax evasion applies, but this can be easily taken into account.
Households maximize a well-behaved utility function, which depends on
private consumption and a public good, subject to their budget constraint.
Because the government decides on public consumption, utility maximization
of individuals amounts to the maximization of consumption with respect to
foreign investment. The household’s optimal amount of cross-border invest-
ments is determined by a comparison between the transaction costs incurred
in depositing funds abroad (i.e., σ′(F)) and the taxes saved in doing so (i.e.,
r(τ − t∗N)k(1− ξ∗)). More formally, a home investor balances foreign and do-
15These transaction costs are net costs because there also exist non-tax related benefits of
investment abroad (e.g., diversification benefits or agglomeration externalities). At low levels
of F, costs may be negative. For example, σ(F) ≡ 12χ1 F2 − χ0F, where χ0 > 0, χ1 > 0, and
χ0 < (1/2)χ1.
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mestic investment such that the net marginal return on foreign investment
(left hand side) equals the net marginal return on domestic investment (right
hand side):
r(1− τ) + r(τ − t∗N)k(1− ξ∗)− σ′(F) = r(1− τ) (5.1)
The foreign investors’ first order condition is similar:
r(1− τ∗) + r(τ∗ − tN)k∗(1− ξ)− σ′(F) = r(1− τ∗) (5.2)
An interior solution applies if τ − t∗N > 0 and τ∗ − tN > 0. Equations (5.1)–
(5.2) then yield the optimal cross-border investment by the home country (F̂)
and by the foreign country (F̂∗). Note that optimal tax rates are set in a pre-
vious stage of the game in such a way that it pays to households to evade
domestic income taxes, implying that F̂, F̂∗ > 0. Because a higher degree of






Following Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000), a second-best world is considered
in which each government finances its public spending entirely by distor-
tionary taxes on interest income (i.e., G = τr(1 − F) + tNrF∗ + [1 − k(1 −
ξ∗)](τ − t∗N)rF for the home country). Consequently, the marginal cost of
public funds (η) exceeds unity. Governments maximize welfare, which is the
discounted utility of present and future generations, by choosing their income
tax rate, non-resident withholding tax rate, and degree of information sharing.
I consider the special case in which countries have set their non-resident with-
holding taxes cooperatively, implying that a double tax relief treaty is optimal
for both countries. Subsequently, the two governments play a Nash game in
income tax rates, taking into account the tax effect on households’ savings
allocations. After governments have set their taxes, private investors decide
how much to invest abroad.
I analyze countries’ incentives to cooperate on tax information sharing. To
simplify the analysis, the effect of information sharing on the sustainability of
the double tax relief treaty is ignored. Furthermore, governments cannot enjoy
one-off gains from deviating from information sharing because it is assumed
that the private sector cannot react immediately to a change in ξ (ξ∗) before
the foreign (home) government does. Consequently, the countries’ discount
rates do not play a role. If one country does not transmit information, it is
‘punished’ by the other country that abstains from information provision as
well. In this context, the following condition applies (see equation (13) of
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Bacchetta and Espinosa, 2000):
Ω ≡ tN ∂F̂
∗
∂ξ








k(τ − t∗N)F̂ > 0 (5.3)
where Ω indicates the home country’s willingness to exchange information.
The first term of (5.3) represents the costs of information provision to the
home country, whereas the second and third terms denote the benefits of re-
ceiving information. Factors that increase Ω make the home country more
willing to exchange information. This yields a set of economic and institu-
tional determinants for the empirical analysis, which I will discuss in turn.
5.1.3 Determinants
Countries with a high income tax rate on residents are more likely to provide
information than countries with a low income tax rate (Hypothesis 1), which
is also derived by Huizinga and Nielsen (2003). A high tax rate increases the
second term of (5.3) (because ∂F̂
∗
∂ξ∗ < 0), thereby increasing Ω:
Hypothesis 1 A country is more likely to cooperate on information sharing if the
resident income tax rate is high, that is ∂Ω/∂τ > 0.
A large non-resident withholding tax rate makes the first term of (5.3) more
negative (because ∂F̂
∗
∂ξ < 0), reducing a country’s incentive to share informa-
tion (Hypothesis 2).
Hypothesis 2 A country is more likely to cooperate on information sharing if its
domestic non-resident withholding tax rate is low, that is, ∂Ω/∂tN < 0.
The intuition for Hypotheses 1–2 is as follows. The additional revenue a coun-
try gets from the foreign savings of its own residents (which are brought into
tax due to tax information sharing) exceeds the loss of revenue from non-
resident savings (which will be relocated to ‘information free’ places).
The third term of equation (5.3) demonstrates that countries with a sizable
public sector—which thus feature a large marginal cost of public funds, η—
are more likely to engage in information sharing (Hypothesis 3). Intuitively,
these countries derive a larger gain from the additional resources brought into
tax, owing to the received tax information.
Hypothesis 3 Countries that value public goods more than private goods (and thus
feature a high marginal cost of public funds) are more eager to engage in information
sharing, that is, ∂Ω/∂η > 0.
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Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995, 2000) reason that countries with a large share
of investment abroad (yielding a large third term in (5.3)) are more eager to
share information than countries where a lot of foreign capital is deposited
(Hypothesis 3). This argument is closely linked to Tanzi and Zee’s (2001) ob-
servation that countries being net exporters of capital would place a higher
value on tax information received than countries that are net importers of cap-
ital.16
Hypothesis 4 Countries that have a large share of financial assets abroad are more
eager to share information than countries where a lot of foreign capital is deposited,
that is, ∂Ω/∂F̂ > 0.
Institutional factors such as the degree to which a country’s tax authority
monitors its taxpayers abroad play a role too. The lower the degree to which
a country can monitor its residents’ foreign investments—and thus the higher
the percentage of non-complying taxpayers it is faced with—the more eager
it is to exchange tax information. More formally, the second and third terms
of (5.3) are positive, where ∂F̂/∂ξ∗ < 0, ∂(∂F̂/∂ξ∗)/∂k < 0, and ∂F̂/∂k > 0.
Intuitively, there is less need for information sharing if a country can obtain
most information by its own means.
Hypothesis 5 Countries that are better able to monitor their residents’ financial
transactions (i.e., implying a smaller k) provide less tax information, that is,
∂Ω/∂k > 0.
5.1.4 Information Sharing Instruments
Most countries have laws protecting the confidentiality of information that
tax authorities have gathered about a particular taxpayer. As a result, tax au-
thorities of a country cannot provide taxpayer-specific information to a tax
authority of another country without a legal instrument permitting such dis-
closure. Traditionally, information exchange has been carried out under bi-
lateral double income tax relief treaties (typically based on the OECD (2005)
Model Convention on Income and Capital) and various multilateral mutual
16Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000) also argue that countries featuring capital inflows that are
less sensitive to information sharing than their capital outflows (which is typically the case
for large countries) are more willing to exchange information (because the greater will then
be the advantages to the small country of not providing information). More formally, | ∂F∗∂ξ | is
small compared with | ∂F∂ξ∗ | in equation (5.3).
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assistance treaties.17 Given that many countries have an extensive network of
bilateral tax treaties, the country coverage of these treaties is generally wider
than the typical multilateral treaty. The most well-known multilateral treaties
are the following two.18 All 27 EU countries participate in the EU Mutual As-
sistance Directive (which applies to direct and indirect taxes). The EU Mutual
Assistance directive was concluded in 1977 and amended in 2004 to better
facilitate information sharing for direct taxes. A much smaller treaty is the
OECD/Council of Europe Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance
in Tax Matters, in which 11 countries participate.19 Under all those treaties,
countries are expected to rely on their domestic sources before making a spe-
cific request to a treaty partner. The request has to be precise (i.e., details about
the taxpayer in question, the fiscal year, the transaction(s) under scrutiny, and
the relevance of the information being sought). All of these requirements are
designed to prevent countries from overburdening each other with requests
and to ensure that taxpayer information is disclosed only when necessary.
Having enacted one of the legal instruments mentioned above does not nec-
essarily imply that national tax authorities can fully share tax information.
The information sharing clause in most bilateral tax treaties incorporates a
provision relieving tax authorities from providing information that is not ob-
tainable under their normal administrative procedures. Consequently, obliga-
tory exchanges are typically reduced to the ‘least common denominator.’ Fur-
thermore, some countries have imposed an article in their double tax treaties
that limits information sharing (e.g., to criminal tax matters only) or precludes
information sharing. Finally, some countries can only exchange information
related to criminal tax matters under the principle of ‘double incrimination,’
whereas no obstacles exist for civil tax matters.20
17Alternative legal instruments exist, however. Mutual legal assistance treaties or provi-
sions in domestic laws may permit information sharing for criminal tax matters. Criminal tax
matters refer to tax investigations involving intentional conduct of a taxpayer that is subject
to criminal prosecution in the country of residence of the offender. Civil tax matters are those
subject to non-criminal penalties. See Keen and Ligthart (2006b, p. 83).
18Since July 1, 2005, the Netherlands also automatically exchanges information on interest
income with EU member states and associated territories under the EU Savings Tax Directive.
19Besides the Netherlands, the following 10 countries participate in this convention: Azer-
baijan, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and the United
States.
20The principle of double incrimination implies that a country is unable to share informa-
tion unless the offense would also be a tax crime if committed in its own jurisdiction.
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5.2 Data Description
The data set pertains to tax information sharing by the Dutch tax authorities
with tax authorities of foreign countries for income tax purposes. The ex-
changed information typically includes the following items: banking records
(i.e., interest income earned, account number, and contact information of pay-
ing agent), fiscal residence of an individual, and expenses recorded on a tax
return. The data points refer to the annual number of completed cases of infor-
mation sharing on request for the period 1992–2005. On average, it takes 3–6
months to settle a case. In the early 1990s, this amounted to an average of 9
months when secure/encrypted e-mail exchanges were not that common yet.
The non-response to information requests is generally very small,21 because of
reciprocity in information sharing (see Section 5.4.3). Requesting tax authori-
ties can ‘punish’ non-complying partners by not reciprocating future informa-
tion requests by the latter, making non-compliance costly. Furthermore, it is
quite likely that the Dutch tax authority is only requesting information from
countries that are known to be complying.
Table 5.1 shows the average number of exchanges by partner country dur-
ing the sample period. All countries are included that have at least pro-
vided/received information once, yielding a total of 50 countries. The coun-
tries are ranked by the average size of the information flow. On the informa-
tion import side, 19 countries exchange 95 percent of the information and only
seven countries do about 80 percent of the exchanges. On the information ex-
port side, 30 countries exchange 95 percent of the data. The average aggregate
number of exchanges on the information import side is much larger than on
the export side. Furthermore, information received on request is more concen-
trated than information provided on request (the coefficient of variation is 2.10
and 2.23, respectively). Information sharing has gained prominence over the
years. On average, 23 countries supply information to the Netherlands dur-
ing the sample period; the number of countries grows from 13 in 1992 to 41 in
2005. On the information receipt side, one can see a similar pattern. Note that
the average number of exchanges is extremely small compared to the number
of Dutch income tax payers (8.86 million in 2004) and completed audits in the
Netherlands (66,428 in total in 2004).
Information flows can be decomposed into three types: (i) automatic;22 (ii) on
21This is based on anecdotal evidence obtained from conversations with experts at the Min-
istry of Finance. Exact figures are not available.
22Automatic information sharing implies that the authorities of the source country period-
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request; and (iii) spontaneous. On average, automatically received infor-
mation amounts to 85.4 percent, spontaneously received information is 14.3
percent, and requested information amounts to 0.3 percent of the total infor-
mation received by the Netherlands. A similar pattern can be seen on the
information supply side. The dependent variable in the econometric analysis
is the number of cases per year for which a country’s tax authority has pro-
vided information to the Dutch tax authority on request.23 I expect informa-
tion sharing on request (as compared to the other forms) to yield the strongest
relationship between information flows and the hypothesized determinants
of information sharing. The number of automatic information exchanges per
year itself does not contain any information because it is the outcome of an
automated process. Hence, the only meaningful information is, when and
if automatic exchange is initiated. Spontaneous information sharing is very
much a by-product of auditing activities of the foreign partner country. The
pattern of spontaneously provided information exhibits a lot of noise with
the amount of information often varying from zero to large numbers back to
zero again within one or two years. In addition, it is very much concentrated
among a small group of OECD countries.
One could include all countries of the world in the sample, but that would
result in a large share of zero observations in the sample. Instead, the sam-
ple for the benchmark regression consists of 81 countries that are mentioned
in the OECD (2006b) report on Tax Co-operation: Towards a Level Playing Field
(which I will refer to as the ‘OECD information list,’ see Table 5.2 ).24 This set
contains more or less all countries in which a tax-evading investor may con-
sider putting his or her funds. It comprises all industrialized countries as well
as the larger developing countries. More relevant, it also encompasses smaller
jurisdictions and associated territories that are known to be tax havens; 32 of
them featured on the initial (June 2000) blacklist of the OECD. Countries on
this list typically provide less tax information, which is confirmed by a corre-
lation coefficient of -0.33 between the logarithm of information sharing and a
ically pass on (in bulk) to the residence country all tax-relevant information they have agreed
to exchange without need for a specific request.
23I do not analyze Dutch tax information provided on request to partner countries because
the explanatory variables for the Dutch do not vary across partner countries, so there is no
variation to exploit.
24The left panel of Table 5.1 reports 12 countries (i.e., Brazil, Dominican Republic, Estonia,
Indonesia, Israel, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, and Thailand)
with which the Netherlands has exchanged information, but which are not part of the OECD
information sharing list and thus do not feature in the benchmark data set.
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dummy representing whether a country is on the OECD blacklist. The Nether-
lands has double taxation relief treaties with 77 countries (as of January 2005)
of which 36 treaties are with countries in the sample (Table 5.2).
Ranking the countries in the benchmark data set by size shows that coun-
tries large in terms of economic size (as measured by the logarithm of real
GDP) provide more information (also measured in logarithms, see Section 5.3)
to the Netherlands than economically small countries. The partial correlation
coefficient amounts to 0.490 [p = 0.000]. It appears also that there is a negative
correlation between the logarithm of distance and the logarithm of informa-
tion provision by partner countries (i.e., the partial correlation coefficient is
-0.598 [p = 0.000]).25 Indeed, 17 of 19 countries that cover 95 percent of the
imported information by the Netherlands are EU countries. On the informa-
tion export side, only 8 of 30 countries are EU members, however.
5.3 Empirical Methodology
This section studies single-stage procedures (like and negative binomial mod-
els) and a sample selection model based on a two-stage procedure.
5.3.1 Single-Stage Procedures
From the data discussion, it appears that large countries send more informa-
tion on tax cases to the Netherlands than small ones. Furthermore, countries
that are situated close by send more tax information than distant ones. There-
fore, I use the partner country’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—which
serves as a proxy for its economic size—and distance between the partner
country and the Netherlands as basic control variables. This approach bears
resemblance to the popular gravity model, which is used to explain bilateral
trade flows between countries (cf. Tinbergen, 1962; and Anderson, 1979).26
To explain any additional heterogeneity beyond the basic gravity pattern, I
include additional control variables—related to the geographic and cultural
25These figures do not change much if only those countries of the benchmark regression
(see column (2) of Table 5.4 below) are considered. The correlation coefficients amount to
0.407 and -0.658, respectively.
26I employ a modified version of the basic gravity model, given that I use bilateral informa-
tion flows for the Netherlands only. Real GDP for the Netherlands is, therefore, not included
in the gravity equation. It features as a constant in a cross-sectional analysis and becomes part
of the time-specific effect in a panel data analysis.
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characteristics of countries—and the variables of interest that should play a
role according to theory (see Section 5.1).
For a considerable number of observations in the sample, the Netherlands
does not receive any information from the partner country in a given year. The
benchmark data set contains 60.6 percent zero-valued information flows.27 To





it if y∗it ≥ 0
0 if y∗it < 0
, (5.4)
where yit is the information received from country i = 1, ..., N in year t = 1, ...T
and y∗it denotes an index function (representing the latent variable):
y∗it = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln Disti + φ
′xit + ψ′qit + δ′dt + εit, (5.5)
where Disti represents country i′s distance to the Netherlands, the vector xit
denotes the explanatory variables of interest (which are measured in loga-
rithms, except for tax rates and dummy variables), the vector qit represents
additional control variables (also measured in logarithms, except for the dum-
mies related to country characteristics), dt captures time-specific fixed effects
(i.e., 13 annual dummies to account for the overall increase in information
sharing), and εit is a normally distributed error term. The β′s, φ′s, ψ′s, and δ′s
are parameters to be estimated.
The following variables of interest are generally present in all specifications
(the expected sign of the parameter to be estimated and the hypothesis to be
tested are between brackets): (i) the resident income tax rate (φ1 > 0, Hy-
pothesis 1); (ii) the non-resident withholding tax rate (φ2 < 0, Hypothesis 2);
(iii) the expenditure-to-GDP ratio as a proxy for the marginal cost of public
funds (φ3 > 0, Hypothesis 3); (iv) the share of savings deposits held abroad
in total deposits of a country (φ4 > 0, Hypothesis 4);28 and (v) the degree
of taxpayer monitoring by the domestic tax authorities (φ5 < 0, Hypothe-
sis 5). Tax authorities’ monitoring ability is proxied in three ways (of which
27The most extensive sample—including also many developing countries, yielding a total
of 124 countries—gives rise to 81 percent zero observations. Silva and Tenreyro (2006) find
48 percent of zero observations in their analysis of bilateral goods trade, which is typical for
gravity studies.
28I do not think there is much concern with simultaneity. Huizinga and Nicodème (2004)
could not find any evidence that information sharing negatively affects savings deposits. Note
also that there are no multi-collinearity issues since the correlation coefficient between the
domestic tax rate and the logarithm of the deposit ratio is only 0.11.
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the first two proxies increase monitoring ability, whereas the third proxy re-
duces it). The first proxy is the tax authorities’ auditing intensity, that is, the
conducted number of audits per taxpayer during a year. The second proxy
is a bank reporting dummy, which indicates whether information on inter-
est income is automatically reported by domestic financial institutions to the
domestic tax authorities. Third, a bank secrecy dummy is included, which
indicates whether the privacy of bank information is protected (by statutory
provisions) to unauthorized disclosure to ordinary third parties. Note that
bank secrecy rules are less restrictive if it concerns information requested by
tax or judicial authorities. Most countries in the sample give access (on re-
quest) to bank information for criminal tax matters. Only three countries (i.e.,
Guatemala, Nauru, and Panama) do not grant access for this purpose.
The additional control variables pertain to various geographic and cultural
characteristics of the partner countries. I include dummy variables for coun-
tries that are landlocked or islands. In addition, I include the logarithm of
a country’s surface area to capture its physical size. In addition to being a
control variable, country size may also have a bearing on information shar-
ing. An informal analysis by Ligthart (2007) shows that small countries are
likely to exchange less information than large countries. Finally, I incorporate
a common language dummy variable for countries that have Dutch as an of-
ficial language, which captures cultural ties between countries. As Tanzi and
Zee (2001) emphasize in their informal analysis, language hurdles may also
frustrate tax information sharing. See Table 5.3 for the descriptive statistics
and the Appendix, Section 5.A, for a list of data sources.
Exploiting the time dimension meaningfully would require a sufficient share
of countries changing their basic stance on information exchange. That has
probably not happened in the last two decades. Most of the exploitable infor-
mation is therefore in the cross-sectional variation between countries. Run-
ning cross-sectional regressions for every year would be one way to use this
variation. Instead of using a cross-section approach, I choose the more suc-
cinct and efficient way of pooling the observations and adjusting the stan-
dard errors (via clustering by country) such that they are robust to correlation
across time. That approach also yields unbiased estimates in the presence of
unobservable country-specific random effects. Because of the ‘incidental para-
meter problem,’ fixed-effect regressions are a problematic option if the panel’s
time dimension is not sufficiently large.29 Furthermore, a considerable num-
29If the number of time periods is fixed and the number of cross-sectional units goes to infin-
ity, the coefficients of the dummy variables in the least-squares dummy variable approach are
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ber of countries does not send information to the Netherlands at all during the
sample period. These countries would drop completely from the sample in a
fixed effects estimation, implying that any information on why these countries
do not exchange information would be lost.
Strictly speaking, the number of cases for which information is exchanged
represents count data, so that a Poisson regression model or a negative bino-
mial regression model may be good alternatives. In both cases, the regression
model is then
ln λit(GDP, Dist, x, q, d) = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln Disti + φ′xit + ψ′qit + δ′dt (5.6)
where λit is the conditional expected number of information transmissions
from country i to the Netherlands in year t. Based on the corresponding prob-
ability distributions, the parameters β, φ, ψ, and δ are estimated by maximum
likelihood.30 The generalizations of the negative binomial model with respect
to the Poisson model are twofold. First, the conditional variance of the depen-
dent variable does not have to equal its conditional mean. Second, unobserv-
able random effects are allowed.
5.3.2 Sample Selection Model
The models above implicitly assume that the ultimate control about the num-
ber of information exchanges rests with the supplying country, even if an in-
formation sharing agreement has been concluded. Existing information shar-
not consistent since the number of these parameters increases as the number of cross-sectional
units increases. See Greene (2004a) and Greene (2004b) for a recent in-depth discussion of the
incidental parameter problem in the context of regressions.
30The corresponding Poisson probability distribution is




, yit = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
where yit counts the number of cases for which information is sent by country i to the Nether-
lands in year t, yit! = yit × (yit − 1)× . . .× 2× 1, and Yit is a Poisson random variable. The
Poisson random variable satisfies E(Y|xit) = λ and V(Y|xit) = λ, where V denotes the con-
ditional variance. The corresponding negative binomial probability distribution is









, yit = 0, 1, 2, . . . ,
where Γ(·) is the gamma distribution, ν ≡ 1/α, and α is a dispersion parameter (which is
simultaneously determined with the other coefficients through maximum likelihood estima-
tion). As α increases, the variance of the negative binomial distribution also increases.
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ing agreements do not provide for passing on the ordinary costs of informa-
tion provision to the requesting country. At a price of zero, the demand for
information should always surmount information supply. Then the number
of information exchanges genuinely reflects a country’s incentive to supply
information. If the previous assumptions appear too strong, then Heckman’s
(1979) selection model—a generalization of the model—allows for the repre-
sentation of a two-dimensional decision process. First, the partner country
decides whether or not to provide information to the Dutch tax authority (i.e.,
the extensive margin). Second, the Dutch tax authority decides how much
information to request from the partner country (i.e., the intensive margin).
However, the second dimension is only observable if the partner country de-
cides to provide information.




1 if z∗it ≥ 0
0 if z∗it < 0
, (5.7)
where z∗it is a latent, unobservable decision variable:
z∗it = γ0 + γ1 ln GDPit + γ2 ln Disti + ζ
′wit + χ′qit + ω′dt + uit, (5.8)





it if zit = 1
0 if zit = 0
, (5.9)
where γ, ζ, χ, and ω are parameters to be estimated, wit is the vector of vari-
ables of interest, and the latent variable y∗it is defined as:
y∗it = β0 + β1 ln GDPit + β2 ln Disti + ψ
′qit + δ′dt + εit, (5.10)
where εit ∼ N(0, σ2ε ) (with variance σ2ε ), uit ∼ N(0, 1) (with variance σ2u, which
is normalized to unity), and ρεu is the correlation between the error terms uit
and εit.31 The focus is on a country’s incentive to share information, so it is the
selection equation that features the full set of explanatory variables as used in
the regressions. The outcome equation only encompasses basic gravity and
control variables because data with cross-sectional variation for the Nether-
lands is not available. Hence, the variation in Dutch information demand
31The size of the coefficients in the outcome and selection equation cannot be readily com-
pared. Heckman’s model reduces to a model if all explanatory variables in the selection and
outcome equation are the same, ρuε = 1, and γ = β/σε, and χ = ψ/σε.
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across countries cannot be captured in more depth. Evidently, the number of
variables in the selection equation exceeds that in the outcome equation, so
the selection and outcome equation are fully identified. I estimate the equa-
tions by full maximum likelihood allowing for clustering of error terms at the
country level.
5.4 Estimation Results
This section presents econometric results for both single-stage and two-stage
procedures and performs a sensitivity analysis. In addition, it studies reci-




Table 5.4 reports regression results explaining the flow of information from
foreign tax authorities to the Dutch tax authorities in the period 1992–2005.
The benchmark regression (1) shows a coefficient of 0.0259 for the domestic
income tax variable, which is significant at the one percent level. In line with
Hypothesis 1, this suggests that an increase in the foreign country’s tax rate
on its residents’ interest income by one percentage point increases the amount
of information sent abroad by 2.6 percent.32 A country’s non-resident with-
holding tax rate does not have a significant effect on the information flow.
Hypothesis 2 is thus not supported. The expenditure-to-GDP ratio features
a coefficient of 1.45, which is significant at the one percent level. Hence, a
one percent increase in a country’s government expenditure-to-GDP ratio in-
creases the amount of information sent abroad by 1.45 percent, which sup-
32The marginal effect of a change in the regressor of interest on the information sent to the
Netherlands is given by:
∂ ln E[yit|xit]
∂xit
= φ× Prob [y∗it ≥ 0],
where E denotes an expectations operator. The coefficient vector φ gives an upper bound
on the marginal effects because 0 < Prob [y∗it ≥ 0] < 1. The marginal effect for a large,
close by situated, country approximates this upper bound. Indeed, the probability of this
country sending some information to the Netherlands is close to one. The coefficient 100× φ
is the semi-elasticity of ln E[yit|xit] with respect to xit. If I replace xit by ln xit in the equation,
100× φ denotes an elasticity.
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ports Hypothesis 3 as the expenditure-to-GDP ratio serves as a proxy for the
marginal cost of public funds. The ratio of deposits owned abroad to domestic
deposits has a significant coefficient of 0.37. Hence, a one percent increase in
this ratio increases the information sent to other countries’ tax authorities by
0.37 percent, lending support to Hypothesis 4.
The various control variables enter the regression as expected; GDP features
a positive coefficient and distance a negative coefficient, showing a gravity
pattern. The absolute size of the distance elasticity and GDP-elasticity is some-
what larger than usually found in gravity models of bilateral goods trade (cf.
Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). A common language seems to facilitate informa-
tion exchange as the significantly positive coefficient shows. Other geographic
variables like a country’s surface area, or whether a country is an island or is
landlocked do not seem to play a role.
For many countries, especially the smaller ones, there are no data on savings
deposits held abroad. Furthermore, data on the variable are available from
1995 onwards only. Therefore, regression (2) excludes the variable ‘foreign
deposit ratio,’ which increases the sample size by about 40 percent. Estima-
tion results are very similar, despite the different sample size and the omitted
variable. Regressions (3)–(5) include different variables as proxy for the de-
gree to which a tax authority of a country monitors its citizens’ capital move-
ments/tax affairs in order to test Hypothesis 5. The sample sizes are gener-
ally smaller than for the benchmark regression because the proxy variables
are available for some countries only. Regression (3) includes the auditing in-
tensity variable, which turns out to be insignificant. Alternatively, using the
number of audit staff per taxpayer (not reported in the table) does not yield a
significant effect either.33 Regression (4) incorporates a dummy variable cap-
turing whether there is mandatory (automatic) reporting by domestic finan-
cial institutions to the country’s tax authority. The coefficient has the predicted
negative sign, but it is only significant at the 10 percent level. Regression (5)
includes a dummy variable indicating whether the confidentiality between
the bank and its customer is reinforced by statutory provisions.34 The bank
secrecy variable has the wrong sign, but is insignificant. In summary, only the
results from regression (4) show weak support for Hypothesis 5, whereas the
other two regressions do not support the hypothesis.
33The organization of the anti-fraud unit (i.e., whether it is part of the tax administration) is
likely to play a role too, but data on this variable are hard to come by.
34In total, there are 59 bank secrecy countries in the sample, including the ‘usual suspects,’
such as Austria, Luxembourg, and Switzerland.
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I have tested the assumption of normally distributed error terms with the
conditional moment test by Pagan and Vella (1989). The test results show that
for all model specifications the null hypothesis of normality cannot be rejected
at the 5 percent level of significance.35 Following Wooldridge (2002), I also the
test the appropriateness of the specification by comparing the scaled coeffi-
cient estimates (i.e., β/σε) to the coefficient estimates of a similar (unreported)
Probit regression, in which the binary dependent variable is given by obser-
vations being censored (zero) or uncensored (one). There are no sign changes
in the coefficients and the magnitude of the estimates is sufficiently similar.
Hence, the model seems to be appropriate.
Robustness Analysis
To limit the number of censored observations (with no information exchange
at all), I restricted the sample in the previous regressions to the 81 countries
on the OECD information list. Instead, regression (6) of Table 5.5 tests the ro-
bustness of the results with respect to sample selection by including all coun-
tries and/or jurisdictions in the world for which the relevant tax rate data are
available. As a result, the share of censored observations rises from 60.6 per-
cent to 81 percent. Generally, the results are the same as for the benchmark
regression. One difference is the positively significant island dummy vari-
able, which is not in line with received wisdom on the tax havens status of
small island economies. This can be explained by the disproportionate pres-
ence of big island economies, such as, Australia, New Zealand, and United
Kingdom. Regression (7) focuses the sample on those countries that have ex-
changed information with the Netherlands at least once. As compared with
the benchmark, the coefficient on the foreign deposit ratio is larger, whereas
the expenditure-to-GDP ratio has a smaller coefficient.
I also analyze the sensitivity of the benchmark regression to different econo-
metric modeling approaches. The previous regressions are robust with respect
to country-specific random effects. Nevertheless, regression (8) explicitly ac-
counts for random effects because this renders more efficient parameter esti-
mates if random effects are indeed present. The signs of the estimated coef-
ficients are the same as in the benchmark regression, although the size of the
slope coefficients decreases a bit. Instead of a model, I can employ a Poisson
model or (a more general) negative binomial regression model. The likeli-
35Because the sample size is not large enough to rely on critical values of the asymptotic χ2
distribution, I derive critical values of the test using a parametric bootstrapping procedure.
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hood ratio test (i.e., χ2(1) = 1509.41 with p = 0.0000) indicates that the mean-
variance equality is always violated in the Poisson model. I find a dispersion
parameter α of 0.76, so that there is substantial overdispersion (while noting
that for α = 0 the negative binomial model has the same distribution as the
Poisson model, see footnote 30). Consequently, in regression (9) I estimate a
negative binomial model, which yields coefficients of the variables of interest
that are again very similar to the benchmark regression. The same variables
are statistically significant. Regression (10) includes the bank reporting vari-
able, which is insignificant, however.
5.4.2 Sample Selection Model
Regression (11a-b) in Table 5.6 reports the estimation results for the sample
selection model. The set of significant variables in the selection equation is
similar to that in the benchmark case (see column (1) of Table 5.5). The do-
mestic income tax rate, the height of the marginal cost of public funds, and
the foreign deposit ratio are significant and all have the expected sign. One
difference is that a country’s surface area is now significant at the 5 percent
level in the selection equation. Small countries are thus less likely to supply
information, which is in line with formal analysis of Keen and Ligthart (2006a)
and the informal analysis of Ligthart (2007).
Comparing the selection and outcome equations in the Heckman specifi-
cation shows that the set of significant control variables changes slightly. A
common language does not seem to play a role in determining the inten-
sity of information sharing, but is important in selecting a country into in-
formation sharing. In addition, the Dutch tax authority appears to demand
less information from landlocked countries as indicated by the negative land-
locked dummy (which is significant at the 10 percent level only). Note that
a country’s surface area is significantly positive in the selection equation, but
is significantly negative in the outcome equation. Apparently, the Dutch tax
authority requests more information from small non-landlocked economies.
To analyze the robustness of the results, the estimates in regressions (12a-b)
are based on a broad sample of countries (including many countries that are
not on the OECD information list). The estimates are similar to before, ex-
cept for the island dummy now being significant and the common language
dummy variable being insignificant. Regressions (13a-b) add the bank report-
ing dummy to the selection equation of the broad sample. Because the bank
reporting dummy is observed for 38 countries only, the sample size drops
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substantially. The bank reporting is significant and has the expected negative
sign.
5.4.3 Reciprocity
Informal studies consider information sharing as a ‘matter of reciprocity’ (as
opposed to ‘free lunch’ information provision or ‘issue linkage,’ in which case
a country provides information in return for a concession in some other area of
public policy). Reciprocity could be viewed as mechanism to share the admin-
istrative (including auditing) costs of information sharing between countries
(cf. Keen and Ligthart, 2006b, p. 84). Indeed, information supplying countries
do not receive any (monetary) compensation for the ordinary costs of informa-
tion provision. Information requests, however, often involve some additional
research for the requested country. Reciprocity is expected to be less than per-
fect. A lack of reciprocity may reflect a legal obstacle, the absence of taxable
activities, or a country’s reluctance to cooperate.
To capture reciprocity, the amount of information that the Dutch tax author-
ities have provided to other countries is added as an explanatory variable.36
This allows determining whether there is reciprocity above and beyond the in-
formation flows associated with the previously identified determinants. The
information variable is likely to be endogenous as there is a reciprocal effect
that works in both directions. Therefore, I apply an instrumental variables (IV)
model. I instrument the information received from the Dutch tax authorities
by its own two- and three-year lagged values and the other explanatory vari-
ables.37 The estimation results are derived using Newey’s (1987) minimum
χ2 estimator which is asymptotically efficient relative to many conventional
two-stage estimators.
The results, reported as regression (14) in Table 5.7, show that Dutch infor-
mation provision is significant at the one percent level, suggesting that reci-
procity plays an important role. A one percent increase in the amount of tax
information that the Dutch tax authorities provide to foreign tax authorities,
increases the amount of information received by the Dutch tax authorities by
0.67 percent. A Wald test of exogeneity reveals that an IV estimation approach
36The new variable is defined as the logarithm of the amount of Dutch information provi-
sion to other countries plus one.
37Using longer or shorter lags as instruments produces very similar results, but the sample
size will decrease with longer lags because information provision is only available up to three
years before the sampling period.
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is indeed required. The hypothesis that contemporaneous Dutch information
provision is exogenous is rejected at the 1 percent level.38 The IV estimator is
overidentified as there are two instruments, one more than necessary to iden-
tify the model. Under the joint null hypothesis of a correct model specification
and valid orthogonality conditions, the objective function of Newey’s (1987)
minimum χ2 estimator follows a χ2 distribution with one degree of freedom
(cf. Lee, 1992). With a test statistic of 0.011 and a p-value of 0.92, the null
hypothesis cannot be rejected. The instruments seem to be valid. Instead of
a two-step estimator, one could also employ a full maximum likelihood ap-
proach, which also allows to take clustering into account. The corresponding
coefficients reported in regression (15) are very similar to the two-step esti-
mates.
5.4.4 The Role of Tax Treaties
Instead of the number of information exchanges, one could have used the
existence of information sharing clauses in tax treaties as a dependent vari-
able. However, information sharing clauses are an imperfect proxy for the
amount of information sharing effectively taking place because other institu-
tional features play an important role. The degree to which a government
limits domestic reporting requirements can severely constrain the usefulness
of information exchange agreements. Another constraining factor is the size of
resources deployed to government departments that control reporting oblig-
ations or that are ultimately responsible for the information exchange taking
place.39 In fact, an information sharing agreement is not even a necessary legal
38See Wooldridge (2002, pp. 472-478) for further details on the Wald test of exogeneity.
39For example, the National Audit Office (2007) reports that in the UK overseas territories,
“at least in the smaller financial centres, the number of reports is so low as to indicate that
some financial institutions either do not know or monitor their customers sufficiently or are
unaware of their obligations to report”. The National Audit Office (2007) goes on to report
that “in Bermuda, very few of the 313 reports received in 2006 had been investigated to the
extent of their potential for prosecution. In Anguilla, the Financial Intelligence Unit has no
permanent full-time staff. Investigation work, and developing local officers to investigate fi-
nancial crime there, fell to a contracted UK Detective Inspector, who also acquired criminal
investigation and management responsibilities and was supported by one part-time local de-
tective constable. There was a backlog of some 20 cases and the Inspector estimated that the
staffing requirement to match the workload as three full time investigators and an adminis-
trator.” The report eventually summarizes: “Where significant numbers of suspicious activity
reports are generated, an increasing burden falls on law enforcement agencies to assess the
substance of the reports, investigate those found to have substance and to support subse-
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instrument as some countries allow for information sharing in their domestic
laws even in the absence of international treaties.
Nevertheless, the existence of certain treaty arrangements can be usefully
employed as regressors. As they are a proxy for the dependent variable itself,
it cannot explain a country’s incentive for information exchange. Explaining
the intensity of information exchange by the existence of an information shar-
ing clause would be tautological. Instead, the coefficients of these variables in-
dicate which legal framework countries choose to initiate effective exchange
of information. To this end, various treaty dummy variables are added to
a parsimonious specification including only the gravity variables GDP and
distance. The results reported in Table 5.8 show that double tax treaties are
strongly correlated with information sharing, suggesting that they are an im-
portant vehicle for exchanging tax information. The absence of an information
sharing clause in a tax treaty is a clear sign of a country not being interested
in information sharing. Limited information sharing clauses are insignificant.
Joint membership of the OECD/Council of Europe mutual assistance treaty
is not correlated with more information sharing. The EU Mutual Assistance
directive, however, has a significant positive effect on information sharing; its
estimated coefficient is larger than that of bilateral double tax treaties. Ap-
parently, the EU Mutual Assistance directive is a more convenient vehicle for
sharing tax information.40
5.4.5 Discussion
The regression analysis found support for Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 put forward
in the theoretical literature. I could not find convincing evidence for Hypoth-
esis 5, which says that countries provide less information if they can better
monitor their residents’ investments abroad. This can potentially be explained
by either of three factors: (i) the proxy variables describing the tax authority’s
ability to monitor residents’ cross-border investments were inappropriate; (ii)
countries are generally unable to monitor their residents’ affairs to such a de-
gree that they may rely less on cooperation with other countries; and (iii) the
variable is simply not a determinant of tax information sharing.
quent prosecutions. This burden has outstripped the capacity of law enforcement agencies
in most Territories. Only the Cayman Islands has so far achieved successful prosecutions of
local participants for offshore money laundering offences.”
40The EU Mutual Assistance directive dummy variable is very similar to an EU membership
dummy variable, so the two institutions cannot be disentangled.
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Hypothesis 2 on the effect of the withholding tax on non-residents could also
not be supported, casting doubt on the way that withholding taxes are per-
ceived in the theoretical framework. According to the hypothesis, countries
may not engage in tax information exchange because the consequent decrease
in inbound foreign investment results in a decrease of tax revenue from with-
holding taxes. Some countries may indeed extract some rents from foreign
investors via withholding taxes. Most tax havens, however, seem to set with-
holding taxes (and sometimes even corporate income tax rates) to zero to lure
foreign investors. Rent extraction is then left to the local financial institutions
and legal services industry or to government via non-tax instruments (e.g., li-
cense fees). The insignificance of withholding taxes signals the limitations of
previous attempts to model information exchange, which only take interac-
tions between two countries into account. In such a framework, the domestic
tax-evading investor is faced with a foreign monopoly supplier of ‘informa-
tion free’ savings income. Accordingly, rent extraction via the imposition of
withholding taxes is easy, implying that the county will have less of an incen-
tive to participate in information sharing agreements. In a world of many tax
havens competing for tax-evading investors, this relationship may even be the
exact opposite; those countries that resist information sharing also feature ex-
tremely competitive non-resident withholding tax rates because both features
make the country more attractive to foreign tax-evading investors.
5.5 Conclusions
This chapter analyzes empirically the determinants of tax information sharing
between national tax authorities. More specifically, I study information on
tax cases that the Dutch tax authority has received ‘on request’ from various
foreign tax authorities. In addition, I study whether tax information sharing
is based on reciprocity and investigate which legal framework countries use
in exchanging information. The sample covers 81 countries and jurisdictions
for the period 1992–2005.
Information sharing features a basic gravity pattern. Above and beyond this
pattern, the regression analysis finds support for four of five hypotheses put
forward in the analytical literature. The height of the domestic income tax rate,
the size of the marginal cost of public funds, and the share of a country’s share
of deposits held abroad make a country more willing to engage in information
sharing. Only weak support can be found for the hypothesized negative effect
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of a country’s ability to monitor its taxpayers’ investment activities abroad.
The bank reporting dummy is significant at the 5 percent level, whereas the
bank secrecy dummy and auditing variable are insignificant.
Bilateral double tax treaties and the EU Mutual Assistance treaty are used
as legal instruments to facilitate tax information sharing, where the latter is
more productive in terms of facilitating information sharing. The absence of
an information sharing clause in a double tax treaty indicates that a country is
not interested in information sharing. Such negative effect is absent for clauses
in tax treaties that limit information sharing. Finally, there is a substantial
degree of reciprocity in information sharing. A one percent increase in the
amount of tax information that the Dutch tax authorities provide to foreign
tax authorities, raises the amount of information received by the Dutch tax
authorities by 0.67 percent.
The econometric analysis shows that non-resident withholding taxes do not
negatively affect the amount of information that is provided to the Dutch tax
authorities. An important policy implication of this analysis is, therefore, that
information sharing and non-resident withholding taxes are complementary
instruments in tax authorities’ fight against international tax evasion. Efforts
to strengthen information sharing relationships should be devoted to those
countries that substantially discriminate between residents and non-residents
in taxing capital income. In view of the ever expanding cross-border capital
flows, tax authorities are expected to rely more heavily on tax information
sharing in the future. Information sharing may be facilitated further if more
(focused) multilateral legal instruments were developed. The EU Savings Tax
Directive is an important step in this direction.
As the empirical analysis of information exchange in this chapter suggests
that the main shortcoming of existing models of information exchange is the
limitation to only two countries, the following chapter develops a framework
of information exchange that allows for a multi-jurisdictional world.
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5.A Data Appendix
Information received on request Cases of information provision for income tax pur-
poses from country i to the Dutch tax authorities in year t. Source: Dutch Ministry of
Finance.
Domestic income tax rate (in percent) Country i’s tax on residents on interest from
savings deposits in year t. The top rate applies if the tax is progressive. Wealth taxes
are included by calculating an equivalent tax on interest income assuming an in-
terest rate of 4 percent. Representative taxes levied at lower levels of government
are taken into account as determined by the OECD data source. For non-OECD
countries with sub-national taxes, the location of the capital determines the repre-
sentative sub-national government tax. Sources: For single-level income tax regimes,
statutory personal income tax rates are from the OECD tax database (Tables I.5–I.7),
available at http://www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase, the World Bank’s World Develop-
ment Indicators available at http://econ.worldbank.org, the World Tax Database of the
Office of Tax Policy Research, available at http://www.bus.umich.edu/otpr/otpr/
introduction.htm, and from data provided on request from Huizinga and Nicodème
(2004). In case of dual income tax systems and wealth taxes, statutory tax rates
are taken from Huizinga and Nicodème (2004) and following sources of the Inter-
national Bureau of Fiscal Documentation (IBFD): Global Tax Surveys, Europe: Individ-
ual Taxation, Europe: Private Investment Income, European Tax Surveys, Central/Eastern
Europe: Taxation and Investment, Africa: Taxation and Investment, Middle East: Taxa-
tion and Investment, Canada: Taxation and Investment, Caribbean: Taxation and Invest-
ment, Latin America: Taxation and Investment, Latin American Tax Surveys, Asia-Pacific:
Taxation and Investment and the Tax News Service, which are available at http://
www.ibfd.org/portal
Non-resident withholding tax rate (in percent) Country i’s withholding tax on
(Dutch) non-residents’ interest from savings deposits in year t. Sources: Huizinga and
Nicodème (2004) and following sources of the International Bureau of Fiscal Docu-
mentation (IBFD): Global Tax Surveys, Europe: Individual Taxation, Europe: Private In-
vestment Income, European Tax Surveys, Central/Eastern Europe: Taxation and Investment,
Africa: Taxation and Investment, Middle East: Taxation and Investment, Canada: Taxa-
tion and Investment, Caribbean: Taxation and Investment, Latin America: Taxation and
Investment, Latin American Tax Surveys, Asia-Pacific: Taxation and Investment, and the
Tax News Service, which are available at http://www.ibfd.org. The IBFD tax treaty
database, also available at http://www.ibfd.org, allows taking treaty withholding tax
rates into account that potentially undercut a country’s general level of withholding
tax rates.
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Expenditure-to-GDP ratio Logarithm of country i’s ratio of government expenditures
over gross domestic product (in current prices) in year t. Sources: The International
Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, available at http://www.imf.org/
external/data.htm. Alternatively, if a country’s time series is missing in the pre-
vious source: the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, available at http://
econ.worldbank.org.
Foreign deposit ratio Logarithm of the ratio of deposits abroad owned by country
i’s non-banking sector (in local currency) over the sum of time and demand deposits
in country i in year t (in local currency). Sources: Deposits abroad are taken from the
Bank of International Settlement’s Locational Banking Statistics, available at http://
www.bis.org/statistics/bankstats.htm, where US dollars have been converted to lo-
cal currency using the exchange rates from the World Bank’s World Development Indi-
cators, available at http://econ.worldbank.org. Time and demand deposits are taken
from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics, available at
http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm.
Auditing intensity Logarithm of the ratio of the number of audits conducted in
2004 to the number of registered taxpayers in 2004. It is assumed that the ratio re-
mains constant over time. Source: The number of audits is obtained from Table 27 of
OECD (2006b) and the number of registered taxpayers follows from Table 30 of OECD
(2006b).
Bank reporting dummy A one indicates that there is mandatory (automatic) report-
ing by domestic financial institutions to the domestic tax administration. Source: Table
12 of OECD (2006b).
Bank secrecy dummy A one indicates that country i features bank secrecy reinforced
by statute. A zero indicates the contrary. Source: Column 3 of Table B1 of OECD
(2006a).
Gross domestic product Logarithm of country i’s gross domestic product in year t
in millions of US dollar (in constant prices, base year 2000). Source: The World Bank’s
World Development Indicators, available at http://econ.worldbank.org
Distance Logarithm of the distance between the Dutch capital Amsterdam
and country i’s capital in kilometers. Sources: Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et
d’Informations Internationale (CEPII) data set, available at http://www.cepii.fr/
anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm and own calculations based on location data
from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) factbook 2007, available at https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications
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Surface area Logarithm of country i’s surface area in square kilometers. Sources:
CEPII data set, available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm
and the CIA factbook 2007 available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications
Landlocked dummy A one indicates that country i has no coastline. A zero indicates
the contrary. Sources: CEPII data set, available at http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/
bdd/distances.htm and the CIA factbook 2007, available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications
Island dummy A one indicates that country i is an island. A zero indicates the
contrary. Source: The CIA factbook 2007, available at https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications
Common language dummy A one indicates that country i has Dutch as an official
language, whereas a zero indicates otherwise. Sources: CEPII data set, available at
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm and the CIA factbook 2007,
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications
Information sent on request Logarithm of the amount of Dutch information pro-
vision for income tax purposes in year t to country i plus one. Source: Dutch tax
authority.
OECD/Council of Europe treaty dummy A one indicates that country i participates
in the mutual treaty and a zero otherwise. Source: http://www.oecd.org
EU Mutual Assistance treaty dummy A one indicates that country i participates in the
mutual assistance treaty and a zero otherwise. Source: http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_
customs/taxation/tax_cooperation/mutual_assistance/direct_tax_directive/index_
en.htm_customs
Double tax treaty dummy A one indicates that country i has a bilateral tax treaty
with the Netherlands and a zero otherwise. Source: Tax treaties data base of the IBFD,
available at http://www.ibfd.org
Double tax treaty with limited information sharing dummy A one indicates that
country i has a bilateral tax treaty with the Netherlands that limits information shar-
ing and a zero otherwise. Source: Tax treaties data base of the IBFD, available at
http://www.ibfd.org
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Double tax treaty without information sharing dummy A one indicates that country
i has a bilateral tax treaty with the Netherlands that does not allow for information
sharing and a zero otherwise. Source: Tax treaties data base of the IBFD, available at
http://www.ibfd.org
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Table 5.1: Average Information Sharing on Request, 1992–2005
Received Provided
Country Mean Percent Country Mean Percent
Total 862.8 100.0 Total 569.2 100.0
Germany 180.9 21.0 Belgium 122.6 21.5
Belgium 165.8 19.2 Germany 108.9 19.1
United Kingdom 123.4 14.3 France 64.9 11.4
Spain 80.6 9.3 United Kingdom 41.1 7.2
France 59.6 6.9 Italy 38.5 6.8
Italy 49.9 5.8 Russia Federation 21.2 3.7
Luxembourg 45.5 5.3 Spain 20.6 3.6
Portugal 24.5 2.8 Lithuania 11.8 2.1
Denmark 15.6 1.8 Denmark 11.2 2.0
Ireland 15.3 1.8 Sweden 10.9 1.9
Sweden 12.8 1.5 United States 10.6 1.9
Austria 8.5 1.0 Poland 10.1 1.8
United States 7.8 0.9 Portugal 6.7 1.2
Netherlands Antilles 6.9 0.8 Greece 6.1 1.1
Estonia 5.0 0.6 Suriname 6.0 1.1
Greece 4.8 0.6 Netherlands Antilles 5.5 1.0
Poland 4.5 0.5 Ukraine 4.9 0.9
Finland 3.9 0.4 Republic of Korea 4.2 0.7
Czech Republic 3.8 0.4 Austria 3.6 0.6
Turkey 3.8 0.4 Latvia 3.6 0.6
Cyprus 3.0 0.3 Indonesia 3.3 0.6
Hungary 2.8 0.3 Canada 3.3 0.6
Suriname 2.8 0.3 Finland 3.1 0.5
Canada 2.4 0.3 Czech Republic 2.9 0.5
Malta 1.7 0.2 Luxembourg 2.9 0.5
Lithuania 1.5 0.2 Ireland 2.7 0.5
Latvia 1.4 0.2 Estonia 2.4 0.4
Aruba 1.3 0.2 Hungary 2.4 0.4
Slovak Republic 1.3 0.1 Norway 2.4 0.4
Norway 1.2 0.1 Slovakia 2.3 0.4
New Zealand 1.2 0.1 Australia 2.2 0.4
Romania 1.2 0.1 Croatia 2.0 0.4
Argentina 1.0 0.1 Kazakhstan 2.0 0.4
Australia 1.0 0.1 Kuwait 2.0 0.4
Belize 1.0 0.1 Mexico 2.0 0.4
Brazil 1.0 0.1 Japan 1.8 0.3
Cayman Islands 1.0 0.1 Argentina 1.5 0.3
Dominican Republic 1.0 0.1 Bulgaria 1.5 0.3
Guatemala 1.0 0.1 New Zealand 1.5 0.3
Indonesia 1.0 0.1 Belarus 1.3 0.2
Israel 1.0 0.1 Israel 1.3 0.2
Japan 1.0 0.1 India 1.2 0.2
Mexico 1.0 0.1 Turkey 1.2 0.2
Russian Federation 1.0 0.1 Brazil 1.0 0.2
Singapore 1.0 0.1 Iceland 1.0 0.2
Slovenia 1.0 0.1 Malta 1.0 0.2
South Africa 1.0 0.1 Pakistan 1.0 0.2
Sri Lanka 1.0 0.1 Romania 1.0 0.2
Switzerland 1.0 0.1 Singapore 1.0 0.2
Thailand 1.0 0.1 South Africa 1.0 0.2
Notes: Only those countries are listed for which there has been at least one exchange during the sample period.
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Table 5.2: Countries in the Sample
Country/Territory OECD OECD Tax Country/Territory OECD OECD Tax
member black- treaty member black- treaty
list list
Andorra 0 1 0 Liechtenstein 0 1 0
Anguilla 0 1 0 Luxembourg 1 0 1
Antigua and Barbuda 0 1 0 Macao, China 0 0 0
Argentina 0 0 1 Malta 0 0 1
Aruba 0 1 ∗ Malaysia 0 0 0
Australia 1 0 1 Marshall Islands 0 1 0
Austria 1 0 1 Mauritius 0 0 0
The Bahamas 0 1 0 Mexico 1 0 1
Bahrain 0 1 0 Monaco 0 1 0
Barbados 0 1 0 Montserrat 0 1 0
Belgium 1 0 1 Nauru 0 1 0
Belize 0 1 0 Netherlands Antilles 0 1 ∗
Bermuda 0 0 0 New Zealand 1 0 1
British Virgin Islands 0 1 0 Niue 0 1 0
Brunei 0 0 0 Norway 1 0 1
Canada 1 0 1 Panama 0 1 0
Cayman Islands 0 0 0 Philippines 0 0 1
China 0 0 1 Poland 1 0 1
Cook Islands 0 1 0 Portugal 1 0 1
Costa Rica 0 0 0 Russian Federation 0 0 1
Cyprus 0 0 1 St Kitts & Nevis 0 1 0
Czech Republic 1 0 1 St Lucia 0 1 0
Denmark 1 0 1 St Vincent & Grenadines 0 1 0
Dominica 0 1 0 Samoa 0 1 0
Finland 1 0 1 San Marino 0 0 0
France 1 0 1 Seychelles 0 1 0
Germany 1 0 1 Singapore 0 0 1
Gibraltar 0 1 0 Slovak Republic 1 0 1
Greece 1 0 1 South Africa 0 0 1
Grenada 0 1 0 Spain 1 0 1
Guatemala 0 0 0 Sweden 1 0 1
Guernsey 0 1 0 Switzerland 1 0 0
Hong Kong SAR 0 0 0 Turkey 1 0 0
Hungary 1 0 1 Turks and Caicos Islands 0 1 0
Iceland 1 0 1 United Arab Emirates 0 0 0
Ireland 1 0 1 United Kingdom 1 0 1
Isle of Man 0 1 0 United States 1 0 1
Italy 1 0 1 US Virgin Islands 0 1 0
Japan 1 0 1 Uruguay 0 0 0
Jersey 0 1 0 Vanuatu 0 1 0
Korea 1 0 1
Total 29 32 36
Sources: Keen and Ligthart (2006b) and IBFD’s tax treaties data base. Notes: The sample of 81 countries is based on
OECD (2006a). The identifier is one if the country is included in the chosen sub-sample. The June 2000 version of the
OECD’s blacklist is employed. The double tax treaty status of a country is measured as of 2005. Asterisks denote that
the jurisdiction is part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands (and thus the treaty of the Kingdom of the Netherlands
applies).






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.4: Tax Information Sharing: Tobit Regression Results
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Domestic income tax rate 0.0259*** 0.0368*** 0.0257** 0.0288*** 0.0257***
(0.0069) (0.0099) (0.0078) (0.0064) (0.0067)
Non-resident withholding tax rate -0.0001 -0.0046 0.0185 -0.0053 0.0002
(0.0180) (0.0302) (0.0148) (0.0207) (0.0192)
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 1.4486*** 1.4611*** 0.6300* 1.7480*** 1.3801***
(0.5430) (0.5088) (0.3899) (0.6046) (0.5175)
Foreign deposit ratio 0.3677*** – 0.3950*** 0.3637*** 0.3610***
(0.0684) (0.0649) (0.0689) (0.0699)
Auditing intensity – – 0.0614 – –
(0.0806)
Bank reporting dummy – – – -0.6302* –
(0.3268)
Bank secrecy dummy – – – – -0.2886
(0.2986)
GDP 0.4944*** 0.4861*** 0.5836*** 0.4825*** 0.4711***
(0.0988) (0.1183) (0.1277) (0.1029) (0.0986)
Distance -0.9619*** -0.9852*** -1.0990*** -0.8533*** -0.9612***
(0.1476) (0.1616) (0.1634) (0.1801) (0.1438)
Surface area 0.0696 0.0004 0.0342 0.0836 0.0481
(0.0691) (0.0802) (0.0647) (0.0704) (0.0688)
Landlocked dummy -0.4508 -0.6894 -0.0726 -0.5458 -0.5166
(0.3737) (0.4789) (0.3482) (0.3694) (0.3561)
Island dummy 0.3451 0.0257 0.5620** 0.5258 0.1717
(0.3582) (0.3709) (0.2779) (0.3791) (0.3254)
Common language dummy 1.3985*** 2.4525*** 0.8062 1.5357*** 1.1980***
(0.4314) (0.6736) (0.6343) (0.5457) (0.4120)
Constant 3.3305** 3.7190** 3.1036** 3.3252** 4.0349**
(1.4415) (1.8328) (1.4159) (1.4514) (1.5838)
Observations 543 887 331 375 543
Censored observations 329 598 136 167 329
Clusters 52 67 31 35 52
McFadden pseudo R2 0.471 0.426 0.433 0.422 0.473
Log-likelihood -389.96 -605.40 -321.84 -361.70 -388.33
χ2 statistic for normality test 6.283 2.699 12.734 4.062 6.492
5% critical value, bootstrapped 19.92 13.06 16.84 19.48 21.80
Notes: These are tobit regressions and the dependent variable is the logarithm of tax information received on request
by the Dutch tax authorities from country i in year t. Zero observations are taken into account as censored obser-
vations. Year effects are not reported. Standard errors, robust to error clustering on a country level, are provided
in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. For variable definitions
and data sources, see the Appendix 5.A. The conditional moment test Pagan and Vella (1989) is applied to test the
assumption of normally distributed error terms. The sample size is not large enough to rely on critical values of the
asymptotic χ2 distribution. Instead, critical values are derived using a parametric bootstrapping procedure.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5.6: Heckman’s Selection Model
Independent variables OECD Information sample Broad sample Bank reporting
Selection Outcome Selection Outcome Selection Outcome
(11a) (11b) (12a) (12b) (13a) (13b)
Domestic income tax rate 0.0146** – 0.0106** – 0.0122* –
(0.0065) (0.0052) (0.0067)
Foreign withholding tax rate -0.0062 – -0.0070 – -0.0163 –
(0.0160) (0.0151) (0.0212)
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 1.9596*** – 1.1242** – 2.5693*** –
(0.5716) (0.5265) (0.6649)
Foreign deposit ratio 0.3629*** – 0.2683*** – 0.4614*** –
(0.0786) (0.0577) (0.0966)
Bank reporting dummy – – – – -0.6980* –
(0.4128)
Gross Domestic Product 0.3383** 0.5940** 0.4384*** 0.4448 0.3982** 0.6092***
(0.1538) (0.2767) (0.1056) (0.4148) (0.1931) (0.2355)
Distance -0.3744** -0.5814** -0.4519*** -0.5567* -0.2579 -0.5630**
(0.1874) (0.2528) (0.1609) (0.3388) (0.1663) (0.2296)
Surface area 0.1440** -0.3179** 0.0263 -0.2107 0.1903*** -0.3213**
(0.0590) (0.1430) (0.0482) (0.1829) (0.0717) (0.1417)
Landlocked dummy 0.1405 -0.7145* 0.1842 -0.6709* 0.3425 -0.6359
(0.3589) (0.4091) (0.2582) (0.3927) (0.3356) (0.4085)
Island dummy 0.1571 0.0170 0.5272** 0.0392 0.4570 0.1903
(0.3078) (0.3156) (0.2482) (0.3434) (0.3415) (0.3172)
Common language dummy 1.1428*** 0.4125 1.1003 0.5257 4.1872*** 0.8100*
(0.9505) (0.5002) (1.1043) (0.5070) (1.4354) (0.4602)
Constant -0.1024 3.9156** -0.6007 4.1547** -0.7521 3.6750**
(1.4587) (1.7943) (1.1520) (1.7597) (1.3194) (1.8516)
ρεu -0.6008 -0.6444 -0.6808
(0.4631) (0.5191) (0.2882)
σε 1.1449 1.1781 1.1616
(0.1713) (0.2438) (0.1490)
Observations 543 1269 408
Censored observations 329 1,030 198
Clusters 52 125 38
Log-likelihood -479.11 -645.27 -452.71
Wald test (H0 : ρεu = 0) 0.92 0.74 2.39
Prob > χ2 [0.3379] [0.3884] [0.1220]
Notes: These are Heckman selection regressions. The binary dependent variable in the selection equation describes whether or not
information is provided by country i to the Dutch tax authorities in year t. The endogenous variable in the outcome equation represents
Dutch demand for tax information, which is measured by the logarithm of the number of requests made by the Dutch tax authorities
if information sharing occurred. Year dummy variables are not reported. Standard errors, robust to correlation of errors across time,
are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. The values in square brackets
are p-values. For variable definitions and data sources, see the Appendix 5.A.
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Table 5.7: Tobit Regression Results: Reciprocity in Information
Sharing
Independent variables Two-step IV Full max.
likelihood
(14) (15)
Domestic income tax rate 0.0204*** 0.0204***
(0.0035) (0.0063)
Non-resident withholding tax rate 0.0140 0.0140
(0.0107) (0.0156)
Expenditure-to-GDP ratio 0.9629*** 0.9629**
(0.1848) (0.4260)
Foreign deposit ratio 0.2794*** 0.2794***
(0.0298) (0.0611)
Information sent to partner 0.6728*** 0.6728***
(0.1013) (0.1654)




Surface area 0.0351 0.0351
(0.0443) (0.0603)
Landlocked dummy 0.2560 0.2560
(0.2135) (0.3351)
Island dummy 0.4142** 0.4142
(0.1861) (0.3720)





Censored observations 329 329
Wald test of exogeneity 9.08*** 9.71***
Prob > χ2 [0.0026] [0.0018]
Amemiya-Lee-Newey test 0.011 –
Prob > χ2 [0.9183]
Notes: These are IV tobit regressions and the dependent variable is the logarithm of tax in-
formation received on request by the Dutch tax authorities from country i in year t. Zero
observations are taken into account as censored observations. Regression (14) is a two-step
estimator and regression (15) is a full maximum likelihood estimator. The variable ‘Informa-
tion sent’ is instrumented by its own 2- and 3-year lagged values. Year dummy variables are
not reported. Standard errors are provided in parentheses. The standard errors of the full
maximum likelihood regression are robust to correlation of error terms across time. ***, **, *
denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. The values in square brackets
are p-values. For variable definitions and data sources, see the Appendix 5.A.
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Table 5.8: Tobit Regression Results: Tax Treaties
Independent variables (16)
OECD/Council of Europe mutual assistance treaty -0.2646
(0.4843)
EU Mutual Assistance directive 2.2759***
(0.4677)
Bilateral double tax treaty 1.6657**
(0.8273)
Double tax treaty with limited information sharing 0.1969
(0.6116)
Double tax treaty without information sharing -2.4904***
(0.5680)
Real GDP (in logarithms) 0.2503
(0.1647)






McFadden pseudo R2 0.412
Log-likelihood -706.18
Notes: This is a tobit regressions and the dependent variable is the logarithm of tax informa-
tion received on request by the Dutch tax authorities from country i in year t. Zero observa-
tions are taken into account as censored observations.Year effects are not reported. Standard
errors, robust to correlation of errors across time, are provided in parentheses. ***, **, * denote
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. For variable definitions and data
sources, see the Appendix 5.A.

More light!
Last words of J. W. von Goethe
CHAPTER 6
COOPERATION ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND
ITS EFFECT ON THE PRESENCE OF TAX HAVENS
From an efficiency and equity perspective, it is desirable that countries are
able to tax capital income on a residence basis. With respect to efficiency, the
Diamond-Mirrlees theorem (1971a, 1971b) states that production efficiency
requires residence-based capital income taxation because source-based capi-
tal taxation at different tax rates distorts production decisions.1 With respect
to equity, an equitable financing of public goods requires that governments
can tax their residents’ capital income, especially if capital is distributed very
asymmetrically among citizens.2 However, a country on its own only has ac-
cess to information about its residents’ capital income at home. For taxing cap-
ital income derived abroad, the home tax authority must rely on its residents’
honesty in reporting worldwide capital income or on foreign authorities that
share information on capital income.
This chapter analyzes under what circumstances countries exchange infor-
1However, Keen and Wildasin (2004) show that it may be efficient to deviate from the
principle of residence-based taxation if countries cannot transfer tax revenues and have insuf-
ficient tools to replicate a transfer of tax revenues. The assumptions of the Diamond-Mirrlees
theorem are also not satisfied if pure profits cannot be fully taxed.
2Furthermore, residence taxation avoids the fierce tax competition for capital that may de-
velop under source-based taxation. See Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). Instead of taxing
income, countries could resort to taxing consumption, but it is difficult to impose a progres-
sive taxation system via consumption taxes.
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mation on non-residents’ capital income in a multi-jurisdictional world. A
game-theoretic model is developed for a multi-jurisdictional world in which
each country decides on its bilateral information exchange policy in a two-
stage process. Using the concept of cartel stability (see D’Aspremont and Gab-
szewicz, 1986), the countries are enabled to commit themselves to cooperation
if they choose to do so. In the first stage, countries decide simultaneously if
they want to cooperate or not. Having observed the outcome of the first stage,
all countries simultaneously set their their bilateral information sharing pol-
icy, where the countries that previously chose to cooperate act as one single
player whose actions are determined by a bargaining process within the set of
cooperating countries. After all countries have set their information exchange
policies, households decide whether they want to deposit their funds at home
or abroad (to evade domestic taxes). Conclusions on the feasibility of infor-
mation exchange agreements are eventually drawn from the set of subgame
perfect Nash equilibria.
The analysis shows first that the conventional current institutional frame-
work of concluding information exchange agreements mainly on a bilateral
basis can trap countries in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium without information
exchange.3 Multilateral approaches are necessary to achieve Pareto-optimal
outcomes.
Second, the relationship between the degree of information exchange and
parameters like bank profitability or capital mobility is — in contrast to pre-
vious work — U-shaped. In fact, an increase in bank profitability or capital
mobility can enforce full information exchange although a similar increase
at a lower level of bank profitability has the contrary effect of deteriorating
the degree of information exchange and contributing to the emergence of tax
havens.
Third, the model distinguishes between two motivations for engaging in in-
formation exchange. On the one hand, countries can be intrinsically motivated
to exchange information because the value of the information received from
partner countries outweighs the value of becoming a tax haven. On the other
hand, countries may only continue sharing information because they know
that their partner countries would not tolerate the existence of another tax
haven triggering a complete break-down in information exchange. These mo-
tivations require different policy responses. In the latter scenario the degree
of mutual control and transparency must be higher with respect to adhering
3Chapter 5 discusses the institutional framework of information exchange agreements in
depth.
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to an agreed information sharing policy.
Fourth, the model determines endogenously the fraction of countries becom-
ing tax havens. The number of countries in the world is in itself an important
determinant, which cannot be determined in a two-country framework. In
particular, the model can also explain why identical countries may choose dif-
ferent information exchange policies. Hence, the coexistence of information
exchanging countries next to tax havens that resist to share any information
can be explained even without differences in country characteristics.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 reviews related studies on
information sharing between countries. Section 6.2 develops a model for in-
formation exchange between many countries. Section 6.4 contains a compar-
ative statics analysis of the potential equilibria. The model is then applied to
explaining the genesis and certain features of the EU Savings Tax Directive in
Section 6.5. Finally, Section 6.6 concludes.
6.1 Related Literature
In a setting of two large countries, Bacchetta and Espinosa (1995) identify a
strategic revenue effect that gives countries an incentive to exchange informa-
tion. The foreign country takes into account that the home country reacts to
(partial) information sharing by setting higher capital income taxes. The for-
eign country seems to lose utility from the deterrence of evading capital due
to the (partial) information exchange, but that is more than compensated for
by a larger inflow of capital due to the higher income capital taxation in the
home country.
This strategic effect ceases to exist in a small open economy setting, as nu-
merous foreign countries would benefit if one of them increases the degree of
information sharing. In order to explain information sharing in a small coun-
try setting, Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000) apply an infinitely repeated game.
Both countries could attain a short-run advantage by defecting from the in-
formation exchange policy agreed upon with the other country and hence at-
tracting a large amount of tax evading capital. However, a potentially defect-
ing country fears the retaliatory measures of the other country in the long run
as it looses its reputation as a trustworthy partner. If both countries are suffi-
ciently far-sighted/patient, this fear of non-cooperation in the future enables
them to exchange information as if they could credibly commit themselves to
a policy of information exchange.
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Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) extend this approach by allowing countries to
choose between withholding taxes and information exchange as policies to
(partially) prevent international tax evasion. In both regimes, full cooperation
is possible if countries are sufficiently patient. In comparison to information
sharing, applying non-resident withholding taxes allows relatively more co-
operation between impatient countries. If countries are patient, however, fully
cooperative behavior is more easily sustained under information sharing. If
allowed to choose, small countries opt for withholding taxes because they gen-
erate some additional tax revenue, whereas large countries opt for information
exchange because the withdrawal from information sharing is a more power-
ful threat to keep small countries cooperating than a withdrawal from setting
withholding taxes cooperatively. Keen and Ligthart (2006a) extend this model
by allowing for tax revenue sharing between source and residence country.
They show that revenue sharing has no effect on the size of withholding taxes,
so they are comparable to lump-sum transfers from the source country to the
residence country. However, revenue sharing does increase the degree of in-
formation exchange between source and residence country because the rev-
enue sharing aligns the objectives of source and residence countries. This dif-
ference enables them to show that every revenue sharing regime with with-
holding taxes is dominated by some regime with information exchange and
an appropriate revenue sharing parameter.
The conventional two-country framework has the drawback that the model’s
results have to be projected on a multi-jurisdictional reality to be able to draw
conclusions. This raises several problems. For example, in two-country mod-
els, both countries have a monopoly on offering possibilities for tax evasion
to the other country’s citizens. In a universe with only two countries there
is no competition for tax evading capital. At least three questions cannot be
answered in such a framework: First, does the number of countries itself have
an effect on the degree of information exchange? Second, does it make a dif-
ference if countries negotiate with each other bilaterally or multilaterally on
information exchange agreements? Third, what factors can explain the co-
existence of similar country pairs, one characterized by complete information
sharing, the other without any information exchange?
The logic of the infinite game is also quite problematic in the context of capi-
tal income taxation. The barrier to more intensive information exchange is cre-
ated by the fear that the other country may suddenly defect from the agreed
upon information exchange policy. For one period, the defecting country can
benefit from information provided by the other country as well as attract a
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large inflow of tax evading capital. How should the defecting country hide its
intentions from the other country and at the same time inform a large mass of
atomistic investors that it has stalled information sharing? (Is the length of the
period of surprise sufficient to extract any considerable benefit?) Tax havens
do not lack the credibility to commit to information exchange agreements,
they simply abstain from concluding an agreement in the first place. This be-
havior is extremely difficult to model in a two-country universe because two
countries may easily identify Pareto improvements if they can commit to a
course of action.4 To solve these conceptual problems, the model described
below in Section 6.2 will allow for more than two countries.5
Before describing the model in detail, it is worthwhile to discuss the differ-
ences with a model by Slemrod and Wilson (2006), which also discusses the
effect of tax havens’ presence in a multi-country world, albeit not in the con-
text of information exchange. They develop a general equilibrium model to
show that the existence of tax havens reinforces the detrimental effect of tax
competition and that even a partial elimination of tax havens would be ben-
eficial. Countries cannot interact strategically to coordinate their actions to
reduce the number of tax havens.6 The model described below relies on a
partial equilibrium model that takes Slemrod and Wilson’s (2006) results as a
starting point: the detrimental effects of tax evasion on efficiency are taken as
given, as the revenue loss resulting from tax competition is taken to be welfare
reducing. That approach allows focusing on the strategic interaction between
countries, which may decide to cooperate to reduce the degree of tax evasion
and the number of tax havens. Another important difference is, of course,
that Slemrod and Wilson (2006) analyze territorial capital income taxation at
the firm level. This makes information exchange between countries immater-
ial. In their model, tax enforcement, although costly, is under the total control
of firms’ host countries. The model described here analyzes residence-based
capital income taxation at the individual level. Home countries can fully tax
4See Section 4 of Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000): if countries cannot defect on information
exchange agreements, then there always exists some information exchange agreement that
makes both countries better off. The authors argue that rights and obligations of information
exchange clauses in conventional tax treaties are traditionally stated in a symmetric manner
with respect to the participating countries. This prohibits a widespread use of information
exchange agreements, especially between asymmetric countries. Chapter 5 discusses the in-
stitutional framework of information exchange in more depth.
5Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) allow for a myopic third country, but that does not resolve
the previously mentioned problems.
6In fact, Slemrod and Wilson (2006) conclude their article by stating: “A task for future
research would be to explore ways to coordinate further reductions in tax havens.”
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capital deposited at home, but they must rely completely on information ex-
change with foreign countries for taxing capital deposited abroad.Information
transmission is assumed to be costless.
6.2 The Model
Consider a set M = {1, . . . , m} of m ≥ 3 countries. In each country there are
H households that own funds of unit size that they wish to deposit at either
domestic or foreign banks. Depositors receive the same pre-tax interest rate
at domestic and foreign banks.7 Specifically, the deposit interest rate equals
r − δ, where r is an (exogenous) return on bank assets, and δ is the fixed in-
terest spread or profit rate per unit of deposits. As all banks pay the same
deposit rate, the deposit location will be determined by tax and non-tax costs,
if any. Starting with the non-tax costs, I assume that depositing at a domestic
bank is costless, whereas the costs of depositing at a foreign bank vary across
households and across countries. For any household from country j the cost
for depositing in country i is given by the random vector Xj of order m × 1.
The elements xij are exponentially distributed with an average cost of β, ex-
cept for the household’s home country i = j for which depositing costs are
zero (xjj = 0). Otherwise, depositing costs are i.i.d. (identically and indepen-
dently distributed) across households and across countries. These heteroge-
neous costs may reflect differences in travel or communication costs. Alterna-
tively, they may represent heterogeneous expectations of how likely a country
is to retain its role as tax haven for private investors in the future.8
The taxation of interest income generally also varies with the bank’s loca-
tion. In any country, domestic deposits are assumed to be subject to a specific
tax t. Countries can report interest income accruing to non-residents to the
respective foreign tax authority. The reporting country i controls the flow of
information, and hence the probability pij ∈ [0, 1] that deposits by residents
from country j are indeed reported. If reported, cross-border deposits are sub-
ject to a domestic tax equal to t(1 + f ) where f ≥ 0 is a fine rate. The expected
tax imposed on cross-border deposits now equals τij = pijt(1 + f ) ≥ 0. The
residence-based tax t is taken to be exogenous, as it might be determined by
the need to tax other income (such as labor income) in a comprehensive in-
7Different pre-tax interest rates are not considered because banks can redistribute the de-
posited funds internationally such that pre-tax returns on capital are equalized.
8Strictly speaking one should also index depositing costs per household, but that would
only cloud notation.
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come tax system. Likewise, the fine rate f is taken to be exogenous, as it would
be determined by the severity of tax evasion relative to other forms of crime.
As pij therefore is more readily adjusted than t or f , the effective cross-border
tax τij is de facto chosen by the reporting country i. Information transmission
is assumed to be costless.
A household from country j prefers to deposit at home if
r− δ− t ≥ r− δ− τij − xij ∀i ∈ M \ {j} (6.1)
Otherwise, the household deposits in country i∗ for which the sum of transac-
tion costs plus effective taxes due to information exchange are smallest, such
that τi∗ j + xi∗ j = mini[τij + xij] holds, where i ∈ M \ {j}.
















[xki + τki]) i, j, k ∈ M
The index k represents all countries to which a tax evading depositor from
country i could send funds (hence, potential tax havens). The first term repre-
sents country i’s share of households for which it would not pay off to engage
in tax evasion. The transaction costs together with taxation due to information
exchange are too high for all potential tax havens, so they deposit their funds
at home, in country i. These households earn the net interest r − δ on which
they pay domestic taxes t. The second term represents country i’s share of
households for which it pays off to engage in tax evasion. They deposit their
funds in the tax haven that incurs the lowest transaction costs such that they
earn a net interest of r − δ, but they incur transaction costs and face taxation
due to information exchange of mink 6=i[xki + τki]. Of course, the most favor-
able tax haven may differ across households because transaction costs differ
across households.
Banks in country i receive deposits from residents and non-residents, yield-
ing average bank profits (normalized by the number of households H)











xij + τij = min
k 6=j
[xkj + τkj]







[xkj + τkj] < t
} )
i, j, k ∈ M (6.3)
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The index j represents all countries to which a tax evading depositor from
country i could deposit and — vice versa — from which country i could at-
tract funds from tax evading households. The index k, which includes coun-
try i, represents the countries that are competing for tax evading funds from
country j. The first term represents bank profits from country i’s share of
households for which it would not pay off to engage in tax evasion. They
deposit their funds with banks at home on which the banks earn a profit rate
of δ. The second term represents profits from the share of households from
all other countries, which deposit their funds in country i because transaction
costs and information exchange policies are such that tax evasion pays off for
these households and country i indeed turns out to be the most favorable des-
tination country.
Country i’s average tax revenue (normalized by the number of households
H) is given by












xji + τji = min
k 6=i
[xki + τki] | min
k 6=i







[xki + τki] < t
} )
i, j, k ∈ M (6.4)
The indices j and k represent all countries to which a depositor from country i
could evade and — vice versa — from which country i could attract funds of
tax evading households. The first term represents domestic tax revenue from
country i’s share of households for which it would not pay off to engage in
tax evasion. They deposit their funds at home and pay the domestic tax t. The
second term represents country i’s tax revenue due to information exchange
with other countries such that the share of households that choose country j as
their favorite investment location pays an effective tax of τji. Appendix 6.A.1
substitutes the probability expressions in the above three equations taking into
account that transaction costs xij are exponentially distributed.
Each government is interested in maximizing the average social surplus,
Si, consisting of average household private income, average bank profits per
household, and average tax revenue per household as follows
Si = E[Ii] + E[Pi] + ρE[Ti] (6.5)
where ρ ≥ 1 is the marginal cost of public funds from an alternative source of
government revenue. Due to the law of large numbers, the expected values
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will be very close to the actual observed averages if the number of households
is sufficiently large. Hence, a government’s attitude to risk does not play a
role.
6.3 Solving the Model
6.3.1 Information Exchange without the Ability to Commit
This section considers the situation in which countries cannot commit to a par-
ticular information exchange policy in contrast to the next section, in which
countries can commit to cooperate. Countries set their information exchange
policy simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Country i specifically sets its
information exchange policy with respect to country j in form of the non-
negative strategic variable τij, which determines the effective tax that tax evaders
from country j to country i have to pay at home due to information exchange.
Every country has control over m− 1 strategic variables and takes the informa-
tion exchange policy of other countries as given. Country i’s payoff is given by
equation (6.5), which is a function of the strategic variables. The game is not
repeated in order to avoid introducing the assumption that private investors
can react more quickly to changes in a country’s information exchange policy
than other governments.9
As the following proposition shows, no country has an incentive to exchange
information. The proof is in Appendix 6.A.2.
Proposition 6.1 If there exist bank profits δ > 0, then the unique Nash equilibrium
of a one-shot non-cooperative game exhibits no information exchange, that is, τij = 0
for all i 6= j and i, j ∈ M.
The intuition of the proposition is straightforward and similar to the two-
country case as discussed in Huizinga and Nielsen (2003). There is no direct
reward for exchanging information. A higher degree of information exchange
only deters potential depositors that generate bank profits. Without the pos-
sibility to commit to mutual information exchange, countries cannot reward
9As Bacchetta and Espinosa (2000) put it: “Since information goes from government to
government, it seems reasonable to assume that the foreign private sector cannot react before
the foreign government to a change in λ” (where λ stands for information sharing).
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each other for information exchange.10 In fact, with more countries compet-
ing for tax evading funds, the negative incentive for providing information
has become even worse. Not only may depositors decide to deposit at home
and pay domestic taxes, but with many countries to choose from, they may
switch to another tax haven to deposit their funds. This makes deposits more
elastic to information exchange than in the two-country case, where one coun-
try is the tax haven monopolist for tax evaders from the other country.
6.3.2 Information Exchange with Possibility to Commit to Co-
operation: The Second Stage of the Game
In this section, the degree of information sharing is determined in a two-stage
game. In the first stage, countries choose simultaneously whether or not they
wish to cooperate.11 After observing the outcome of the first stage, all coun-
tries simultaneously set their degree of information sharing, where the coop-
erating countries act as one player that maximizes the sum of the coalition
members’ payoffs.12 Last, households decide whether they want to pay do-
mestic taxes and deposit their funds at home or try to evade domestic taxes
and deposit their funds abroad. In the latter case they also choose their fa-
vorite country, which is characterized by the lowest possible combination of
transaction costs and taxation due to information exchange. This completely
determines each country’s payoff.
10Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) use a repeated game setting in which countries use punish-
ment strategies to induce more cooperative behavior. However, such an approach requires
the assumption that private investors react immediately to a change in the information ex-
change policy of the foreign government, whereas governments can only react with a lag of
one period.
11The possibility of more than one cooperating coalition is not allowed for. Furthermore,
free entry and exit from the coalition is implicitly assumed (as any country can decide to join
or not to join the coalition in the first stage). Introducing the possibility of several coalitions
or the possibility to bar entry to the coalition would not affect the results. Proposition 6.5 (on
p. 132) will show that larger coalitions weakly dominate smaller coalitions in terms of the
coalition members’ payoffs. So there would be no interest in barring entry of new members.
Furthermore, competing coalitions of equal or smaller size would have an incentive to either
join the largest coalition or to effectively dissolve the coalition, thereby behaving just like
non-cooperating countries.
12One could equivalently assume that the countries that choose to cooperate in the first
stage act as one single player whose actions are determined by a bargaining process within
the set of cooperating countries. Since countries are symmetric, all bargaining processes that
satisfy certain basic axioms arrive at the same outcome.
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The game is solved by backwards induction. In the second stage, all sin-
gleton countries and the cooperating countries determine the degree of infor-
mation exchange τij, i 6= j, i and j ∈ M, given that n countries choose not
to cooperate and c = m − n countries choose to cooperate in the first stage.
(The n non-cooperating countries form the set of non-cooperating countries N,
whereas the c cooperating countries form the set of cooperating countries C.)
The optimal second-stage strategy of non-cooperating countries is equivalent
to the situation in the previous section in which commitment is not possible
at all. They do not provide any information irrespective of other countries’
first-stage decisions.
Proposition 6.2 If there exist bank profits δ > 0, then the strictly dominant strategy
of non-cooperating countries in the second stage of the game is not to provide any
information to other countries, τij = 0 for all i 6= j, j ∈ M, i ∈ N.
Proof: The same proof as for Proposition 6.1 in Appendix 6.A.2, but only
applied to all i ∈ N. ¤
The following proposition shows that also cooperating countries do not pro-
vide information in the second stage to countries that have not joined the coali-
tion. The proof is in Appendix 6.A.3.
Proposition 6.3 If there exist bank profits δ > 0, then the strictly dominant strat-
egy of cooperating countries in the second stage is not to provide any information to
countries that are not part of the coalition, such that τij = 0 for all i 6= j, j ∈ N,
i ∈ C.
It follows that information exchange can only take place within the group of
countries that have decided to cooperate. Suppose that the group of cooperat-
ing countries could share information at a pre-emptive level such that τij = t
for all countries i 6= j and i, j ∈ C that have chosen to cooperate in the first
stage. In that case, households from a cooperating country can only evade
taxes by holding their deposits in a non-cooperating country. Cross-border
tax evasion within the group of cooperating countries would be eradicated.
Alternatively, the group of cooperating countries could also decide that it is
better not to share information such that τij = 0 for all countries i 6= j and
i, j ∈ C. Then there is no information exchange between any pair of countries
and the outcome would be equivalent to the situation described in Section
6.3.1 where countries are not able to commit themselves.
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The cooperating countries take the following factors into account when de-
ciding to exchange information or not. On the one hand, cooperating coun-
tries have an incentive to share information because it reduces the number
of tax havens available to their citizens. The share of households for which
tax evasion is not an attractive option increases. These households do not
want to incur the transaction costs of depositing their funds abroad anymore,
deposit their funds at home, thereby increasing domestic tax revenue. On the
other hand, some households may simply switch to their second-best choice of
tax haven if their first-best location concludes an information exchange treaty.
That share of households does not contribute to an increase in domestic tax
revenue. Instead, these households only suffer higher transaction costs as
their most favorable tax haven is taken away, which has a negative effect on a
country’s payoff function. Another negative effect of exchanging information
within the coalition is the loss of bank profits. Households that have evaded
taxes by depositing funds with a coalition member may shift their funds to al-
ternative locations outside the coalition, driving out bank profits from within
the coalition to non-cooperating countries.
After the first stage of the game, the number of cooperating countries c and
the number of non-cooperating countries n = m − c is fixed. Furthermore,
τij = 0 for any country pair such that i or j ∈ N because not providing any
information to country j is country i’s strictly dominant strategy. Hence, the
decision whether or not to exchange information, can be written as a function
of the number of non-cooperating countries n. If the coalition decides to fully
share information then the corresponding social surplus is given by SC∗i (n)
for cooperating countries and by SN∗i (n) for non-cooperating countries. The
social surplus So if the coalition decides not to exchange information is equal
for all countries, whether cooperating or not. The three functions are specified
in Appendix 6.A.4. A coalition of size c = m− n decides to exchange informa-
tion if SC∗(n)− So > 0. The non-cooperating countries then receive a payoff
SN∗(n).
The following two propositions further characterize the behavior of the co-
operating countries in the second stage of the game. The propositions’ proofs
are in Appendices 6.A.5 and 6.A.6.
Proposition 6.4 If all countries decide to cooperate at the first stage, they will always
decide to exchange information at the second stage.
Proposition 6.5 If a coalition of c countries decides to exchange information, then
also a coalition of size c + 1 exchanges information. In fact, once a coalition of size
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c∗ decides to exchange information, the gains from exchanging information, as mea-
sured by SC∗(n)− So, keeps increasing in the number of cooperating countries; the
increments become larger for every additional member.
6.3.3 The First Stage of the Game
In the first stage of the game, a coalition of size c = M − n is said to be in-
ternally stable if none of the cooperating countries wants to defect from the
coalition and externally stable if none of the non-cooperating countries wants
to join the coalition:
RC(n)−QN(n + 1) > 0 (6.6)
QN(n)− RC(n− 1) ≥ 0 (6.7)
where QN(n) represents the payoff for not cooperating and RC(n) represents
the payoff for cooperation if n countries are outside the coalition and c =
M − n countries are in the coalition. The payoff for cooperating countries is
RC(n) = max[SC∗(n), So]. The coalition will fully exchange information with
a payoff of SC∗(n) if that is better than not exchanging any information with
a payoff of So. The non-cooperating countries’ payoff depends on the coali-
tion’s strategy in the second stage. The payoff is QN(n) = SN∗ if there is full
information exchange within the coalition, that is, if SC∗(n) > So. Otherwise,
if SC∗(n) ≤ So, then the payoff is QN(n) = So.
Conditions (6.6) and (6.7) identify the set of sub-game perfect Nash equilib-
ria as the functions QN(n) and RN(n) take the optimal coalition behavior in
the second stage of the game into account. The inequalities in conditions (6.6)
and (6.7) ensure that, for QN(n + 1) = RC(n), countries within the coalition
have an incentive to leave because they could attain the same payoff without
cooperation. This reflects infinitesimal transaction costs of being a coalition
member.13 As a result, coalitions are only formed if they exchange informa-
tion in the second stage of the game.
For an equilibrium with a grand coalition (i.e., n = 0), internal stability is
sufficient. For an equilibrium with no cooperation (i.e., n = M− 1), external
stability is sufficient. For all intermediate equilibria, both stability conditions
have to be satisfied.
One can now determine all equilibria for a given set of parameters by back-
ward induction. First, it is determined for all potential coalition sizes c = m−
13Higher transaction costs could also be specified. This would make equilibria with coali-
tions less likely. Otherwise, results would remain unaffected.
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n if information is shared or not by analyzing the function g(n) ≡ SC∗(n)− So.
That determines the payoffs RC(n) and QN(n) for all n ∈ {0, ..., m − 1}. In
a second step, one determines for which n the conditions (6.6) and (6.7) are
satisfied. This procedure identifies all existing equilibria. The two steps of
equilibrium identification are now explained in more detail.
First, the function g(n) = SC(n)− So, determines, if members of a coalition
exchange information in the presence of n outsiders, which are defined as tax
havens. Figure 6.1 illustrates a typical shape for the function g(n). By Propo-
sition 6.4, the function must be positive for n = 0. By the proof of Proposition
6.5, it is convex and downward sloping for any g(n) > 0. If g(n) has a zero
point at n∗, it separates the domain of g(n) in two relevant regions. Informa-
tion exchanging coalitions may be feasible if there are less than n∗ outsiders.
This corresponds to the positive values of g(n) to the left of n∗. An infor-
mation exchanging coalition is impossible if there are more than n∗ outsiders
as represented by the negative values of g(n) to the right of n∗. Hence, n∗
defines a necessary threshold size for stable coalitions because coalition mem-
bers have an incentive to leave a coalition that does not exchange information.
The analysis further below will consider how the threshold size n∗ changes
with respect to changes in parameter values.
The validity of conditions (6.6) and (6.7) for different values of n is most
easily analyzed graphically by plotting the function g(n) and another func-
tion: f (n) ≡ SC∗(n) − SN∗(n + 1). This latter function determines whether
or not a country has an incentive to leave an information exchanging coali-
tion to become the (n + 1)th tax haven under the assumption that the coalition
keeps exchanging information even if one country defects. Equivalently, f (n)
shows if there is an incentive for the (n + 1)th tax haven to join an information
exchanging coalition. These incentives are exactly the opposite of each other.14
With the help of the functions g(n) and f (n) one can distinguish between two
different sorts of equilibria.
14For example, if f (n) ≤ 0, then any member of an information exchanging coalition of size
c = m− n has an incentive to leave the coalition if it could be ensured that the coalition of size
c− 1 would still be exchanging information. Similarly, if f (n) ≤ 0, there is no incentive for
non-cooperating countries to join an information exchanging coalition of size c− 1 to become
the cth member. On the other hand, if f (n) > 0, then no member of an information exchang-
ing coalition of size c = m− n has an incentive to leave the coalition. Similarly, if f (n) > 0,
there is an incentive for non-cooperating countries to join an information exchanging coalition
of size c− 1 to become the cth member.
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The first set of equilibria have coalitions of size c = M− n for which:
f (n− 1) ≤ 0 (6.8)
f (n) > 0 (6.9)
Condition f (n) > 0 ensures internal stability. First, f (n) > 0 guarantees by
definition that coalition members have no incentive to leave the coalition even
if the coalition without them continued to share information. That also implies
that coalition members have no incentive to leave the coalition if that makes
the coalition abandon information exchange. Because of SN∗(n) ≥ So for all
n ∈ {0, . . . , m− 1}, it follows that g(n) ≥ f (n) > 0. And g(n) > 0 not only
shows that the coalition of size c = m − n is exchanging information, but it
also means that coalition members have no incentive to leave the coalition if
that leads to a total breakdown of information exchange. Hence, f (n) > 0 is
sufficient for internal stability.
Similarly, f (n− 1) ≤ 0 ensures by definition that no outsider would like to
join an information exchanging coalition. Hence, f (n− 1) ≤ 0 and f (n) > 0
together are sufficient conditions for external stability because f (n) > 0 en-
sures that a coalition of size c = m− n and (by Proposition 6.5) also a coalition
of size c + 1 = m− (n− 1) are both information sharing. For 0 < n < M− 1,
this is called an intrinsic intermediate coalition equilibrium. Special cases are
the intrinsic grand coalition, for which n = 0 and only condition (6.9) has to be
satisfied for stability, and no coalition, for which n = m− 1 and only condition
(6.8) has to be satisfied for stability.
The second set of equilibria have coalitions of size c = M− n for which
f (n− 1) ≤ 0 (6.10)
g(n) > 0 (6.11)
g(n + 1) ≤ 0 (6.12)
where g(n) > 0 ensures that the coalition is sharing information in the pres-
ence of n tax havens. Because of g(n + 1) ≤ 0 there would be no information
exchange anymore if the coalition lost one member. Hence, condition g(n) > 0
and condition g(n + 1) ≤ 0 together are sufficient for internal stability because
every coalition member realizes that leaving the coalition results in a com-
plete breakdown of information exchange which makes everyone worse off,
coalition members as well as tax havens.15 Similarly, f (n− 1) ≤ 0 ensures by
15From SN∗(n) ≥ So for all n ∈ {0, . . . , m− 1} and g(n) > 0 it follows that everyone would
be worse off without information exchange.
136 COOPERATION ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE
definition that no outsider would like to join an information exchanging coali-
tion. Hence, f (n− 1) ≤ 0 and g(n) > 0 together are sufficient conditions for
external stability because g(n) > 0 ensures that a coalition of size c = m− n
and (by proposition 6.5) also a coalition of size c + 1 = m− (n− 1) are both
information sharing.
For 0 < n < M − 1, this is called a forced intermediate coalition equilib-
rium. A corner solution is the forced grand coalition, for which n = 0, and
conditions (6.11) and (6.12) are sufficient for stability.
The difference between the ‘intrinsic’ first set of equilibria and the ‘forced’
second set of equilibria is the mechanism by which a coalition is internally sta-
ble. The attribute ‘forced’ indicates that the threat of a complete breakdown in
information sharing keeps coalition members from leaving the coalition. (As
opposed to an ‘intrinsic’ desire to be a coalition member, which is a prereq-
uisite for internal stability if the coalition’s threat of abandoning information
exchange in case of defections is not credible.)
Proposition 6.6 There always exists at least one equilibrium.
Proof: Case 1: f (m − 2) ≤ 0, which satisfies condition (6.8). Hence, a no-
coalition equilibrium exists. Case 2: f (0) > 0, which satisfies condition (6.9).
Hence, an intrinsic grand coalition equilibrium exists. Case 3: f (m− 2) > 0
and f (0) ≤ 0. Then there must exist at least one n ∈ {1, . . . , m − 2} such
that f (n) > 0 and f (n − 1) ≤ 0 and these are the conditions (6.8) and (6.9).
Hence, an intrinsic intermediate coalition equilibrium exists. Together, these
cases cover all possible situations. ¤
6.4 Description of Equilibria
This section will answer the questions posed in the Introduction. Will there
be information exchange? How many countries will take part in an informa-
tion sharing agreement? Are there several equilibria? How are the answers to
these questions affected by parameter changes? What are the policy implica-
tions? These questions are answered by illustrating numerically all possible
combinations of equilibria.
The parameter values for the benchmark case are the same as in Huizinga
and Nielsen (2003): average transaction costs are β = 0.04, the domestic tax
rate is t = 0.03, bank profits are δ = 0.005, and the marginal value of tax
revenues is ρ = 1.4. The number of countries m is initially assumed to be 7.
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The graphs of g(n) and f (n) in Figure 6.1 show that there exist two equilibria.
(i) an intrinsic grand coalition (due to f (0) > 0); and (ii) no cooperation at all
(due to f (5) ≤ 0). What about intermediate equilibria? Coalitions confronted
with 2 or more tax havens would not exchange any information (due to g(n) ≤
0). These coalitions cannot be part of an equilibrium because they are not
internally stable. A coalition of 6 countries that is only confronted with 1 tax
haven does exchange information (due to g(1) > 0). It is not externally stable,
however, because the tax haven would like to join the information exchanging
coalition (due to f (0) > 0).
The intrinsic grand coalition is clearly a Pareto improvement with respect
to no cooperation at all. It is hence quite important to have an institutional
set-up that facilitates the grand coalition equilibrium. Bargaining over infor-
mation exchange clauses in the framework of sequential bilateral tax treaties
(as it has been the most common practice over the last century) is destined
to trap countries in the inferior equilibrium. A multilateral approach to in-
formation exchange agreements, or at least the use of green light provisions
enables countries to coordinate the superior equilibrium. (A green light pro-
vision ensures that a framework of treaties does not enter into force before the
last involved country has enacted the treaties in its domestic law.) Departing
from a situation without any information exchange no pair of countries has
an incentive to sign a bilateral information exchange agreement. Figure 6.1
illustrates this fact as g(5) ≤ 0.
As bank profitability increases from δ = 0.005 to δ = 0.01 it becomes more
attractive to become a tax haven. The dashed and solid lines in Figure 6.2
show that the grand coalition has become impossible (due to f (0) ≤ 0). The
two equilibria are a forced intermediate coalition (due to f (0) ≤ 0, g(1) > 0
and g(2) ≤ 0) and no cooperation at all (due to f (5) ≤ 0). Again, the former
equilibrium is Pareto superior to the latter equilibrium.16
As bank profitability increases further to δ = 0.02, no coalition is willing to
bear the presence of tax havens anymore. The foregone bank profits would
hurt the information sharing countries so much that they would prefer no co-
operation to any intermediate coalition. The lines in Figure 6.3 show two equi-
libria. (i) a forced grand coalition (due to g(0) > 0 and g(1) ≤ 0); (ii) and no
cooperation at all (due to due to f (5) ≤ 0). Of course, the former equilibrium
16Strictly speaking there are 8 equilibria: one equilibrium with no cooperation and 7 equi-
libria with six information sharing countries and one tax haven. Every equilibrium of the
latter sort features another country as the tax haven. Due to all countries being symmetric,
these 7 equilibria are equivalent.
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is Pareto superior to the latter and a coordination mechanism that ensures
the outcome of a grand coalition is very desirable. Further increasing bank
profitability would not lead to qualitatively different outcomes. On the other
hand, by decreasing bank profitability to zero, the function f (n) converges
to the function g(n) and the result is qualitatively similar to the benchmark
situation depicted in Figure 6.1.
Increasing the total number of countries m has effects very similar to increas-
ing bank profitability δ. The situation for m = 7 countries has already been
summarized in Figure 6.1, which shows two equilibria: (i) an intrinsic grand
coalition and (ii) no cooperation at all. Increasing the number of countries
to m = 10 makes it more attractive to become a non-cooperating tax haven
because the the potential gain from attracting tax-evading bank depositors in-
creases as the tax haven is now smaller relative to the rest of the world. Figure
6.4 shows two equilibria in this situation: a forced intermediary coalition (due
to f (0) ≤ 0, g(1) > 0 and g(2) ≤ 0) and no cooperation at all (due to f (9) ≤ 0).
Increasing the number of countries further to m = 13 causes the presence of
tax havens to become unbearable to any information sharing coalition. Fig-
ure 6.5 shows two equilibria: a forced grand coalition (due to g(0) > 0 and
g(1) ≤ 0) and no cooperation at all (due to f (11) ≤ 0). Further increasing
the number of countries M does not render any qualitatively different results.
However, decreasing the number of countries to m = 4 leads to a qualitatively
different situation. Figure 6.6 shows that the intrinsic grand coalition has be-
come the unique equilibrium (due to f (0) > 0). If the number of countries
is sufficiently small, it is not necessary to coordinate a superior equilibrium
outcome as there is only one. Departing from a situation without any infor-
mation exchange, two countries would have an incentive to sign a bilateral
information exchange agreement even if no other bilateral agreement were to
follow. Figure 6.6 illustrates that f (2) = g(2) > 0.
The equilibrium pattern across the two-dimensional parameter space, that is,
the number of countries and bank profitability is summarized more generally
in Table 6.1. The prototypical combinations of equilibria are indicated by the
following abbreviations: IG, which indicates the co-existence of an intrinsic
grand coalition and a no cooperation equilibrium as represented by Figure
6.1. FI, indicating a forced intermediate coalition and an equilibrium without
any information sharing as represented by Figures 6.2 and 6.4. FG stands for
the equilibrium combination of a forced grand coalition and no information
sharing at all as represented by Figures 6.3 and 6.5. AG stands for a unique
intrinsic grand coalition as represented by Figure 6.6.
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The effects of increased capital mobility (reflected in a decreasing β) are com-
parable to the effects of increased banking profitability. Table 6.2 summarizes
the equilibrium pattern across the number of countries and capital mobility
(m× β). In the row representing m = 10 countries, one can observe that for
very immobile capital (β = 0.16), the grand coalition is the unique equilib-
rium. Avoiding citizens’ costly tax evading activities is of such a value that
all countries will join an information exchanging coalition without any coor-
dination effort. (See Figure 6.6 for a representative illustration of incentives.)
As capital mobility increases to β = 0.08, the grand coalition is not the unique
equilibrium anymore. Avoiding transaction costs has become less attractive
compared to retaining a country’s status of potential tax haven, so no cooper-
ation at all has become a second equilibrium next to the intrinsic grand coali-
tion. (See Figure 6.1 for a comparable structure of incentives.) As capital mo-
bility increases to the benchmark value of β = 0.04, some countries will find it
attractive to exploit the increased mobility of bank deposits and will act as tax
havens. The two equilibria in this situation are a forced intermediary coalition
and no information sharing. In case of a further increase of capital mobility
(β = 0.02), the presence of tax havens becomes unbearable to any interme-
diary information exchanging coalition. Either there will be no information
exchange at all, or there will be full information exchange in a forced grand
coalition. From Table 6.2 it emerges that this is a general pattern across any
potential number of countries m. For relatively immobile capital (high val-
ues of β), tax havens can exist next to an intermediary information sharing
coalition. This equilibrium becomes infeasible as capital mobility increases
because the loss in depositors — and thus tax base — becomes intolerable to
an intermediary information exchanging coalition.
Table 6.3 summarizes the equilibrium pattern across the number of countries
and the domestic capital income tax rate (m × t). For m = 10 countries and
high domestic tax rates t = 0.12 (and all other parameters at benchmark val-
ues), there exists an intrinsic grand coalition equilibrium because the size of
countries’ tax revenues in the absence of tax evasion makes it attractive to stay
in an information exchanging grand coalition. However, no cooperation at all
is also an equilibrium because households have a strong incentive to evade
domestic taxation and hence there is considerable scope to attract foreign de-
posits. In this equilibrium, no country would like to scare potential depositors
away by engaging into an information exchange agreement. As the size of do-
mestic taxes decreases to t = 0.06, the size of tax revenues is not sufficient
anymore to give an intrinsic motivation for countries to stay with the grand
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information exchanging coalition. Becoming a tax haven has become more at-
tractive, but it is the threat of a total breakdown of information sharing that
keeps the grand coalition a viable equilibrium. An intermediary information
exchanging coalition would not tolerate the presence of tax havens. The coali-
tion would stop sharing information altogether. Interestingly, an intermediary
information exchanging coalition does tolerate the existence of a limited num-
ber of tax havens if the domestic tax rate decreases further to the benchmark
value t = 0.03. The decreased incentive to evade taxes also limits the loss of
deposits to the tax havens such that information sharing within the coalition
can be upheld. In contrast to Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the forced intermediary (FI)
coalition equilibrium pattern is not ‘in between’ the forced grand (FG) coali-
tion pattern and the intrinsic grand (IG) coalition pattern, but an intermediary
coalition is the outcome in the limit as domestic tax rates become smaller. In
fact, as domestic tax rates decrease further to t = 0.001, there is a new equi-
librium not encountered before; the (unique) intrinsic intermediary coalition
(AI): f (n) > 0 and f (n − 1) ≤ 0 are both satisfied. No tax haven would
like to join the coalition and no country would like to leave the intermedi-
ary information exchanging coalition. Table 6.3 shows that this equilibrium
is especially relevant if the number of countries is not too large.17 Figure 6.7
illustrates the structure of incentives for m = 7 countries and t = 0.001 by
plotting the functions f (n) and g(n).
6.5 Application to the EU Savings Tax Directive
On July 1, 2005 the EU Savings Tax Directive (and associated treaties) entered
into force. The genesis and the provisions of this agreement leave no doubt
that it represents a forced equilibrium (in the terms of the model developed
above). A clear sign is the use of a ‘green light provision’. The EU Savings Tax
Directive was supposed to enter into force on January 1, 2005 provided that
5 non-EU member countries and 10 dependent/associated territories apply
from the same date measures equivalent to the ones determined in the Direc-
tive. This mechanism ensured that no country could defect at the last minute
on previous promises without triggering the credible threat that there would
be no automatic information exchange or withholding taxes at all. In fact,
‘green light’ could not be given prior to January 1, 2005, so the entry into force
17One should keep in mind, that changes in other parameter values may extend the rele-
vance of this equilibrium to larger values of m as well.
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had to be deferred to July 1, 2005. Another sign of the forced nature is the be-
havior of several parties during the negotiations: The European Commission
proposed the precursor of the Directive in 1998, upon which Austria, Luxem-
bourg and the UK required that the cooperation of all relevant third countries
should be a precondition for the European solution. Later, in June 2000, all
EU member countries agreed on a system of automatic information exchange
except for Austria and Luxembourg. These two countries objected declaring
that they would only adjust bank secrecy laws if relevant third countries such
as Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino and Switzerland did the same. Even-
tually, Belgium joined this point of view. In the following negotiations with
third countries, Switzerland proposed an alternative to information exchange.
It would apply a withholding tax on non-residents’ interest income of up to
35% if Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg did the same.18 The recurring con-
ditionality on the behavior of other countries shows that all parties wanted to
make sure that all relevant countries are effectively included under the even-
tual agreement. Last, it took seven years from the first proposal in 1998 until
2005 to enact the Savings Tax Directive. Some countries deliberately procras-
tinated to test if some version of the Savings Tax Directive would go through
without having to participate. If previous failed initiatives for coordination of
capital income taxation in 1967 and in 1989 are taken into account, then it took
38 years to arrive at cooperation in this policy area.19
Has anything happened in the meantime that enabled the successful con-
clusion of the EU Savings Tax Directive? Several potential explanations are
18The withholding tax will initially be lower. See Keen and Ligthart (2006b).
19The initiative in 1967 was meant to reduce the extent of tax evasion as well as double
taxation of capital income. The European Commission (1967) discussed two proposals: Either
abolish all withholding tax rates and exchange information on capital income or introduce a
harmonized withholding tax rate on capital income. The former option was seen as impracti-
cal because it collided with the principle of bank secrecy and because it may have caused mas-
sive capital flight to non-member countries. The latter option was never agreed upon because
Belgium, France and Italy called for more than the proposed 10% withholding tax to combat
tax evasion whereas Luxembourg and the Netherlands called for less than 10% to facilitate
free movement of capital (Genschel, 2002, p. 138, and Holzinger, 2005). In 1989, the European
Commission (1989) still disqualified the idea of information exchange because of its infeasi-
bility and proposed a minimum withholding tax rate of 15%. The member countries could
not agree: France and Italy still desired a higher rate, whereas Denmark and the Netherlands
preferred an information exchange system. Luxembourg and the United Kingdom rejected
both ideas because they wanted to protect their banking sectors. After Germany’s bad expe-
rience with a national withholding tax on savings income which resulted in massive capital
flight, the initiative had become politically infeasible (Genschel, 2002, p. 147, and Holzinger,
2005).
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cited. First, the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 has created
a wider support for the OECD initiatives in the area of financial transparency,
bank secrecy and information exchange (CEPS, 2001).20 This awareness might
have helped the European Commission to hammer out an agreement. Sec-
ond, issue-linkage has been widely used in the history of EU negotiations
to reach agreements in areas very sensitive to national vetoes. The Savings
Tax Directive may have a negative effect on Switzerland, but at the same time
Switzerland concluded bilateral treaties with the EU that made the EU Parent-
Subsidariy Directive and the EU Merger Directive applicable to Switzerland.
That makes Switzerland much more attractive for locating multinationals’
headquarters and, indeed, over the last two years many European headquar-
ters have flocked to Zurich. Naturally, official sources always denied a con-
nection between the negotiations of the different agreements. Third, it should
be taken into account that the Savings Tax Directive relates only to fixed in-
come assets. Such a limited agreement may be more easily concluded than
an agreement that relates to all asset classes either because the definition of
fixed income assets has gaps or because it may not be a binding constraint for
tax evading investors if their optimal portfolio can still be achieved without
investing any tax evading funds in fixed income assets (Keen and Ligthart,
2006b).
The model developed in the previous section offers an alternative explana-
tion. The transaction costs for moving funds from one EU country to another
have decreased tremendously over the last decades. Most capital controls
have ceased to exist. Border controls have been abolished for the member
states of the Schengen agreement. Costs for physical transportation have de-
creased while the introduction of the Internet has lowered the costs for vir-
tual transactions. The introduction of a common currency in 1999 has elim-
inated the currency risk between the 15 Euro members. Since 2001, banks
must charge the same fees for cross-border transactions as for domestic trans-
actions. In 2008, the introduction of the Single Euro Payments Area (cover-
ing the European Economic Area and Switzerland) has further eradicated any
remaining discrimination between national and intra-European cross border
payments in the Euro currency. The strong increase in capital mobility (in the
20More specifically, the OECD launched an initiative against harmful tax practices in 1998,
the OECD Global Forum on Taxation was established in 2001 to foster dialogue between
OECD countries and tax havens, a model agreement on exchange of information on tax mat-
ters was developed by the OECD Global Forum Working Group on Effective Exchange of
Information and released in April 2002, the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance
in Tax Matters was opened for signature in 1988 and entered into force in 1995.
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terms of the model a lower β) has made the existence of tax havens unbear-
able to an intermediate information exchanging coalition. Either all countries
started cooperating in taxing capital income or the further financial integra-
tion would have been at risk. Such a scenario would take place in a world
with 10 countries if β would decrease from 0.04 to 0.02 (see Table 6.2). With
β = 0.04, 9 information sharing countries could bear the presence of a tax
haven. With β = 0.02, the presence of the tax haven becomes intolerable.
Either all countries are included in an information exchange agreement or co-
operation breaks down completely.
The Nordic Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters
from 1989 (effective from 1991) is another, very early example of a multilateral
information exchange agreement, which may have been caused by low barri-
ers to capital flows between Nordic countries relative to the rest of the world.
The Nordic countries are very close in terms of language and history; Fin-
land was part of Sweden until 1809, Norway and Sweden were united under
one king until 1905 and all Nordic countries have minority groups deriving or
claiming heritage of a population residing within another Nordic state. Fur-
thermore, the Nordic passport union came into effect in 1958 allowing citizens
of the Nordic countries to cross approved border districts without carrying
their passport or having their passport checked. The increased mobility of
factors of production may have required a multilateral agreement in order to
make further economic integration of these countries acceptable to all parties.
6.6 Conclusion
The previous analysis derives several important results. First, there is a need
for coordinating information exchange agreements beyond the traditional bi-
lateral level in order to attain equilibria that are Pareto-efficient. Otherwise,
countries may be trapped in an equilibrium without any information exchange
even if all countries were intrinsically motivated to contribute to a world with
full information exchange. There exists a first mover disadvantage of acting
cooperatively which must be overcome through the use of multilateral agree-
ments and green light provisions in treaties.
Second, the analysis shows that information sharing may be driven by very
different motivations. On the one hand, countries may have an intrinsic moti-
vation to be part of an information exchanging coalition because its payoff
is higher than if it became a tax haven next to an information exchanging
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coalition. On the other hand, countries may only stay with an information
exchanging coalition because they know that defection would trigger a com-
plete breakdown of information exchange. This eventual situation makes the
option to defect unattractive. Although these equilibria may look very simi-
lar in terms of actual information exchange taking place, they require a very
different institutional framework. If coalition countries are intrinsically moti-
vated, they will automatically take care of keeping the information exchang-
ing coalition effective. However, if countries have an incentive to defect from
an information exchanging coalition, given the remaining countries keep co-
operating, then a lot of effort will have to be invested in keeping information
sharing effective. Individual countries will try to find loopholes in the infor-
mation exchange agreement in order to remain attractive to tax-evading for-
eign depositors and at the same will time pretend to fully cooperate to keep
the information exchanging coalition intact. Other countries may respond by
pulling out of the information sharing coalition arguing that full information
sharing within the coalition is not effective. This kind of incentives requires a
constant renegotiation of the terms of information exchange to keep up with
legal, financial, and technological developments to shift tax evading deposits
from one country to another. Otherwise, there may be a shift to an equilibrium
without any information exchange.
Third, it emerges that the number of players is in itself a very important pa-
rameter determining the feasibility of information exchange. A two-country
analysis will never be able to explore this dimension of information exchange.
Even with symmetric countries, it depends on the number of countries which
outcome (i.e., tax havens or full information exchange) prevails and which
motivation keeps information sharing countries cooperating. Furthermore,
the model shows that identical countries may choose different information
exchange policies. Hence, the coexistence of information exchanging coun-
tries and tax havens that resist to share any information is explainable even
without differences in country characteristics.
Fourth, the relationship between parameters and the feasibility of informa-
tion sharing is non-monotonic. In fact, successive increases in bank prof-
itability (or alternatively capital mobility or the number of countries) may
first cause a breakdown of full information exchange and the emergence of
tax havens. However, further increases then contribute to the disappearance
of tax havens and reestablishment of full information sharing (although the
motivation to stay within the information sharing coalition has changed with
respect to the initial situation as discussed above). It is noteworthy, that the
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model allows a seamless analysis of the transition from a world with imper-
fectly mobile capital to a world with perfectly mobile capital (as β converges
to zero). Previous research used to introduce auxiliary assumptions that ex-
cluded perfectly mobile capital.
Fifth, countries’ discount rates and infinitely repeated games are not re-
quired in order to explain information sharing between countries. Due to
the folk theorem (cf.Abreu, 1988), repeated games can explain an extremely
wide range of possible behavior. Determining a country’s discount rate is an
intricate task in itself. Modeling information exchange as a repetitive game
must assume that it is possible for countries to credibly inform atomistic in-
vestors about an imminent defection and still surprise the other country with
its action. The present approach does not exhibit these drawbacks. It allows
for an endogenous choice of countries to credibly commit to cooperation or to
refrain from cooperation.
There are two caveats in interpreting the results. They apply to a world with
symmetric countries and a homogeneous capital mobility index β. Asymme-
tries in country size or in transaction costs have been left out intentionally
because it would cloud analyzing the ramifications of other parameters. How-
ever, introducing the strong asymmetries (especially in country size) present
in reality will strongly affect the occurrence of different equilibrium patterns.
For example, the coexistence of intermediary information sharing coalitions
(having large country members) and small tax havens will be feasible for a
much larger range of parameter values than for symmetric countries.21 Fu-
ture work along the lines of the model presented here — which takes size
asymmetries into account — is definitely warranted.
21(Slight) asymmetry in country size is in fact the most likely candidate for resolving the
indeterminacy problem of which country gets the (attractive) role of tax haven and which
countries are members of a forced intermediary information sharing coalition. This determi-
nacy problem cannot be resolved within a model assuming perfectly symmetric countries.
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Figure 6.1: Benchmark: 7 Countries







Notes: The dashed line shows the incentive for a coalition of c = m− n coun-
tries to exchange information with each other: g(n) ≡ SC∗(n) − So, where
n ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} indicates the number of non-cooperating countries. A
positive value indicates an incentive to exchange information. The solid line
shows the incentive for a member of an information sharing coalition of size
c = m− n to defect if the defection does not cause the coalition to stop infor-
mation sharing: f (n) ≡ SC∗(n)− SN∗(n + 1). A negative value indicates an
incentive to defect. At the same time, the solid line also reflects the incentive
of a tax haven to join an information sharing coalition of size c = m − n to
become its c + 1th member: SC∗(n− 1)− SN∗(n). A positive value indicates
an incentive to join.
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Figure 6.2: Increased Bank Profitability: δ = 0.01










Figure 6.3: Increased Bank Profitability: δ = 0.02






Notes: The dashed line shows the incentive for a coalition of c = m− n countries to exchange
information with each other: g(n) ≡ SC∗(n) − So, where n ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} indicates the
number of non-cooperating countries. A positive value indicates an incentive to exchange
information. The solid line shows the incentive for a member of an information sharing coali-
tion of size c = m− n to defect if the defection does not cause the coalition to stop information
sharing: f (n) ≡ SC∗(n)− SN∗(n + 1). A negative value indicates an incentive to defect. At
the same time, the solid line also reflects the incentive of a tax haven to join an information
sharing coalition of size c = m − n to become its c + 1th member: SC∗(n − 1) − SN∗(n). A
positive value indicates an incentive to join.
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Figure 6.4: Benchmark with 10 Countries








Figure 6.5: Benchmark with 13 Countries









Notes: The dashed line shows the incentive for a coalition of c = m− n countries to exchange
information with each other: g(n) ≡ SC∗(n) − So, where n ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} indicates the
number of non-cooperating countries. A positive value indicates an incentive to exchange
information. The solid line shows the incentive for a member of an information sharing coali-
tion of size c = m− n to defect if the defection does not cause the coalition to stop information
sharing: f (n) ≡ SC∗(n)− SN∗(n + 1). A negative value indicates an incentive to defect. At
the same time, the solid line also reflects the incentive of a tax haven to join an information
sharing coalition of size c = m − n to become its c + 1th member: SC∗(n − 1) − SN∗(n). A
positive value indicates an incentive to join.
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Figure 6.6: Benchmark with 4 Countries







Figure 6.7: Intrinsic Intermediate Coalition









Notes: The dashed line shows the incentive for a coalition of c = m− n countries to exchange
information with each other: g(n) ≡ SC∗(n) − So, where n ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1} indicates the
number of non-cooperating countries. A positive value indicates an incentive to exchange
information. The solid line shows the incentive for a member of an information sharing coali-
tion of size c = m− n to defect if the defection does not cause the coalition to stop information
sharing: f (n) ≡ SC∗(n)− SN∗(n + 1). A negative value indicates an incentive to defect. At
the same time, the solid line also reflects the incentive of a tax haven to join an information
sharing coalition of size c = m − n to become its c + 1th member: SC∗(n − 1) − SN∗(n). A
positive value indicates an incentive to join.
150 COOPERATION ON INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Table 6.1: Equilibria over the Parameter Space m× δ
Number of Bank Profitability (δ )
Countries
0.001 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.025 0.03 0.036 0.04
2 AG AG AG AG AG AG AG AG AG
3 AG AG AG AG AG AG AG IG FG
4 AG AG AG IG IG FI FG FG FG
5 IG IG IG IG FI FG FG FG FG
6 IG IG IG IG FG FG FG FG FG
7 IG IG IG FI FG FG FG FG FG
8 IG IG IG FI FG FG FG FG FG
9 IG IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG
10 IG IG FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
11 IG IG FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
12 IG IG FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
13 IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
14 IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
15 IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
16 IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
17 IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
18 IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
19 IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
20 IG IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
21 IG FI FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
22 IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
23 IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
24 IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
25 IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
26 IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
27 IG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
28 FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
29 FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
30 FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG FG
Notes: IG indicates the co-existence of an intrinsic grand coalition and a non-cooperative
equilibrium as represented by Figure 6.1. FI indicates a forced intermediate coalition and an
equilibrium without any information sharing as represented by Figures 6.2 and 6.4. FG stands
for the equilibrium combination of a forced grand coalition and no information sharing at all
as represented by Figures 6.3 and 6.5. AG stands for a unique intrinsic grand coalition as
represented by Figure 6.6. Bold and italic typeface are used to facilitate recognizing patterns
across the parameter space.
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Table 6.2: Equilibria over the Parameter Space m× β
Number of Capital Mobility (β )
Countries
0.001 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.16
2 AG AG AG AG AG AG AG AG
3 IG IG IG AG AG AG AG AG
4 IG IG IG IG AG AG AG AG
5 FG IG IG IG IG AG AG AG
6 FG FG IG IG IG IG AG AG
7 FG FG FG IG IG IG IG AG
8 FG FG FG FG IG IG IG AG
9 FG FG FG FG IG IG IG AG
10 FG FG FG FG FI IG IG AG
11 FG FG FG FG FI IG IG AG
12 FG FG FG FG FI IG IG IG
13 FG FG FG FG FG FI IG IG
14 FG FG FG FG FG FI IG IG
15 FG FG FG FG FG FI IG IG
16 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
17 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
18 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
19 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
20 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
21 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
22 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
23 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
24 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
25 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
26 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI IG
27 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI FI
28 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI FI
29 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI FI
30 FG FG FG FG FG FI FI FI
Notes: IG indicates the co-existence of an intrinsic grand coalition and a non-cooperative
equilibrium as represented by Figure 6.1. FI indicates a forced intermediate coalition and an
equilibrium without any information sharing as represented by Figures 6.2 and 6.4. FG stands
for the equilibrium combination of a forced grand coalition and no information sharing at all
as represented by Figures 6.3 and 6.5. AG stands for a unique intrinsic grand coalition as
represented by Figure 6.6. Bold and italic typeface are used to facilitate recognizing patterns
across the parameter space.
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Table 6.3: Equilibria over the Parameter Space m× t
Number of Domestic Tax on Capital Income (t)
Countries
0.001 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.24
2 AG AG AG AG AG AG AG AG AG AG
3 AI AI AG AG AG AG AG IG IG IG
4 AI AI AI AG AG IG IG IG IG IG
5 AI AI AI AG IG IG IG IG IG IG
6 AI AI AI IG IG IG IG IG IG IG
7 AI AI AI IG IG IG IG IG IG IG
8 AI AI FI IG IG IG IG IG IG IG
9 AI AI FI IG IG IG IG IG IG IG
10 AI FI FI FI FI FG FG FG IG IG
11 AI FI FI FI FI FG FG FG IG IG
12 AI FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG IG
13 AI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
14 AI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
15 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
16 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
17 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
18 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
19 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
20 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
21 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG IG
22 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
23 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
24 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
25 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
26 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
27 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
28 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
29 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
30 FI FI FI FI FG FG FG FG FG FG
Notes: AI indicates the intrinsic intermediary coalition. IG indicates the co-existence of an
intrinsic grand coalition and a non-cooperative equilibrium as represented by Figure 6.1. FI
indicates a forced intermediate coalition and an equilibrium without any information sharing
as represented by Figures 6.2 and 6.4. FG stands for the equilibrium combination of a forced
grand coalition and no information sharing at all as represented by Figures 6.3 and 6.5. AG
stands for a unique intrinsic grand coalition as represented by Figure 6.6. Bold and italic
typeface are used to facilitate recognizing patterns across the parameter space.
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6.A Appendix
6.A.1 Unconditional Payoff Functions
The transaction costs for a household from country j depositing with a bank
in the foreign country i are distributed exponentially with a cumulative dis-
tribution function Prob{xij < x} = 1− e−x/β and a probability density func-
tion f (x) = (1/β)e−x/β. Accordingly, the minimum total cost for depositing
abroad, θj ≡ mink 6=j[τkj + xkj], has the cumulative distribution function

















where Λkj(x) = 1 if x ≥ τkj and Λkj(x) = 0 if x < τkj. Furthermore, the chance
that country i∗ is the most favorite depositing country, conditional on θj is:




It is worthwhile to spell out this conditional probability. Given the minimum
total cost for depositing abroad θj, there is an equal chance of being the fa-
vorite depositing country for all countries (indexed by k) that exhibit a restric-
tive information exchange policy with respect to country j such that τkj ≤ θj.
Countries with a higher intensity of information exchange, such that τkj > θj,
have of course no chance of being the favorite depositing country. The equal
probability to locate deposits in a certain country conditional on θj facilitates
integration across all potential values of θj.
The above expressions will now be used in deriving the following equations:
average private net-of-all-cost income, average bank profits per household,
and average tax revenue per household.
















[xki + τki]) i, k ∈M (6.16)
This can be rewritten more succinctly as






i, k ∈ M (6.17)
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Irrespective of the location of a household’s deposits, it will earn a return of r,
of which the bank will cut out a profit rate of δ. The last term is a house-
hold’s average cost of taxation and transaction costs associated with tax eva-
sion. Depending on the random vector of transaction costs, there is either a
most favorite foreign country with sufficiently low transaction costs and infor-
mation exchange policy, or the deposits are kept in the home country and the
domestic tax t applies. Using the property22 that for any nonnegative random
variable X, E[X] =
∫ ∞
0 Prob{X > x} dx, equation (6.17) transforms into







[xki + τki]] > y
}
dy i, k ∈ M (6.18)
which is equivalent to








0 dy i, k ∈ M (6.19)
For example, if i = 3 and τ1i ≤ τ2i ≤ t ≤ τki for all k > 3, then Ii can be written
as
















Banks in country i receive deposits from residents and non-residents, yield-
ing average bank profits




xij + τij = θj < t
}
j ∈ M \ {i} (6.21)











xij + τij = min
k 6=j
[xkj + τkj] | min
k 6=j






[xkj + τkj] < t
} )
i, j, k ∈ M (6.22)



































xij + τij = min
k 6=j
[xkj + τkj] | min
k 6=j






dy i, j, k ∈ M (6.23)
where Λji is an indicator function such that Λji(y) = 0 if y < τji and Λji(y) = 1
if y ≥ τji. Solving the first integral and eliminating the probability term in the
second integral then gives













dy i, j, k ∈ M (6.24)
where Λij and Λkj are indicator functions such that Λij(y) = 0 if y < τij and
Λij(y) = 1 if y ≥ τij, and Λkj(y) = 0 if y < τkj and Λkj(y) = 1 if y ≥ τkj. This
can be further simplified to:









min[1, e−(y−τkj)/β]dy i, j, k ∈ M (6.25)
Country i’s average tax revenue per household is given by
E[Ti] = t Prob(θi > t) + ∑
j 6=i
τjiProb(xji + τji = θi < t) i, j ∈ M (6.26)












xji + τji = min
k 6=i
[xki + τki] | min
k 6=i






[xki + τki] < t
} )
i, j, k ∈ M (6.27)
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Using the probability density function of the second probability in the integral,















xji + τji = min
k 6=i
[xki + τki] | min
k 6=i






dy i, j, k ∈ M (6.28)
where Λki is an indicator function such that Λki(y) = 0 if y < τki and Λki(y) =
1 if y ≥ τki. Solving the first integral and substituting the probability term in
the second integral then gives














dy i, j, k ∈ M (6.29)
which further simplifies to










min[1, e−(y−τki)/β]dy i, j, k ∈ M (6.30)
Each government is interested in maximizing the average social surplus, Si,
consisting of average household private income, average bank profits per house-
hold, and average tax revenue per household as follows
Si ≡ E[Ii] + E[Pi] + ρE[Ti] (6.31)
where ρ ≥ 1 is the marginal cost of public funds from an alternative source of
government revenue. Due to the law of large numbers, the expected values
will be very close to the actual observed averages if the number of households
is sufficiently large. Hence, a government’s attitude to risk does not play a
role.
6.A.2 Proof of Proposition 6.1
For every country i ∈ M, having no information exchange at all — such that
τij = 0 for all j 6= i and j ∈ M — is the strictly dominant strategy over all
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other strategies with τij ≥ 0 for all j 6= i and τij > 0 for at least one j ∈ M.
Let τi be the vector of order m − 1 containing the different variables τij. Let
the vector τK of order (m − 1)2 indicate the information exchange policy of
the remaining countries. It consists of the (m − 1)2 variables τkj ≥ 0, for all
k, j ∈ M and k 6= j and k 6= i. For the proof it is sufficient to show that for all
i ∈ M:
Si(τi = 0, τK) > Si(τi 6= 0, τK) (6.32)
⇔ Pi(τi = 0, τK) > Pi(τi 6= 0, τK) (6.33)






















































And the last inequality holds because the integrands on the left-hand side of
the inequality are larger or equal to the respective integrands on the right-
hand side because min[1, e−
y−τkj−τij
β ] ≥ min[1, e−
y−τkj
β ]. Furthermore, all inte-
grands are strictly larger than zero and the integrals on the left-hand side have
a larger upper limit t + τij than the right-hand side integrals for at least one
j ∈ M. This shows that the left-hand side is strictly larger than the right-hand
side. ¤
6.A.3 Proof of Proposition 6.3
The coalition maximizes the aggregate social surplus of members SK = ∑kεC Sk.
Consider ∂SK∂τij , where i ∈ C and j ∈ N. If τij > t, then
∂SK
∂τij
= 0. If τij < t, then
the relevant part of SK — a summand in the equation describing bank profits
— whose derivative with respect to τij is not equal to zero, can be written as:



























where Chigh is the set of countries such that k ∈ C and τkj > τij and t ≥ τkj.
The set Clow is the set of countries such that k ∈ C and τkj ≤ τij. The latter
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set is never empty, because it always contains at least country i. Taking the




































The summands in the first and the last row can be collected in one integral and
the summands in the middle row cancel each other out such that the deriva-


















where Λ is an indicator function such that Λkj(τkj, y) = 0 if y < τkj and
Λkj(τkj, y) = 1 if y ≥ τkj. The second term contains Prob{minl 6=j[xl j + τl j >
τij]} = ∏l 6=j min[1, e−
τij−τl j
β ], which is the probability that the minimum cost of
tax evasion for a household from country j is larger than τij. This probability























The derivative is strictly smaller than zero because the integrand of the sec-
ond term is at least as large as the integrand of the first term over the whole
integration domain, reflecting ∑lεM\{j} Λl j(τl j, y) ≥ ∑kεC Λkj(τkj, y). Further-
more, the integrands are strictly larger than zero and the second integral has
no upper limit on its domain as the first term has. Hence, ∂SK∂τij < 0 for τij < t.
For τij > t, the derivative is zero. For τij = t, SK is not differentiable. (As
τij converges to t from below, the first derivative is strictly negative and does
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not converge to zero.) SK is a continuous function, so the information on the
derivative is sufficient to conclude that SK(τij = 0) > SK(τij > 0). Hence,
τij = 0 is a strictly dominant strategy. ¤
6.A.4 Payoffs as a Function of First-Stage Results
If there is information exchange between the coalition countries, but not be-
tween any other pair of countries, then private net-of-all-cost income for a
coalition member i ∈ C as a function of the number of non-cooperating coun-
tries n is derived from equation (6.19) in Appendix 6.A.1 by substituting τij =
0 for all {i, j} such that i or j ∈ N and substituting τij = t for all {i, j} such that









if n > 0
r− δ− t if n = 0
(6.40)
Similarly, a coalition member’s bank profit is derived from equation (6.25) in
Appendix 6.A.1 as











And a coalition member’s tax revenue is derived from equation (6.30) in Ap-
pendix 6.A.1 as
TC∗i (n) = te
−n tβ (6.42)
A coalition member’s total payoff is then
SC∗i (n) = I
C∗
i (n) + P
C∗
i (n) + ρT
C∗
i (n) (6.43)





r− δ− βn +
(
δ + ρt + βn
)




if n > 0




if n = 0
(6.44)
The function is twice continuously differentiable for all n ∈ [0, m− 1].
The respective payoff functions can also be stated for the countries i ∈ N
that have chosen not to cooperate in the first stage. Their payoffs are
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TN∗i (n) = te
−(m−1) tβ (6.47)
Their total payoff is given by
SN∗i (n) = I
N
i (n) + P
N
i (n) + ρT
N
i (n) (6.48)
which can be rewritten as




















The function is twice continuously differentiable for all n ∈ [0, m − 1]. The
values in the domain n ∈ (m− 1, m) are not of any interest because SN∗(m−
1) = SN∗(m) always holds. The second-stage equilibrium is the same if no
country or only one country decides to cooperate in the first stage. In either
case, there is no meaningful coalition that could exchange information.
If there is no information exchange between the coalition countries, then
the payoff for all countries — cooperating or not — is found by substituting
τij = 0 for all {ij} in equations (6.19), (6.25), and (6.30) in Appendix 6.A.1.
Then private net-of-all-cost income, bank profits, and tax revenues are


















Social surplus is then:











6.A.5 Proof of Proposition 6.4
The proposition is true if it can be proven that SC∗(0)− So > 0 for all possible
parameter values δ ≥ 0, ρ ≥ 1, t > 0, β > 0 and m ≥ 3.
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Proof: For all x 6= 0, it holds that ex − 1 > x. Due to t > 0 and m− 1 > 0,
this is equivalent to:
e(m−1)
t
β − 1 > (m− 1) t
β
(6.54)


























− t > 0 (6.57)
⇔ SC∗(0)− So > 0 (6.58)
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6.A.6 Proof of Proposition 6.5
A coalition of size c = m− n decides to exchange information if SC∗(n)− So >
0. The specific form of this decision function is
SC∗(n)− So =
(














− ρte−(m−1) tβ (6.59)
Proposition 6.4 has already proven that SC∗(0)−So > 0. Furthermore, SC∗(m−
1)− So = 0 because one ‘cooperating’ country exchanging information exclu-
sively with itself and m − 1 non-cooperating countries that do not exchange
any information are equivalent to the situation, in which a coalition — irre-
spective of its size — decides against information exchange. In both cases
there is no information exchange between any pair of countries. The first,
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Following conditions have to be proven: SC∗(n− 1) > SC∗(n) and SC∗(n−
1)− SC∗(n) > SC∗(n)− SC∗(n + 1) if SC∗(n) > 0.
Proof: For the grand coalition SC∗(0)− So > 0, whereas without any cooper-
ation SC∗(m− 1)− So = 0. It will be proven that there is no interior maximum
for the function SC∗(n)− So and at most one interior minimum. If there is no
minimum then the function SC∗(n)− So is strictly decreasing and strictly con-
vex (which would prove the proposition). If there is a minimum at some point
nmin, then SC∗(nmin)− So < 0 and the function SC∗(n)− So is strictly decreas-
ing and strictly convex for all n ∈ [0, nmin]. Furthermore, SC∗(n)− So ≤ 0 for
all n ∈ [nmin, m− 1] (which again proves the proposition).
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= (t/β)2(δ + ρt− 1
3
t) > 0 (6.66)
Furthermore, ∂
2SC∗(n)
∂n2 ≤ 0 ⇒
∂3SC∗(n)
∂n3 > 0 for all n such that n(t/b) + t/(δ +























































































∂n2 ≤ 0 for any n̂ such that n(t/b) + t/(δ + ρt) < 3, then by
the continuity of the second and third derivative ∂
2SC∗(n)
∂n2 < 0 for all n < n̂
which contradicts limn→0
∂2SC∗(n)
∂n2 > 0. Hence,
∂2SC∗(n)
∂n2 > 0 for all n such





∂n ≤ 0 ⇒ ∂
2SC∗(n)
∂n2 > 0 for all n such that 2 < n(t/b) +



























































This proves that there can be no interior maximum for all n such that 2 <
n(t/b) + t/(δ + ρt). In conjunction with the fact that there is no interior max-
imum for all n such that n(t/b) + t/(δ + ρt) < 3, this excludes the existence
of any interior maximum for all n ∈ (0, m− 1). If this is the case, then there
exists at most one interior minimum.
If an interior minimum does not exist, then SC∗(n)− So must monotonically
decrease over the whole domain of n ∈ [0, m − 1] (as SC∗(0) > So). In fact,
the second derivative is strictly positive on the domain n such that n(t/b) +
t/(δ + ρt) < 3 and on the domain n such that 2 < n(t/b) + t/(δ + ρt),
∂SC∗(n)
∂n ≤ 0 implies ∂
2SC∗(n)
∂n2 > 0. Therefore, the second derivative is strictly
positive on the whole domain. The function SC∗(n)− So is strictly convex.
If an interior minimum at nmin does exist, then SC∗(n)− So < 0 for all n ∈
[nmin, m− 1) and SC∗(n)− So must decrease monotonically for all n ∈ [0, nmin].
In fact, ∂
2SC∗(n)
∂n2 > 0 for all n ∈ [0, nmin] because the second derivative is
strictly positive on the domain n such that n(t/b) + t/(δ + ρt) < 3 and on the
domain n such that 2 < n(t/b) + t/(δ + ρt), ∂S
C∗(n)
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SAMENVATTING (SUMMARY IN DUTCH)
Dit proefschrift, met als titel Belastingconcurrentie en belastingontduiking in een
gedecentraliseerde wereld, onderzoekt hoe de structuur van multinationale bedri-
jven door het belastingbeleid van landen wordt vormgegeven. Tevens verkent
deze dissertatie hoe de overheid belasting op kapitaalinkomsten van indi-
viduen zou kunnen heffen in een globaliserende wereld waarbij het voor indi-
viduen eenvoudiger wordt hun rente-inkomsten buiten het gezichtsveld van
hun eigen belastingdienst te houden.
Diverse studies hebben aangetoond dat buitenlandse directe investeringen
door lage belastingtarieven worden aangetrokken. Het is gebruikelijk om be-
lasting op deze investeringen te heffen via het bronlandbeginsel, dat kapi-
taalinkomen belast in het land waar dat wordt gegenereerd. In een dergelijk
systeem zullen afzonderlijke landen met elkaar concurreren ten aanzien van
de belastingtarieven; zij zullen elkaar onderbieden in een race to the bottom
om buitenlandse ondernemingen aan te trekken en te behouden. Dit proef-
schrift bouwt voort op deze inzichten en toont empirisch aan dat ook de or-
ganisatiestructuur van multinationale ondernemingen door de internationale
belastingwetgeving wordt beïnvloed. Bij grensoverschrijdende fusies en over-
names is het fiscaal aantrekkelijk om het hoofdkantoor in het land te vestigen
dat een laag belastingtarief heft op in het buitenland gerealiseerde bedrijf-
swinsten. Dit blijkt uit een econometrische analyse van de drijfveren van
grensoverschrijdende fusies en overnames gebruikmakend van data op bedri-
jfsniveau. Ditzelfde verschijnsel kan ook vanuit een macro-economisch per-
spectief worden bestudeerd door gebruik te maken van een empirisch zwaar-
tekrachtmodel gebaseerd op data voor het totale aantal grensoverschrijdende
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fusies en overnames per landenpaar. De analyse toont aan dat een lager bin-
nenlands tarief van de winstbelasting resulteert in een groter aantal over-
names door buitenlandse bedrijven. Deze bedrijven zijn uiteraard alleen af-
komstig uit die landen die dit lagere belastingtarief op hun beurt niet neu-
traliseren door een hoger tarief te heffen over de uit het buitenland gerepa-
trieerde winsten. Ondernemingen met een hoofdkantoor in een land zonder
dubbele belasting op internationale winsten genieten dus een voordeel bij het
overnemen van (delen van) andere ondernemingen.
Vervolgens rijst de vraag hoe een overheid de voorziening van collectieve
goederen en diensten alsmede de doelstelling van inkomensherverdeling nog
kan realiseren als multinationale ondernemingen — vanwege de mogelijkheid
om economische activiteiten reëel of virtueel tussen landen heen en weer te
schuiven — niet direct belast kunnen worden. Hogere belastingtarieven op
het arbeidsinkomen of op de particuliere consumptie zijn in principe mogelijk,
maar pakken ongetwijfeld electoraal slecht uit. Een hoger tarief van de con-
sumptiebelasting maakt de inkomensverdeling van een land waarschijnlijk
veel minder gelijk. De Organisatie voor Economische Samenwerking en On-
twikkeling (OESO) pleit er dan ook voor om belasting op het kapitaalinkomen
van huishoudens te heffen op basis van het woonlandbeginsel, waarbij een in-
gezetene wordt belast op zijn wereldwijde inkomen in het thuisland. Dit sys-
teem zou de maatschappelijke welvaart kunnen verhogen in vergelijking met
een systeem gebaseerd op het bronlandbeginsel, aangezien individuen min-
der geneigd zijn vanwege fiscale redenen van domicilie te veranderen dan
ondernemingen (waardoor de belasting minder verstorend zal zijn).
Er doet zich evenwel een praktisch probleem voor bij het naleven van het
woonlandbeginsel. Zoals het recente schandaal rondom belastingontduiking
in Liechtenstein duidelijk heeft gemaakt, ondervinden belastingautoriteiten
grote problemen om belastinginformatie te vergaren over het buitenlands ver-
mogen van ingezetenen. Uiteindelijk heeft de binnenlandse belastingautoriteit
alleen soevereiniteit ten aanzien van belastingheffing en informatieverwerv-
ing binnen de eigen landsgrenzen. Hierdoor hebben individuele belasting-
plichtigen echter weinig tot geen prikkels om rente-inkomsten uit het buiten-
land te rapporteren. Dit probleem zou kunnen worden opgelost door uitwis-
seling van belastinginformatie tussen nationale belastingautoriteiten. Indien
een belastingverdrag wordt afgesloten, is dit kosteloos mogelijk. Onder welke
omstandigheden zullen landen bereid zijn informatie uit te wisselen? In the-
orie is vrijwillige uitwisseling van informatie tussen twee landen mogelijk als
de nationale overheid relatief veel waarde toekent aan belastinginkomsten, in-
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gezetenen veel financieel kapitaal in het buitenland aanhouden ten opzichte
van hun binnenlandse beleggingen en het binnenlandse marginale tarief van
de inkomstenbelasting hoog genoeg is om een prikkel tot belastingontduik-
ing te vormen. Aan de hand van een empirische analyse voor Nederland (uit-
gaande van informatie ontvangen van partnerlanden) wordt aangetoond dat
de genoemde factoren ook in de praktijk een rol spelen. Op één punt falen
de geponeerde hypothesen echter. Een land zou minder belang bij informatie-
uitwisseling hebben als een binnenlandse bronbelasting wordt geheven op het
kapitaalinkomen van niet-ingezetenen. Informatieverschaffing zal namelijk
belastingontduikende buitenlandse spaarders afschrikken, hetgeen een nega-
tief effect heeft op de opbrengsten van de bronbelasting geheven op rente-
inkomsten van deze groep. Waarschijnlijk kan het uitblijven van empirisch
bewijs voor de bovenstaande hypothese worden verklaard doordat theoretis-
che modellen uitgaan van een hypothetische wereld met slechts twee landen.
Ingezetenen die de belasting willen ontduiken hebben in dat geval maar één
keuze om hun kapitaal buiten het gezichtsveld van hun eigen belastingdienst
te houden. Een land kan dan een bronbelasting heffen op buitenlands kapitaal
zoals een monopolist prijzen zet.
De bestaande theorie schiet dus tekort betreffende het modeleren van de
strategische interactie tussen belastingautoriteiten. Daarom wordt in dit proef-
schrift, als laatste stap, een analytisch model ontwikkeld waarin meerdere lan-
den op het gebied van de informatie-uitwisseling interageren. Uit het model
blijkt dat de maatschappelijk optimale uitkomsten alleen door een multilat-
erale aanpak kunnen worden gerealiseerd. Bilaterale belastingverdragen zijn
echter de usance op het gebied van informatie-uitwisseling, terwijl een mul-
tilaterale aanpak gebruikelijk is bij internationale handels- en milieuverdra-
gen. Verder toont het model aan dat factoren, zoals een grotere kapitaalmo-
biliteit, die conform de intuïtie nadelig voor de uitwisseling van informatie
zou moeten zijn, juist een samenwerking tussen alle landen in de hand kan
werken.
